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Technology has changed the way people work and the way employers monitor their employees. Employers may use CCTV cameras, screen-recording software, keystroke tracking, biometric attendance systems, location tracking and artificial intelligence (AI) to supervise work. These methods can help protect confidential information and organise work, but they can also affect employee privacy, dignity and fairness. This paper examines whether digital workplace surveillance is compatible with employee rights under Indian law. It uses doctrinal legal research to analyse Article 21 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court’s privacy jurisprudence, the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, relevant labour legislation and selected principles from the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation. The paper argues that the main issue is not whether employers should be allowed to monitor work, but whether monitoring is necessary, proportionate, transparent and used fairly. It proposes a practical framework based on purpose-specific monitoring, data minimisation, clear notice, limited retention, human review of consequential decisions and a meaningful process for employees to challenge inaccurate records. It also explains that the DPDP Act has a phased commencement schedule, meaning that its substantive provisions must not be treated as already operative merely because the Act has been enacted. The paper concludes that India should develop clearer workplace-surveillance standards that protect employees without preventing legitimate management and security measures.

Marital rape is one of the most contested questions in contemporary criminal law, constitutional jurisprudence and gender justice. It refers to non-consensual sexual intercourse or sexual acts committed by a spouse against the other. In India, the principal controversy arises from the marital rape exception, which excludes certain sexual acts by a husband with his wife from the definition of rape where the wife is not below eighteen years of age. Although Indian law recognises several forms of domestic violence and cruelty within marriage, the general offence of rape does not currently apply to non-consensual sexual intercourse between an adult husband and wife in the same way as it applies outside marriage. The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), in force from 1 July 2024, retained this exception in Section 63, Exception 2. Its continuation raises questions concerning equality before law, bodily autonomy, dignity, privacy and the constitutional protection of women. Decisions such as Independent Thought v. Union of India, RIT Foundation v. Union of India and Hrishikesh Sahoo v. State of Karnataka have shaped the debate, although they do not amount to a final Supreme Court ruling invalidating the exception for adult wives. This paper examines the meaning and historical development of marital rape, the applicable statutory provisions, constitutional arguments, leading judicial decisions, comparative approaches and possible reforms. It adopts a doctrinal methodology and argues that any reform should place consent and bodily autonomy at its centre while preserving due process, fair investigation and the presumption of innocence.

This paper examines the tension between community-based customs and constitutional rights through the example of khap panchayats in northern India. These informal caste and clan councils do not have authority under Indian law, but some have continued to influence decisions about marriage and relationships. Their opposition to marriages that cross caste, gotra or village boundaries has, in some cases, contributed to threats, social exclusion and violence. The paper considers the historical background of khaps, the legal meaning of custom, and the protection given to an adult’s choice of partner under the Constitution. It focuses particularly on the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the Special Marriage Act, 1954, and decisions such as Lata Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M. and Shakti Vahini v. Union of India. The central argument is that an adult’s choice of a life partner is protected by constitutional guarantees of liberty, dignity and privacy. Community disapproval cannot lawfully replace that choice. The continuing problem is the gap between legal principles and their implementation. Police inaction, weak protection systems, the public-notice procedure under the Special Marriage Act and deep-rooted social inequalities can leave couples exposed to pressure. The paper concludes with suggestions for stronger legislation, better policing, safer marriage procedures and wider social awareness.

An ex parte decree is a decree made against a person who was not present. The Code of Civil Procedure 1908 gives that person ways to undo the decision. This paper outlines the law on when a court can proceed without one party and on the options that follow: an application under Order IX Rule 13, an appeal under Section 96(2), review under Order XLVII, and, in rare cases, a suit on fraud. It argues that the courts have decided a plan. The appeal and the Rule 13 application are options that can be used together; the Explanation to Rule 13 stops the application once an appeal is decided on any reason other than withdrawal; and revision under Section 115 is not allowed against a refusal because an appeal is available under Order XLIII Rule 1(d). Supreme Court decisions up to April 2026 maintain a strict standard of good reason and reject strict arguments about delays. The paper ends with suggestions for changes in service of notices, delays and the reach of the Explanation.

As the gig economy has grown, India's job market has changed with flexible jobs being offered through digital platforms. Food delivery and e-commerce logistics are now important parts of the economy. These platforms offer employment opportunities but female delivery workers may have to face several challenges related to gender discrimination, safety at the workplace, irregular income, absence of social security, absence of basic facilities and challenge of balancing work and family responsibilities. The nature of platform-based work also raises questions about the legal status of gig workers and the degree to which they are covered by existing labour laws. The study is focused on the working conditions and labour protection of women delivering goods in India. It looks at barriers related to gender, safety, access to social welfare, awareness of employment rights and effectiveness of grievance procedures. The research employs a socio-legal methodology. Primary data were collected by means of a structured questionnaire, while secondary data were obtained from legislation, scholarly articles, reports and other relevant publications. This research aims primarily at identifying the gaps in existing safeguards and suggesting recommendations to improve the working environment, legal protection and social security of women delivery workers. It seeks to catalyze the development of a more inclusive and gender sensitive framework for platform work in India.

Indian family law has long assumed that intimate life begins with marriage. Yet many couples live together without marrying, and courts have had to decide what rights they and their children should have. This paper traces how Indian courts moved from explaining cohabitation away through the presumption of marriage to accepting it as a lawful choice that deserves some protection. It examines the constitutional foundations of that shift, including Articles 14, 19 and 21, the statutory hooks that allow relief, notably the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and the maintenance provisions of the criminal procedure code, and the position of children. It then compares the approaches of England and Wales, Scotland and Australia and considers the registration regime introduced in Uttarakhand. The paper argues that Indian law protects partners according to how closely a relationship resembles marriage and not according to need, dependence and care, producing uneven outcomes. It concludes that legislation built on vulnerability and contribution, with strong privacy safeguards, is preferable to continued judicial improvisation.

Privacy is more than the ability to keep information secret. It gives people room to make personal choices, develop relationships, express opinions and live with dignity without unnecessary observation or interference. In India, the Supreme Court’s decision in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India (2017) recognised privacy as a fundamental right and provided a constitutional foundation for responding to new forms of surveillance and data collection. Since then, digital technologies have made the question more urgent: personal information may be gathered through phones, websites, identity systems, financial services and public platforms, often at a scale that ordinary users cannot easily understand or control. This paper traces the development of privacy in Indian constitutional law, explains the importance of the Puttaswamy judgment, and considers the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, and the Digital Personal Data Protection Rules, 2025. It discusses consent, government surveillance, data security, automated profiling and unequal access to remedies. It argues that effective privacy protection must be measured not only by the existence of laws, but by whether people can understand their choices, challenge misuse and obtain fair treatment. A humane digital future requires innovation to be accompanied by responsibility, proportionality and respect for every person's dignity.

Indian law has a strange relationship with the marital home. For most of its history it has treated that space as too private for the state to enter when a wife complains of sexual violence, and as public enough for the state to enter when a husband complains of her infidelity or her absence. This paper asks what the constitutional recognition of privacy in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) has changed, and what it has left untouched. It reads the privacy and autonomy cases of the last decade (Puttaswamy, Navtej Singh Johar, Joseph Shine, Independent Thought, Shafin Jahan and others) alongside four long-standing sites of regulation: restitution of conjugal rights, the marital rape exception, adultery and its civil consequences, and the evidentiary exposure of spouses. The paper argues that the law's central difficulty is not too much regulation or too little, but regulation that protects the institution of marriage at the expense of the individuals who make it up. Drawing on liberal, feminist and relational accounts of autonomy, it proposes a workable test for the legitimate limits of state intervention in intimate life: the law may protect persons within relationships from coercion and harm, but it may not enforce the relationship itself, police its moral content, or presume consent from its mere existence.

The rapid and dynamic growth of the gig economy has created a lot of new opportunities through digital platforms, particularly in food deliver, grocery delivery, and other e-commerce services. Although app-based delivery offers flexibility and opportunities to earn an income, workers may face challenges relating to road safety, income benefit, and other social security benefits. The recognition of gig and platform workers under the code on social security 2020.marks an important development in Indian labour. However, the availability of a legal framework does not necessarily ensure that workers are aware of their rights or if easy access is available to them. The study seeks to identify the possible gap between the legal recognition of gig and platform workers and the practical accessibility of social security benefits.it also aims to suggest measures to improve awareness. Simplify the process of registration and strengthen the support for the gig workers. By examining both legal framework and respondent’s experiences, the research aims to contribute to the discussion on making social security protection more accessible effective for workers in India’s growing platform economy.

When a marriage is challenged years after the wedding, the person who suffers most is rarely the one who challenges it. This paper asks how Indian courts should decide whether a Hindu marriage was validly solemnized when the seven steps (Saptapadi) are disputed or absent. I argue that Section 7 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 makes Saptapadi conditionally essential, that the real burden in these cases is proving custom, and that courts have not developed a consistent method for doing so. I propose a three-question approach: whose custom applies, whether its essential rites were substantially performed, and what the parties' conduct shows. The paper also considers who bears the human cost of rigid formalism, and how courts can protect genuine spouses and children without opening the door to false claims.