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White Black Legal – International Law Journal · ISSN 2581-8503
THE ACCOUNTABILITY DEFICIT IN INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: EXECUTIVE DOMINANCE, JUDICIAL DEFERENCE AND THE EROSION OF PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY
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Abstract
THE ACCOUNTABILITY DEFICIT
IN INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: EXECUTIVE DOMINANCE, JUDICIAL DEFERENCE AND THE EROSION OF PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY
AUTHORED BY - ANISHA MAAN
Amity law school, Noida
Abstract
India’s constitutional design
envisages a Parliament that holds
the government to account howev-er the growing gap has separated the constitution from the legislative
practises making them par-allel lines next to intersect again. the fundamental component of Indias
constitutional system is parliamentary accountability closely connected with
the principles of constitutionalism, separa-tion of powers, responsible
government and rule of law, parliament is not merely a law making institution: it is a constitutional mechanism
for controlling and holding the executive accountable. A system has been established by the constitution of india by
which the executive is formally ac-countable to the legislature, particularly
through article 75{3} 164 {2} making
ministers collec-tively responsible to the elected house but overly dominant
executive , reinforced by party disci-pline under the Tenth Schedule, has
reduced that answerability to a formality.the mere existence of constitutional
responsibility does not necessarily ensure it’s effective exercise. This
paper aims to trace the governments control of the legislative agenda
manifesting in reduced sitting days, bills passed with minimal debate, lesser
references to standing committees It examines the disruption and suspension of
Question Hour, historically the most direct means of interrogating ministers,
and the weakening of adjournment motions and short-duration discussions, the
paper aims at shedding light to critically analyse the legislative and
constitutional mechanisms. Under articles 118, 105 and further investigate the
relevant provisions.
Ultimately, the
strength of the indian democracy is vested not merely in constitutional powers, but in parliament’s ability to transform
that power into meaningful scrutiny deliberation and ac-countability.
Keywords:-
Parliamentary
accountability, executive dominance, constitutional law, legislative scrutiny,
sepa-ration of powers.
Table of Contents
·
Introduction
·
Research Objectives, Research Questions,
and Methodology
·
Conceptual Framework: What Is the
Accountability Gap?
·
Constitutional Foundations of
Parliamentary Accountability
·
The Anatomy of Decline
5.1
Fewer sitting days, thinner debate
5.2
Question Hour and the other instruments of scrutiny
5.3
Committees bypassed
5.4
Ordinances
5.5
The Money Bill route
5.6
The Tenth Schedule and the disciplined legislator
5.7
Suspensions and the management of dissent
·
The Judicial Response
·
Comparative Perspectives: United Kingdom
and South Africa
·
Towards Reform
·
Conclusion
·
Bibliography
Introduction:-
The framers did not
simply drift into a system. The framers chose it fully aware of the alterna-tives.
During the Constituent Assembly
Dr B.R. Ambedkar defended the Westminster model because he believed that an executive that is
examined every day by the legislature is better than one that is only examined
at elections even if daily examination makes stability a little smaller[1].
The Supreme Court
accepted this view on. In Ram Jawaya Kapur it said that the Indian executive is
modeled after the cabinet and is answerable to the legislature[2],
and in Shamsher Singh it ruled that the President and Governors follow the
advice of the Council of Ministers[3].
The problem is that the
written rule about accountability and the way it is practiced have drifted
apart. Article 75(3) says that the Council of Ministers is jointly responsible
to the House of the People. Responsibility only exists if the tools that
support it are strong: enough time for debate questions that must be answered
committees that can look at a Bill before it becomes law and members who can
vote against the government without losing their seats. All of these tools have become
weaker. This paper
begins with a simple observation. The fall of scrutiny in India usually does not show up as one unconstitutional act. The fall of scrutiny
is the sum of small choices each that can be defended on its own: a
shortened session a Bill declared a Money Bill, an ordinance made while
Parliament is closed or a suspension for disorder. Courts are made to look at
one act at a time. Courts are not good, at looking at acts together. That
mismatch is what the paper calls the accountability gap.
The empirical evidence
is now well established. The Lok Sabha from 2019 to 2024 met for days compared
to previous Lok Sabhas. It also referred a smaller portion of Bills, to
committees than earlier Lok Sabhas had done[4].
The sections that follow examine whether these numbers point to an issue and
not just a political one.
Research
objectives
1.
To find out the
rules and traditions in the constitution that make the executive responsible to Parliament.
2.
To record
the ways and methods that have led to checking
by Parliament.
3.
To look at how the decisions by the Supreme
Court, about ordinances, the Tenth Schedule, Money Bills and privilege have
limited the power of the executive.
4.
To learn from the United Kingdom
and South Africa.
5.
To suggest
changes that can be made without changing
the constitution if
possible.
Research
questions
1.
What
constitutional provisions establish parliamentary accountability and
legislative con-trol over the executive in India?
2.
How does executive
dominance affect legislative scrutiny, parliamentary committees and financial
accountability?
3.
What principles have Indian courts
developed concerning legislative procedure, parlia-mentary
privilege and constitutional accountability?
4.
What institutional and procedural reforms
can strengthen parliamentary scrutiny while
preserving effective governance?
RESEARCH
METHODOLOGY
This research follows
an analytical research methodology. Primary sources include the Constitu-tion
of India parliamentary rules of procedure, legislation and judicial decisions
of the Supreme Court and High Courts. Secondary sources include writings, parliamentary
research reports and institutional publications.
The research uses legal
analysis to examine how constitutional text, judicial interpretation and
parliamentary practice relate to one another. Parliamentary statistics are used
to show how much legislative scrutiny occurs. The paper does not see committee
referral or limited debate, as auto-matic proof that something is
unconstitutional; instead it looks at what those situations mean for
deliberative democracy and responsible government.
The study mainly looks
at the Union Parliament. Its conclusions may also matter for State
Legis-latures. It recognises that parliamentary procedure, constitutional
validity and political account-ability are questions that need different legal
and institutional answers.
Conceptual Framework: What Is the Accountability Gap:-
Walter Bagehot
described the constitution as giving Parliament many duties that go beyond
mak-ing laws[5].
These duties are to choose and keep a government in power to educate the people
to show the peoples opinion and to inform the people by revealing how the
government acts. Only the last duty is relevant to us. In a system the main
role of the legislature is not to draft laws be-cause the majority party has
most of the power to make laws. Instead the legislature compels ministers to
explain and justify their actions before the public and ministers risk losing
the confi-dence of the legislature if they cannot.
The paper defines the
term "accountability gap" as the space between the duty and the
actual per-formance of the institutions. Three parts can be identified. The
first part is answerability, which's the duty to provide information and
explanations. The second part is enforceability, which's the power of
Parliament to impose consequences. The third part is independence, which's the
free-dom of members and committees to examine matters without facing punishment
from their own party. A gap can appear in any of the three parts.
Questions may be. Then avoided,
which is a gap in answerability. Committee recommendations may be ignored,
which is a gap in enforceability. A member may not be able to vote according to
conscience without risking disqualification, which's a gap in independence.
The literature on
separation of powers is useful, for this discussion. Ackerman has argued that the traditional trio of legislature,
executive and judiciary conceals the fact that modern governance relies on a
group of integrity institutions and that parliamentary systems concentrate
power in the hands of the majority party. This is precisely the weakness found
in India. When the executive holds the majority the legislatures oversight
function relies on rules and conventions that the ex-ecutive can shape
Constitutional Foundations of Parliamentary Accountability
The Constitution provides the foundations in scattered provisions of one single clause.
Article 75(3) makes the Council of Ministers collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha and Article 164(2) does the same for State Councils of Ministers and Legislative
Assemblies. Article 85 re-quires that no than six months pass
between the last sitting of one session and the first sitting of the next.
Articles 105 and 194 guarantee freedom of speech in the legislatures so that
members can question and criticise
without fear of action. Article 118
allows each House to make its rules of procedure, which is where Question Hour,
adjournment motions and committees actually live[6] There are three observations to make. First the Constitution sets a minimal
floor. The Constitu-tion says nothing about how days Parliament must sit, whether
Question Hour must be held or
whether Bills must go to committees. All
of that sits in rules and practice which the presiding of-ficers and the government of the day control. Second the Constitution assigns discretion to offi-cers who are in practice drawn
from the ruling
party, namely the Speaker and the Chairman. Third the Supreme Court has
recognised democracy and parliamentary government as part of the structure[7] but the basic structure doctrine addresses the validity of constitutional amendments and fundamental features. The Supreme Court
has seldom been used to measure the day-, to-day quality of scrutiny.
This helps to explain why the gap
has been able to widen. The
Constitutional text secures the ex-istence of accountability mechanisms. Leaves
their intensity to politics.
The Anatomy of
Decline
Fewer sitting days, thinner debate
Parliament cannot
scrutinise a government it rarely meets to examine. The National Commission to
Review the Working of the Constitution recommended in 2002 that Lok Sabha
should sit for least 120 days a year and Rajya Sabha for at least 100 days. The
practice has fallen well short. PRS data shows that 15th Lok Sabha sat for 357 days across its term 16th for about 331 days and 17th for about 274 days[8].
Since a full term is five years the recent average is 55 days a year nowhere,
near the recommended minimum.
I feel Parliament is
missing its role. Sitting days does not merely compress the calendar. It
changes how legislation is made. When
the Business Advisory Committee, on
which government commands a majority, allots time a Bill may receive a few
hours of debate. In September 2020 the
three farm laws passed Rajya Sabha by voice vote amid protests while opposition
members demanded a division[9].
Whatever the person thinks of the merits of those laws the manner of pas-sage
illustrates the point: a major measure affecting a part of the population
cleared a House of Parliament without a recorded vote.
Members business offers
a further sign. No members Bill has become law since 1970 so the one channel
through which backbenchers can set the agenda has effectively closed.
Question
Hour and the other instruments of scrutiny
Question Hour is the
way for the government to be held responsible.
A minister has to answer a
question that a member has asked in advance and more questions
can be asked to test the answer. This is also the easiest way for
the government to avoid responsibility. It happens at a time and if the meeting
gets interrupted this part is the first to be lost. When meetings are stopped
again and again during the hour questions are sometimes only answered in
writing if at all. This takes away
the chance for questions, which makes the whole process weaker.
In the Monsoon Session
of 2020 Question Hour was not held all. The reason given was that the pandemic
needed a schedule. Members from the opposition said that checking how the
govern-ment handled the pandemic was exactly what was needed[10].
The Winter Session that year was canceled too. These choices were made because of health concerns. Were not clearly against the
law.. They showed that Question Hour
only continues if the people in charge and the government want it to.
Other ways of holding
the government responsible have not worked better. Motions to stop the meeting
for issues under Rule 56 of the Lok Sabha rules are usually not accepted.
Discussions that last a time under
Rule 193 and notices to bring attention to something under
Rule 197 depend on the Speaker’s choice to include
them[11]. The
same problem happens again and again. A method meant to make the government
answer for its actions is controlled by people from the party, as the government.
Committees bypassed
The departmental
related standing committees, created in 1993 were meant to give Parliament a
special, cross-party, non-adversarial way to examine Bills and budgets. I
believe committees work best when
Bills are sent to them before debate begins. The data shows a drop in that
prac-tice. PRS reports that 71 per cent of Bills introduced in the 15th Lok
Sabha were sent to commit-tees compared with about 60 per cent in the 14th
about 25 per cent in the 16th and about 16 per cent in the 17th[12].
Sending a Bill to a committee is not mandatory. It depends on the decision of
the Speaker or the Chairman after talking with the government. The Supreme
Court has recog-nised the value of committee reports in Kalpana Mehta, where it
held that parliamentary commit-tee reports can be used in court as aids to
interpretation without breaking privilege[13].
That deci-sion confirms the reliability of committee work. Does not force
Parliament to use committees. The gap therefore lies between respect for
committees in principle and their marginalisation, in practice.
Ordinances
Article 123 lets the
President issue an ordinance when Parliament is not sitting and "immediate
action" is needed. This
ordinance must be sent to Parliament. Will
end six weeks after Parliament meets again unless it gets approved before then.
The power was designed for emergencies.
The Supreme
Court has been watching closely
for misuse. In the case of D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar the Court strongly criticized the
habit of issuing the same ordinance over and over without letting the
legislature look at it. The Governor of Bihar had done this times over many
years. In Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar a bigger bench of judges said
that re-promulgating an or-dinance without Parliament’s approval is cheating
the Constitution and breaking the lawmaking process[14].
The Court has mostly
stayed out of whether the "immediate action" part is really true in
each case. It treats the President’s
or Governor’s decision as a call not one for the courts to check. This is clear in cases where an ordinance
is used to undo a court’s decision. In May 2023 a Constitu-tion Bench in
Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India[15] said
the Delhi government has power over services, in the Capital with some
exceptions. Within days the Union government passed an ordinance to bring back
control. Later Parliament turned that into a law.
You don’t have to pick
a side in the argument to see what’s happening. The pattern shows: the
ordinance power can be used to respond to an unfavorable court ruling. Before
Parliament even gets a chance to talk about it.
The Money
Bill route
Article 110 defines a
Money Bill in a narrow way. It says a Money Bill can only include provi-sions
that deal with financial matters listed in the article. Article 109 says the Rajya Sabha cannot block a Money Bill. It
can only suggest changes. The Lok Sabha does not have to accept these
suggestions. Under Article 110(3) the Speaker of the Lok Sabha has the say when
certifying a Bill as a Money Bill.
This means the Speaker’s decision cannot be challenged in court.
The idea behind this
system was to make sure the lower house, which is directly elected has con-trol over taxes and spending. It was meant to protect
the elected representatives from being blocked by the house on financial
matters.. This system can be misused. When a government does not have a majority in the Rajya Sabha it may classify a
Bill that has far-reaching effects as a
Money Bill. This allows the government to avoid scrutiny from the house and
skip any amend-ments proposed there.
This issue
came into focus
during the Aadhaar
case. The Aadhaar
(Targeted Delivery of Financial
and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act 2016 was certified as a Money
Bill. The Rajya Sabha made some recommendations. The Lok Sabha rejected them.
The Supreme Court had to decide if this certification was valid.
In the case of K.S.
Puttaswamy v. Union of India the majority said the certification was correct
because the main purpose of the Act was to deliver subsidies from the
Consolidated Fund.. Jus-tice Chandrachud disagreed. He said the Act had provisions that went beyond the
scope of Article
110. He called the
certification a fraud on the Constitution. He argued that it was used to avoid
the Rajya Sabha, which's a vital part of the law-making process[16].
Later in Rojer Mathew
v. South India Bank Ltd. a Constitution Bench questioned how the courts should review
the Speaker’s certification. The bench said the issue
was too important to be decid-ed by a group of judges. So it
referred the question to a larger bench[17]. As of now this issue has not been
resolved. So there is still a constitutional uncertainty. Governments still
have a strong reason to use this route because it helps them pass laws faster
without facing opposition, in the Rajya Sabha.
The Tenth Schedule
and the disciplined legislator
The Tenth Schedule,
added by the Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act 1985 disqualifies a member
who voluntarily gives
up party membership or votes against
a party whip.
the main aim was to stop defection. However the
side effect was that every member became a vote that had to be delivered. In
Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu the Supreme Court upheld the Schedule against
challenge but held that the Speaker when deciding disqualification acts as a tribunal and the Speakers decision is subject
to judicial review[18].
The Supreme Court struck down paragraph 7 which sought to remove that
jurisdiction because paragraph 7 had not been ratified by the States. The Tenth
Schedule has a consequence for accountability. I notice that a member
who votes against the
government on a confidence or money motion risks losing the seat. Because of
that risk the incentive to scrutinise
ministers of the party that the member belongs to becomes weak. The only
meaningful opposition comes from the opposition across the aisle and the
government majority can outvote
that opposition. The 91st Amendment closed the exception for splits in 2003
making cross-party defections harder. The 91st
Amendment did not touch the party whip.
The enforcement design
is also in tension with the logic of accountability. I see that
disqualifica-tion petitions go to the Speaker and the Speaker usually belongs
to the party that benefits from the
decision. In Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Hon'ble Speaker, Manipur Legislative
Assem-bly the Supreme Court observed that this arrangement invites delay urged
Parliament to consider a permanent independent tribunal and directed that the
Speaker decide petitions within three months absent exceptional circumstances[19].
In Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra the Supreme Court
again examined the Speakers powers
in a charged dispute, over a
split party[20].
The cases show the Supreme Court seeking incremental correction, not structural
change.
Suspensions and the management of dissent
The presiding officers
can suspend members for conduct. When used proportionately this power protects
the House. When used at scale this power removes the opposition. Lets the
government pass Bills without resistance. After
eight Rajya Sabha members were suspended following disor-der over the farm
Bills in September 2020. Again in
December 2023 when more than a hundred and forty members of the two Houses were suspended
in one session several important
Bills, in cluding the criminal law reform Bills were passed with very
small opposition benches[21].
The point is not that every suspension was unfair. The point is that there are no standard tests, for
pro-portionality and that the Houses own procedures let the matter fall to
those who benefit.
The Judicial Response
The Court's record is
mixed, and its mixed quality has a pattern. Where
an abuse is egregious and formally visible, as with the serial re-promulgation
of ordinances, the Court intervenes. Where the
abuse is a matter of degree, it defers, invoking either parliamentary privilege
or the internal affairs of the House.
The privilege cases
explain the deference. Article 122
provides that the validity of parliamentary proceedings cannot be questioned on
the ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure. In Raja Ram Pal v. Hon'ble Speaker,
Lok Sabha, a Constitution Bench held that the Court may review the
exercise of privilege, such as the expulsion of members, but only for
constitutional violations and gross illegality, not for ordinary procedural
irregularity[22].
That is a sensible rule for protecting legislative autonomy. It also means that
the gradual narrowing of Question Hour or committee referral falls outside
review, because the claim is not that the House broke a rule but that it used
its discretion badly.
The following table summarises the principal decisions discussed.
|
Case
|
Issue
|
Holding in brief
|
Effect on scrutiny
|
|
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)
|
Limits on amendment
|
Basic
structure cannot be amended
|
Foundation for democra-cy as
a protected feature
|
|
D.C. Wadhwa
v. State of Bihar (1987)
|
Re-promulga-tion of ordi-nances
|
Practice condemned as
subverting legislative power
|
Strong,
but confined to extreme abuse
|
|
Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992)
|
Tenth Schedule
|
Upheld;
Speaker's decision reviewable
|
Preserves whip disci-pline
|
|
Raja Ram
Pal v. Speaker
(2007)
|
Parliamentary
privilege
|
Reviewable for illegality,
not irregularity
|
Limits
review of House procedure
|
|
Krishna Kumar
Singh v. State of Bihar (2017)
|
Ordinance re-promulgation
|
Fraud
on the Constitution
|
Strengthens Article 123 limits
|
|
Kalpana Mehta
v. Union of India (2018)
|
Committee re-ports in court
|
Usable
as aids to interpre-tation
|
Confirms committee au-thority,
no duty to refer
|
|
K.S. Puttaswamy (Aad-haar) (2019)
|
Money
Bill cer-tification
|
Certification upheld by majority; dissent critical
|
Leaves
the route open
|
|
Rojer Mathew
v. South India Bank Ltd.
(2019)
|
Money
Bill cer-tification
|
Majority approach doubt-ed;
referred
|
Unresolved
|
|
Keisham Meghachandra
Singh v. Speaker (2020)
|
Disqualification
delay
|
Three-month time limit for Speakers
|
Incremental correction
|
Two features of this
record stand out. First every effective intervention focuses on the form of
legislation. For example intervention asks whether an ordinance was used
properly or a Bill was certified properly. Intervention does not focus on the
quality of scrutiny that happened before. Second the Court often points out a
problem but then refuses to provide a structural remedy. In-stead the Court
wants Parliament to act. That is institutionally understandable. The problem
re-mains with the body that mainly benefits from intervention.
Comparative Perspectives: United Kingdom
and South Africa United Kingdom
I find the United
Kingdom useful for two reasons. The
United Kingdom is the source of the mod-el that India adopted and the United
Kingdoms system shows how much of Westminster
account-ability depends on convention. Prime
Ministers Questions, the departmental select
committees set up in 1979 and
the Liaison Committees review of the Prime Minister are all products of
practice, not law.. This practice has proven sturdier than Indias partly
because select committee chairs are elected by the House and not chosen by the
whips, which gives them a level of independence. The United Kingdom
also demonstrates how law can protect scrutiny
when convention fails.
In R (Miller) v. The Prime Minister, the Supreme Court held that the prorogation of Parliament for five
weeks was unlawful because it frustrated Parliaments ability to perform its
functions of legislat-ing and holding
the government to account without
reasonable justification[23].This reasoning iden-tifies accountability as a constitutional principle that limits
a otherwise broad
executive power. As for
Money Bills, the Parliament Act 1911
provides for the Speakers certificate. Defines a Money Bill by reference, to a
closed list and limits the delaying power of the House of Lords which makes the
category narrow and rarely controversial[24].
South Africa:-
Section 55(2) of the
South African Constitution says the
National Assembly must set up ways to
make sure all executive bodies answer to it. It must also keep an eye on how
executive power's used. In the case of Economic Freedom Fighters v. Speaker of
the National Assembly[25] the
Con-stitutional Court said the Assembly had not done its job when it came to
holding the President accountable over the Nkandla issue. The reason- It did
not act on the steps ordered by the Public Protector. This case shows that
courts in South Africa treat oversight as a duty that must be fol-lowed not
just something that is hoped for in politics.
The lesson for India is
not that India should copy the African
wording. It is that when a constitu-tional duty is written in terms of obligation courts
have a basis to enforce
it. In contrast the Indian Constitution talks about
responsibility. It does not demand any particular process. That difference matters. It means the
Indian system leaves room for interpretation while South Africa’s approach gives courts a role, in requiring action.
Towards Reform
First,
a minimum number of sitting days. The
NCRWC recommended 120 days for the Lok Sabha and 100 for the Rajya Sabha.[32]
This could be given effect through the Houses' rules, or through a statute or
constitutional amendment if a binding standard is wanted. The point is to
re-move the executive's discretion to shorten sessions.
Second,
protected Question Hour. The
rules could provide that when Question Hour is lost to disruption, oral
questions carry over to the next sitting, and that a minister who fails to
answer within a fixed
period must make a statement to the House.
A guaranteed weekly
slot for questions to the Prime Minister, as in
the UK, would add a visible form of accountability at the top.
Third,
presumptive committee referral. Rather
than leaving referral to discretion, the rules could require referral of every
Bill unless the presiding officer records written reasons for ur-gency. A written reason is itself a form of accountability, because it can be debated
and contested. Fourth, tighter limits on ordinances and Money Bill certification. Ordinance-making could be
linked to a reasoned statement of urgency laid with the ordinance, and to a
rule that an ordinance cannot reverse a judicial decision within a fixed
period. For Money Bills, the larger bench con-templated in Rojer Mathew should settle that certification is reviewable on the
ground that the Bill goes beyond Article 110(1), and Parliament might
require the Speaker to give reasons.
These reforms share one
design principle. They convert discretionary choices into rule-bound ones, so
that departing from the norm requires a recorded reason. This approach has a
practical advantage: it does not depend on the unlikely event of a government
voluntarily surrendering power, because the change can begin with parliamentary
rules and the practice of the presiding officers, which a public and judicial
audience can monitor.
Conclusion:-
The main point of this
paper can be explained in three sentences. Parliamentary accountability in
India has been reduced not by any mistake but by the buildup of power that the
executive and the offices it manages have gained. The courts have watched over
cases like repeatedly using ordi-nances but they have not taken action on
everyday issues like the decrease in Question Hour be-cause the rules about
rights and the way the constitution is written stop them from doing that. A lasting solution therefore needs rules
that control that power and the courts need to check if those rules are broken.
The idea that was first
mentioned is mostly correct. At the time the proof has some limits. The numbers
that were talked about are not the evidence and a full study would need more
detailed analysis of the Rajya Sabha, state legislatures and the quality of
debates not just how many de-bates there are. These are areas for research.
The people who created
the constitution cared more about responsibility than, about stability. Whether
that idea still fits the constitution depends on whether Parliaments own rules
and the courts that watch over them keep the constitution alive.
Bibliography
Constitutional and statutory materials
·
Constitution of India 1950, arts. 75, 85, 105, 109, 110, 118, 122, 123, 164, 194; Tenth
Schedule.
·
Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act 1985.
·
Constitution (Ninety-first Amendment) Act 2003.
·
Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and
Services) Act 2016.
·
Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa 1996, s. 55(2).
·
Parliament Act 1911 (UK).
·
Rules of Procedure and Conduct
of Business in Lok Sabha, rr. 56, 193, 197. Reports and other sources
·
Constituent Assembly Debates,
vol. VII (4 November 1948).
·
National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, Report (2002).
·
PRS Legislative Research, Vital Stats:
Functioning of the 17th Lok Sabha (2024), and ear-lier
equivalent reports on the 14th to 16th Lok Sabhas.
·
Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha records and bulletins, Monsoon
Session 2020 and Winter
Session
2023.
[7] Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225; Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975 Supp SCC 1.
[16] K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union
of India (Aadhaar), (2019) 1 SCC 1; see also Aadhaar
(Targeted De-livery of
Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016, No. 18, Acts
of Par-liament, 2016 (India).
How to Cite This Article
ANISHA MAAN, THE ACCOUNTABILITY DEFICIT IN INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: EXECUTIVE DOMINANCE, JUDICIAL DEFERENCE AND THE EROSION OF PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY., White Black Legal – International Law Journal, ISSN: 2581-8503, Vol. Volume 4, Issue VOLUME 4 ISSUE 2, October 2026, pp. 1477-1493. Available at: https://www.whiteblacklegal.co.in/details/the-accountability-deficit-in-indian-constitutional-law-executive-dominance-judicial-deference-and-the-erosion-of-parliamentary-scrutiny-by-anisha-maan
Author & Publication Record
Authors: ANISHA MAAN
Registration ID: 107222 | Published Paper ID: WBL7222
Year: Oct- 2026 | Volume: 4 | Issue: 2
Approved ISSN: 2581-8503 | Country: Delhi, India
Page No.: 1477-1493
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