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Digital evidence has become a central feature of the investigation and trial of sexual offences. Messages, photographs, videos, call records, location data and surveillance footage can identify the accused, fix time and place, corroborate the survivor and reveal conduct before and after the offence. At the same time, electronic records can be altered, fabricated or misunderstood, and their use in sexual offence cases raises concerns of privacy, dignity and fair trial that do not arise in the same way in other prosecutions. This study examines the admissibility of digital evidence in sexual offences under Indian law. It analyses the constitutional protections under Articles 14, 20(3) and 21, the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, the Information Technology Act, 2000, the intermediary rules and selected international instruments. It traces the judicial development of the certificate requirement from Navjot Sandhu to Anvar P.V. and Arjun Panditrao Khotkar, and considers how the new statutory scheme may operate in practice. The study highlights the importance of a survivor-centred and rights-respecting approach. It identifies practical difficulties in authenticating electronic records, preserving them, protecting intimate material and obtaining timely forensic support. It recommends clearer procedure for the certificate, standard protocols for collection and storage, stronger forensic capacity, early preservation by platforms and telecom operators, and training of police, prosecutors and judges. The study concludes that reliable digital evidence and the dignity of survivors can be secured together through careful procedure and sensitive implementation. KEYWORDS Digital Evidence, Electronic Records, Admissibility, Sexual Offences, Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, Section 63 Certificate, Chain of Custody, Survivor Dignity, Fair Trial, Cyber Forensics.

The legal status of transgender persons in India has moved from invisibility and criminal stigma to constitutional acknowledgement, and, most recently, to a contested statutory redefinition. In 2014 the Supreme Court recognised gender identity as part of dignity, autonomy and equality, and affirmed that a person may determine their own gender without being required to undergo surgery. The Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 gave this recognition a statutory form, although an imperfect one. In March 2026 Parliament passed an amendment that narrows who counts as a transgender person, removes the statutory right to self-perceived gender identity, and routes certification through a medical board and the District Magistrate, while at the same time introducing harsher penalties for forced identity, abduction and bonded labour. This study examines the constitutional foundations, statutory design and judicial history of transgender recognition, evaluates the 2026 Amendment against the principles of equality, dignity, privacy and autonomy, identifies gaps in implementation, and proposes reforms aimed at reconciling protection against exploitation with the right of every person to be recognised as they are. Keywords: Transgender Rights, Legal Gender Recognition, Self-Identification, NALSA, Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019, 2026 Amendment, Medical Certification, Article 21, Dignity and Privacy.

When domestic violence is discussed, the legal and social discourse traditionally prioritizes visible physical battery, severe bodily harm, or criminal force. However, for millions of women across diverse socio-economic strata, the most pervasive and paralyzing form of domestic subordination involves no physical violence at all. Economic abuse operates as a systematic, structural mechanism of coercion that strips women of financial autonomy, prevents access to economic resources, and traps them in abusive domestic settings through financial captivity. This research paper presents a comprehensive legal and empirical analysis of the scope, statutory interpretation, and judicial application of "economic abuse" under Section 3(iv) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (PWDVA). The author examines how the PWDVA broke away from traditional penal remedies by codifying financial deprivation, control over shared resources, and alienation of stridhan as distinct civil wrongs. By synthesizing landmark Supreme Court rulings including Rajnesh v. Neha, Prabha Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi, and Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja alongside comparative frameworks from the UK, Australia, and the US, this paper evaluates the systemic barriers in proving economic abuse. Furthermore, a novel Three-Tier Judicial Evaluation Matrix is introduced to assist Magistrates in evaluating hidden assets, preventing procedural delays, and executing monetary reliefs effectively. Keywords: Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005; Section 3(iv); Economic Abuse; Financial Coercion; Stridhan; Monetary Relief; Rajnesh v. Neha; Prabha Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi; Shared Household

The pursuit of gender justice is fundamentally a human rights concern because equality, dignity, liberty, participation and freedom from discrimination belong to every person. A human rights approach does not treat gender justice merely as a question of welfare, protection or social policy; it treats women and persons of diverse gender identities as rights-holders and States and institutions as duty-bearers. This approach requires attention not only to formal equality before law but also to substantive equality, access to justice, effective remedies and the removal of structural barriers that prevent individuals from enjoying rights on an equal basis. The international human rights framework provides a strong foundation for gender justice. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms equality in dignity and rights and prohibits discrimination, while the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) requires States to pursue the elimination of discrimination against women and to ensure practical realization of equality. The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action further placed women's human rights and gender equality at the centre of global policy. Contemporary human-rights approaches increasingly emphasize that justice requires transformation of discriminatory institutions, social norms and practices rather than merely extending identical legal rules to everyone. In India, the Constitution provides the principal normative foundation through the guarantees of equality, non-discrimination, life and personal liberty, freedom and constitutional remedies. Articles 14, 15, 16 and 21, read with the Directive Principles and fundamental duties, provide a framework for advancing gender equality. Judicial decisions have developed these guarantees in areas including sexual harassment, reproductive autonomy, workplace equality, privacy, dignity, marriage, property and protection against gender stereotypes. Statutory measures such as the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace Act, 2013, and laws addressing trafficking, child marriage and other forms of gender-based harm supplement the constitutional framework. The present study critically examines whether the human rights approach is capable of producing substantive gender justice in India. It evaluates the principles of dignity, equality, non-discrimination, autonomy, participation, accountability and access to effective remedies. It also examines the gap between rights formally guaranteed and rights actually enjoyed, with particular attention to structural discrimination, violence, economic inequality, political under-representation, digital harms and intersectional disadvantage. The study argues that gender justice requires a shift from a purely protective model towards a rights-based, survivor-centred and transformative model in which institutions are accountable for preventing discrimination and ensuring meaningful access to justice.

The Non-Banking Financial Company (NBFC) sector plays a significant role in India's financial system by providing credit, facilitating investments and supporting financial inclusion. However, the growing size and interconnectedness of certain NBFCs have raised important questions concerning regulatory jurisdiction and financial stability. The regulatory framework governing NBFCs in India involves two principal authorities: the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), which primarily regulates their financial activities, prudential standards and systemic stability, and the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), which regulates securities markets, disclosure requirements and investor protection. The jurisdictional overlap becomes particularly significant in the case of systemically important NBFCs, especially those classified under the Upper Layer of the RBI's Scale Based Regulation framework. These entities may raise funds through Commercial Papers (CPs), Non-Convertible Debentures (NCDs) and other market instruments while simultaneously undertaking lending, borrowing and asset-management activities regulated by the RBI. Consequently, a single financial institution may be subject to different regulatory priorities depending on the nature of its activities. This research examines the legal and institutional boundaries between RBI and SEBI in regulating systemic NBFCs. It analyses the statutory framework, the regulation of money-market and capital-market instruments, the consequences of financial distress and the challenges arising from fragmented regulatory supervision. It argues that although the two regulators exercise legally distinct powers, inadequate coordination can create regulatory gaps, compliance burdens and uncertainty during financial crises. The paper proposes a coordinated regulatory framework based on information-sharing, supervisory cooperation, clear allocation of responsibilities and an integrated crisis-resolution mechanism.

According to the 2024 report by the National Crime Records Bureau , the undertrial population stood at 72.6% out of the total of 5,11,542 inmates in prisons across India. Despite the existence of the provisions in the constitution that ensure presumption of innocence and speedy trial, the country has been unable to jail the undertrial prisoners because there is a statutory limit on detention since 2005 being ignored. The present paper seeks to discuss the reasons behind the continuance of practice of undertrial detention and tries to analyse if Section 479 of BNSS succeeds in improving on Section 436A of the CrPC. The methodology followed is doctrinal where different provisions of laws, statutes, judgments of the Supreme Court, and reports published have been reviewed. The findings indicate that failure lies in implementation of laws. The research argues that Section 479 seeks to shift responsibility onto the jail authorities, which however only results in creation of more exceptions, and just 627 undertrials got released under it as of the year 2024.

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The recognition of daughters as coparceners under Hindu law represents a significant legislative and constitutional development in the movement towards substantive gender equality in property rights. Traditionally, under the Mitakshara school of Hindu law, coparcenary membership was confined to male descendants, leaving daughters outside the core body of coparceners despite their membership in the wider joint Hindu family. The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 substituted Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and conferred upon a daughter the status of a coparcener by birth, with the same rights and liabilities as a son. This paper examines the historical position, the statutory framework introduced in 2005, and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the amended provision, particularly in Prakash v. Phulavati, Danamma v. Amar and the authoritative three-Judge Bench decision in Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma. It analyses the temporal operation of the amendment, the relevance of the father’s survival on 9 September 2005, the protection of completed transactions, the meaning of partition, and the distinction between coparcenary property and a father’s separate or self-acquired property. The paper adopts a doctrinal method based on primary legislation and judicial precedent. It argues that Section 6 has transformed the formal legal status of daughters, but that effective equality depends upon accurate identification of property, accessible remedies, reliable records and the practical enforcement of shares. The paper concludes that the 2005 reform must be understood as a measure of equal ownership and equal responsibility, rather than as a limited succession benefit.

Sexual harassment at work is a wrong done to one woman and, at the same time, a failure of the institution that employs her. How a legal system divides responsibility between the harasser and the employer, who has to prove what, and what a complainant can realistically recover decides whether a statute works on the shop floor or only on paper. This paper examines the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act 2013 (the POSH Act) in comparison with Title VII of the US Civil Rights Act 1964, the UK Equality Act 2010 and the equal treatment directives of the European Union, with Directive 2006/54/EC at the centre. The comparison is built around three questions: when is the employer liable, how is the burden of proof allocated, and what remedies are open to the complainant. The paper argues that the POSH Act is a compliance-driven, committee-based scheme which penalises an employer chiefly for failing to put machinery in place, whereas Title VII and the Equality Act hold the employer answerable for what happens inside the workplace and excuse it only where it has acted in time. The POSH Act is also silent on the burden of proof and gives the complainant no direct claim against the employer. The paper closes with reform suggestions suited to the Indian setting.

The Indian law is faced with the necessity to distinguish between formal non-citizenship, disputed nationality, documentary exclusion and legal statelessness in citizenship administration. This Article will explore that distinction by analysing the constitutional scheme of Articles 5-11 of the Constitution, the Citizenship Act 1955, the Citizenship (Amendment) Act 2019, the Assam National Register of Citizens and the statutory framework for a National Register of Indian Citizens (NRIC) and the current foreigner law. It uses a doctrinal approach, Supreme Court decisions, official records, scholarship, and International Human Rights instruments to support its approach. The analysis reveals that the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 and citizenship verification systems are two distinct legal mechanisms and hence, should not be examined as a single legal programme. It also determines that the lack of inclusion in a citizenship register is, in and of itself, not a testament to statelessness, but that gaps in documentation and adjudication can nevertheless lead to a nationality limbo and to statelessness. Material evidentiary bases, the principle of procedural fairness and judicial review have gained new relevance in the context of nationality disputes recently, with the constitutional challenge against the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 still pending. International standards provide binding guarantees in some human rights treaties and provide persuasive guidelines in conventions to which India is not a party related to statelessness. In it, the author suggests the technical adoption of an "individual determination" constitutional statelessness prevention framework that is accompanied by a reasoned process, effective review, child-sensitive protections, and a separate determination of whether another State recognises the individual as its national.