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White Black Legal – International Law Journal · ISSN 2581-8503
Nyāya Logic and Judicial Reasoning: Applying the Five-Member Syllogism to Indian Judicial Decisions
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Abstract
NYĀYA
LOGIC AND JUDICIAL REASONING: APPLYING THE FIVE-MEMBER SYLLOGISM TO INDIAN
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
AUTHORED BY - VELUGUBANTLA
UMIKA
ABSTRACT
This
paper examines whether the classical Nyāya five-member inference can provide a
useful analytical framework for understanding judicial reasoning in India.
Nyāya presents inference for another person through five members: pratijñā
(proposition), hetu (reason), udāharaṇa (example or statement of concomitance),
upanaya (application), and nigamana (conclusion). The five-member form is not
simply a longer Western syllogism. Its importance lies in making visible the
movement from a disputed claim, through a reason and a publicly intelligible
basis for that reason, to application of the basis to the facts and finally to
a conclusion. Indian judgments, although not written in Nyāya vocabulary,
frequently perform comparable argumentative operations. Courts identify legal
propositions, state reasons, rely on statute, precedent or evidentiary
principles, apply those materials to facts, and formulate conclusions. The
paper therefore proposes a functional use of the pañcāvayava structure. It
applies the framework to Indian decisions concerning circumstantial evidence,
the duty to give reasons, statutory interpretation and constitutional
proportionality. It concludes that Nyāya offers an indigenous vocabulary for
testing the transparency, coherence and justificatory integrity of judicial
decisions, while recognising that modern adjudication cannot be reduced to a
single syllogistic form.
Keywords: Nyāya; Indian logic;
judicial reasoning; pañcāvayava; pratijñā; hetu; udāharaṇa; upanaya; nigamana;
precedent; legal reasoning; Supreme Court of India.
1. INTRODUCTION
Judicial
decisions are often described as conclusions reached after the application of
law to facts. That description is accurate but incomplete. A judgment is also a
public argument. It must identify what is to be decided, explain why the court
accepts particular propositions, identify the legal or normative principles
that connect those reasons to the issue, apply those principles to the facts
before it, and state the result that follows. The legitimacy of adjudication
therefore depends not only upon the authority of the institution delivering the
decision but also upon the intelligibility of the reasoning through which the
decision is justified. The Supreme Court of India has repeatedly treated
reasons as a necessary link between the materials considered and the
conclusions reached. A reasoned decision enables the parties to understand why
they have won or lost and permits an appellate or reviewing court to determine
whether the decision rests upon a rational and legally permissible basis.[1]
This
concern with the structure of reasoning creates an opportunity to revisit
classical Indian logic as a resource for contemporary legal theory. The Nyāya
school developed a sophisticated account of knowledge, inference, debate and
rational justification. Its theory of inference (anumāna) distinguishes
inference for oneself from inference articulated for another. The latter,
parārthānumāna, is conventionally expressed through five members or avayavas:
pratijñā, hetu, udāharaṇa, upanaya and nigamana.[2]
The familiar example is the inference that a hill has fire because it has
smoke: the proposition identifies what is to be proved; the reason identifies
smoke as the inferential mark; the example articulates the relevant
concomitance between smoke and fire; the application connects that general
relation to the hill; and the conclusion restates the proposition as
established.[3]
The
central claim of this paper is not that Indian judges consciously employ Nyāya
syllogisms, nor that every judgment can be reduced to five propositions. Such a
claim would be historically and analytically overstated. Rather, the
pañcāvayava structure can be used as a functional model for reading judicial
reasoning. It can expose gaps that are sometimes concealed by the rhetorical
form of judgments: an asserted conclusion without a sufficiently articulated
reason; a reason that is not supported by an adequate legal rule or precedent;
a legal principle stated at a high level of abstraction but never properly
connected to the facts; or a conclusion that is stronger than the premises
actually establish.[4]
2. NYĀYA INFERENCE AND THE
PAÑCĀVAYAVA STRUCTURE
Nyāya
is ordinarily introduced as one of the classical systems of Indian philosophy,
but its treatment of reasoning is more than a catalogue of logical forms. Its
central concern is the production of valid cognition and the conditions under
which an inference can legitimately establish a conclusion. Inference is linked
to the notion of vyāpti, an invariable or sufficiently established concomitance
between the inferential reason and the property to be proved. In the standard
example, smoke is a reason for inferring fire because smoke is understood to be
pervaded by fire in the relevant circumstances. The hill is the pakṣa, the
subject under consideration; fire is the sādhya, the property to be
established; and smoke is the hetu, the reason or inferential mark.[5]
The
five-member form is expressly associated with inference presented for the
purpose of convincing another person. The Nyāya Sūtra identifies the members as
thesis, reason, example, application and conclusion.[6]
Their sequence is significant. The pratijñā states the disputed proposition.
The hetu identifies the feature of the case that is said to support the
proposition. The udāharaṇa supplies the relevant general relation and an
illustrative instance. The upanaya states that the case under consideration
possesses the relevant feature in the manner contemplated by the rule. The
nigamana then confirms the proposition as the conclusion of the inferential
process.[7]
The
apparent redundancy of the first and fifth members has sometimes encouraged
comparison with shorter Western syllogisms. That comparison can be useful, but
it should not obscure the dialogical character of the Nyāya structure. The
five-member form makes the inferential path explicit to an interlocutor.
Jonardon Ganeri's account of Indian logic as case-based reasoning is especially
helpful here: the example is not merely decorative but performs an epistemic
and communicative function, because reasoning is situated within a context in
which participants must have access to sufficiently shared information.[8]
Bimal Krishna Matilal similarly emphasised that Indian logical traditions
cannot be adequately understood by reducing them to abstract formal validity;
debate, challenge, counterexample and the conditions of rational communication
are integral to the tradition.[9]
The
five members can therefore be understood as five argumentative tasks rather
than five isolated sentences. Pratijñā fixes the question. Hetu identifies the
basis on which the answer is proposed. Udāharaṇa makes explicit the general
relation that renders the reason probative. Upanaya establishes that the
present case falls within that relation. Nigamana states the result. This
structure makes it possible to ask, at each stage, a distinct question of justification.
The
Nyāya tradition also provides a sophisticated account of defective reasons, or
hetvābhāsas. A reason may fail because it is not established in the subject,
because it is inconsistent with the proposition, because an equally strong
contrary reason exists, or because the purported relation between reason and
conclusion is not properly established.[10]
For legal reasoning, this is particularly valuable. A court may possess a fact
that is genuinely proved but still draw an impermissible inference from it. The
existence of a fact and the sufficiency of that fact as a legal reason are not
identical questions.
Nyāya
also resists the idea that inference is merely formal manipulation. The quality
of an argument depends upon the epistemic status of its premises and the
relation between them. In this respect, it can illuminate judicial reasoning
more effectively than a simple major-premise/minor-premise/conclusion model. A
judicial judgment rarely consists only of formal deduction. It combines
evidence, legal propositions, precedent, interpretation and normative
evaluation. The pañcāvayava framework can nevertheless isolate each inferential
movement and ask whether the court has adequately justified it.
3. FROM PAÑCĀVAYAVA TO JUDICIAL
REASONING
The
first step in applying Nyāya to judicial decisions is to avoid a literal
equation between the five-member syllogism and a judgment. A judgment may
contain dozens of propositions and multiple chains of reasoning. The
appropriate unit of analysis is therefore the judicial inference: a proposition
that the court seeks to establish from identified legal and factual reasons.
Each such inference can be reconstructed through a functional equivalent of the
five avayavas.
The
pratijñā corresponds to the proposition that the court must establish. In
adjudication, this may be expressed as an answer to the legal issue: a
statutory provision applies to the facts; a constitutional restriction is
disproportionate; a particular item of evidence is sufficient; or a particular
interpretation is legally preferable. The discipline of identifying the
pratijñā requires the court to distinguish the actual issue from surrounding
observations. It also helps prevent a judgment from moving imperceptibly from a
broad proposition to a narrower conclusion.
The
hetu corresponds to the reasons offered for accepting the proposition. These
reasons may be statutory language, precedent, constitutional principle,
evidence, institutional practice or a combination of these. The important point
is that the reason must have a rational and legal connection with the
proposition. A judgment is not adequately reasoned merely because it contains
authorities or facts. The court must explain what work those authorities or
facts perform.
The
udāharaṇa is the most difficult member to translate into modern judicial
practice because legal judgments do not ordinarily announce universal
concomitance through empirical examples. Its functional equivalent, however,
can be identified in at least three forms. First, it may be a controlling
precedent that demonstrates how a legal principle operates in a comparable
situation. Secondly, it may be a statutory or doctrinal proposition whose
operation is illustrated through prior decisions. Thirdly, in evidentiary
reasoning it may take the form of an established inferential regularity, such
as the principle that a particular circumstance, when combined with other
circumstances, may support a conclusion. The purpose is not simply to provide
an example but to make the bridge between the reason and the proposition
publicly intelligible.
The
upanaya is the application stage. It asks whether the facts of the case
actually possess the characteristics contemplated by the legal rule, precedent
or inferential principle relied upon. This is where judicial reasoning most
visibly becomes adjudication. A judgment can correctly state a legal rule and
correctly describe the evidence yet still fail at the application stage. The
court may say what proportionality requires but not identify the actual burden
imposed by the impugned measure; it may state a rule concerning circumstantial
evidence but not test each circumstance against alternative explanations; or it
may cite a precedent without demonstrating why the present factual situation
falls within the precedent's ratio.[11]
The
nigamana is the conclusion. It should be the conclusion warranted by the
preceding reasoning, rather than a new proposition introduced without support.
The conclusion also performs an institutional function: it tells the parties
what follows from the court's reasoning and defines the operative legal result.
This
reconstruction fits closely with the modern judicial requirement that reasons
provide a rational nexus between materials and conclusions. In Union of India v
Mohan Lal Capoor, the Supreme Court described reasons as the links between the
materials considered and the conclusions reached.[12]
Later decisions have repeatedly treated the giving of reasons as an important
safeguard against arbitrary decision-making and as a means of enabling
effective judicial review.[13]
Read through the Nyāya framework, the requirement is not simply that a judge
write more. It is that the judge make the inferential chain sufficiently
visible.
The
framework can therefore be formulated as five questions for reading a judicial
decision: What exactly is the court claiming? What reason supports the claim?
What legal, precedential or evidentiary basis establishes the connection
between that reason and the claim? How does that connection apply to the facts
before the court? What conclusion follows? The value of these questions is
diagnostic. They can identify argumentative gaps without imposing a foreign
formalism upon Indian adjudication.
This
is also why the Nyāya model should not be treated as equivalent to the
classical Western syllogism. The Aristotelian syllogism is primarily concerned
with formal relations between propositions. Nyāya's inferential theory gives
greater prominence to the conditions under which a reason is probative and to
the communicative presentation of the inference.[14]
Contemporary legal reasoning similarly involves questions of authority,
interpretation and institutional competence that cannot be captured by formal
deduction alone. The contribution of Nyāya is therefore methodological: it
encourages courts and scholars to examine the stages through which a conclusion
is justified.
4. APPLYING THE FIVE MEMBERS TO
INDIAN JUDICIAL DECISIONS
The
usefulness of the framework becomes clearer when it is applied to actual Indian
judicial reasoning. Three areas are particularly revealing: circumstantial
evidence, reasoned decision-making, and constitutional proportionality.
4.1 Circumstantial evidence
Indian
criminal jurisprudence provides a natural setting for analysing inference
because the court frequently moves from established circumstances to a
conclusion concerning guilt. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v State of
Maharashtra, the Supreme Court restated the well-known five principles
governing cases based on circumstantial evidence. The circumstances from which
guilt is inferred must first be fully established; the established facts must
be consistent with guilt; the circumstances must be conclusive; they must
exclude other reasonable hypotheses; and the chain of evidence must be complete
enough to exclude a reasonable basis consistent with innocence.[15]
The
structure can be mapped onto the Nyāya model without claiming that the Court
was using Nyāya. The ultimate pratijñā is the proposition that the accused is
guilty. The hetu consists not of one fact but of the set of circumstances
proved by the prosecution. The udāharaṇa, in functional terms, consists of the
principles governing when such circumstances can legitimately support an
inference of guilt. The upanaya requires the court to determine whether the
particular circumstances in the case satisfy those principles. The nigamana is
the final conclusion of guilt or acquittal.
This
mapping reveals why the Supreme Court insists upon a complete chain. If one
circumstance is proved but the prosecution cannot establish the necessary
inferential relationship between that circumstance and guilt, the hetu is
insufficient. If the facts are consistent with an alternative hypothesis, the
application stage fails because the legal standard for circumstantial inference
has not been satisfied. The celebrated distinction between “may be” and “must
be” guilty is therefore a demand for inferential necessity rather than mere
suspicion.[16]
The
framework also clarifies why a false defence cannot automatically cure a weak
prosecution case. The prosecution's own inferential chain must be established
before an additional circumstance arising from the accused's explanation can be
used. Otherwise, the court risks allowing the conclusion to supply the missing
reason. In Nyāya terms, the argument would be circular: the conclusion would be
used to validate the inferential basis that is supposed to establish the
conclusion.
4.2 The judicial duty to give reasons
The
second field is the general duty to give reasons. Indian public law has
consistently regarded reasons as an important component of fairness,
accountability and judicial review. Kranti Associates Pvt Ltd v Masood Ahmed
Khan synthesised this jurisprudence and emphasised that reasons should disclose
how the decision-maker applied the relevant material and should reveal a
rational nexus between the material considered and the conclusion.[17]
The
Nyāya model sharpens the meaning of this requirement. A judgment may be lengthy
but still fail the pañcāvayava test if its argumentative links are obscured. A
court might list ten precedents without explaining which principle each
precedent establishes; that would provide authorities but not necessarily an
udāharaṇa in the functional sense. Similarly, a judgment might reproduce the
facts at length but never explain why those facts satisfy the legal test; the
upanaya would be deficient.
Conversely,
a concise judgment can be strongly reasoned if each inferential stage is clear.
The objective is not verbosity but traceability. A litigant should be able to
follow the path from proposition to reason, from reason to legal principle,
from principle to facts, and from facts to result.
This
perspective is especially useful in appellate review. When a reviewing court
asks whether a lower court's conclusion is supported by reasons, it can examine
whether the lower court identified the correct proposition, relied upon legally
relevant reasons, applied the governing standard and reached a conclusion that
follows from its analysis. The model thus reinforces rather than competes with
established Indian principles of reasoned adjudication.
4.3 Statutory interpretation
Statutory
interpretation provides a more complicated example because the court's “reason”
may include text, context, precedent, legislative purpose and consequences.
Consider a case in which the court must decide whether a statutory provision
covers a disputed factual situation. The pratijñā may be: “Section X applies to
the present transaction.” The hetu may be the ordinary meaning of the statutory
words together with contextual indicators. The udāharaṇa may be prior judicial
decisions establishing how similar language has been interpreted. The upanaya
then asks whether the present transaction possesses the characteristics
identified in those authorities. The nigamana is the holding that the provision
does or does not apply.
The
analogy exposes a common danger in statutory judgments: treating the citation
of precedent as if it automatically proves the conclusion. A precedent is not
self-applying. The court must explain its ratio and why the current facts fall
within or outside it. The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that
precedents must be understood in their factual and legal context rather than
converted into isolated propositions.[18]
The upanaya stage captures precisely this requirement.
The
model is also capable of accommodating purposive interpretation. Purpose may
form part of the hetu, but it cannot by itself establish the proposition unless
the court explains why the statutory text and interpretive materials support
the purposive reading adopted. Where competing purposes exist, the court must
identify the relevant hierarchy or interpretive principle. Nyāya therefore
encourages the court to distinguish between an asserted purpose and a reason
that legally supports the chosen interpretation.
4.4 Constitutional proportionality
Constitutional
adjudication presents the greatest challenge to a syllogistic model because
rights cases often involve competing values. The proportionality framework
developed in Indian constitutional jurisprudence generally requires attention
to legitimate purpose, suitability or rational connection, necessity and
balancing or proportionality in the strict sense.[19] A
court applying the test does not simply derive one proposition from a universal
rule. It evaluates the relationship between governmental means and
constitutional ends.
Nevertheless,
each stage can still be analysed through the pañcāvayava structure. The
pratijñā identifies the constitutional conclusion—for example, that a
restriction on a fundamental right is justified or invalid. The hetu identifies
the governmental objective, the nature of the restriction and the evidence
relied upon to justify it. The udāharaṇa consists of the constitutional
doctrine and precedents that explain what counts as a legitimate aim, rational
connection, necessity and proportionality. The upanaya applies those criteria
to the actual measure and its effects. The nigamana states whether the
restriction survives constitutional scrutiny.
The
advantage of this reconstruction is that it prevents balancing language from
becoming conclusory. Saying that a measure is “proportionate” is not itself a
reason. The court must identify the burden on the right, the public objective,
the alternatives available and the relationship between the two. Each of these
elements must be supported. The Nyāya model thus works as a discipline against
unexplained normative leaps.
The
same approach can be used in administrative law. A decision-maker may have
statutory power, relevant material and a legitimate objective, but the final
decision may nevertheless be unlawful if the reasoning does not establish the
connection between the material and the exercise of discretion. The Supreme
Court's insistence upon rational nexus and reasoned decision-making can be
understood as a requirement that the inferential bridge be visible to the
person affected and to the reviewing court.[20]
5. THE FIVE-MEMBER TEST AS A METHOD
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
The
preceding analysis suggests that the pañcāvayava structure can be reformulated
as a practical five-member test for analysing Indian judicial decisions. The
test is not proposed as a new legal doctrine that courts must mechanically
apply. It is an analytical framework for evaluating the justificatory quality
of judicial reasoning.
First,
the Pratijñā test asks whether the judgment has clearly identified the
proposition it must establish. Courts frequently decide multiple issues, and
ambiguity about the actual proposition can cause the reasoning to drift. A
well-formed judicial proposition should be sufficiently precise to be tested
against the law and facts.
Secondly,
the Hetu test asks whether the court has identified reasons that genuinely
support the proposition. Reasons must be legally relevant and sufficiently
established. A court cannot transform assertion into reason merely by placing
it after the word “because”. This stage also captures evidentiary sufficiency:
facts relied upon must themselves be established according to the applicable
standard.
Thirdly,
the Udāharaṇa test asks whether the court has adequately disclosed the rule,
precedent, doctrinal principle or inferential regularity that connects the
reason to the proposition. This is the most important contribution of the Nyāya
model to legal reasoning. Judicial conclusions often appear persuasive because
the middle step is silently assumed. The court states a fact, cites a
principle, and moves to a conclusion without explaining the relation between
them. Making the “example” or general relation explicit exposes that hidden
step.
Fourthly,
the Upanaya test asks whether the court has actually applied the governing
principle to the case before it. This requires attention to factual
correspondence. A precedent may establish a general rule, but the present case
may differ materially. A statutory purpose may be legitimate, but the impugned
measure may not actually advance it. Evidence may be individually credible, but
the complete chain may still fail. The application stage therefore prevents
courts from treating abstract doctrine as a substitute for adjudication.
Fifthly,
the Nigamana test asks whether the conclusion follows from the preceding
reasoning and whether the operative order accurately reflects the reasons
given. A judgment may contain sound analysis but formulate a broader conclusion
than the reasoning permits. Conversely, the reasoning may establish a
proposition that the operative order fails to implement. The conclusion must
remain tethered to the premises.
This
five-member test has a further institutional benefit: it makes judicial
disagreement more precise. An appellate court need not simply say that a lower
court's decision is “wrong”. It can identify the precise inferential defect.
The proposition may have been misstated; the evidence may not establish the
reason; the precedent may not support the claimed legal relation; the rule may
have been incorrectly applied; or the conclusion may exceed the reasoning. Such
a vocabulary can improve the quality of appellate review because it
distinguishes disagreement over law from disagreement over fact and from
defects in inferential structure.
The
framework also helps explain the importance of judicial writing style.
Headings, issue-framing, identification of authorities and structured treatment
of evidence are not merely stylistic preferences. They can make the five
inferential stages more visible. A judgment that clearly separates issues,
rules, analysis and conclusions effectively performs some of the communicative
work that the Nyāya form makes explicit.
At
the same time, the test should not become a rigid template. Judicial decisions
may proceed through analogy, counterexample, precedent, interpretation, policy
and constitutional principle. Some propositions are defeasible rather than
universal. A court may also reach a conclusion after comparing competing
principles rather than applying one rule. The pañcāvayava model should
therefore be applied to argumentative units within a judgment, not to the
judgment as a whole as if it were a single syllogism.
6. LIMITS, OBJECTIONS AND COMPARATIVE
VALUE
The
first objection is historical. There is no basis for claiming that modern
Indian courts consciously derive their reasoning from Nyāya. Indian judges
generally work through constitutional text, statutes, precedent and common-law
methods. The presence of structural similarities therefore cannot establish
intellectual continuity. This paper makes no such claim. Its argument is one of
conceptual reconstruction: an indigenous logical tradition can provide a
vocabulary through which modern reasoning can be examined.
The
second objection concerns the word “syllogism”. The five-member Nyāya inference
should not be treated as identical to Aristotle's categorical syllogism.
Comparative scholarship has shown that Indian traditions developed their own
theories of inference, example, concomitance, fallacy and debate.[21]
The pañcāvayava form is embedded in an epistemology and a theory of rational
dialogue that cannot be reduced to formal deduction. Calling it a “syllogism”
is convenient for comparison but can obscure these differences.
The
third objection is that legal reasoning is not always deductive. Judges
routinely interpret ambiguous provisions, choose among competing precedents,
balance constitutional rights and respond to novel factual circumstances. In
these situations, there may be no universal rule that determines the answer.
This objection is persuasive against a mechanical version of the model but not
against the functional version proposed here. Nyāya can be used to interrogate
the individual inferential steps within interpretive and balancing arguments
even when the overall decision is not deductive.
The
fourth objection concerns value judgments. The conclusion in a constitutional
case may depend partly on contestable normative judgments. The five-member
framework cannot prove the correctness of a value choice. It can, however,
require the court to identify the value judgment and show how it is connected
to constitutional text, precedent and institutional principles. Transparency
about the normative premise is itself an important aspect of reasoned
adjudication.
Most
importantly, the framework changes the question from “Is this judgment
persuasive?” to “Where, exactly, does its persuasive force come from?” That is
a more rigorous question. A judicial decision may be authoritative because of
the court that delivered it, but authority does not eliminate the need for
reasons. The constitutional culture of reasoned adjudication requires that
power be exercised through publicly intelligible justification.
7. CONCLUSION
Nyāya's
five-member inference provides a distinctive and useful framework for analysing
judicial reasoning in India. Its value does not lie in claiming that
contemporary courts secretly reproduce an ancient syllogism. Its value lies in
identifying five recurring functions of justification: stating the proposition,
identifying the reason, establishing the relation that makes the reason
probative, applying that relation to the case, and drawing the conclusion.
Indian
judicial decisions already reflect these functions in different forms. The
jurisprudence on circumstantial evidence requires courts to move carefully from
established facts to conclusions of guilt; the duty to give reasons requires a
rational nexus between materials and conclusions; statutory interpretation
requires courts to connect text and precedent to the facts of the case; and
proportionality requires the application of constitutional standards to the
actual burden imposed by state action. The pañcāvayava framework makes the
structure of those movements more visible.
Its
strongest contribution is therefore diagnostic. It can expose a judgment in
which the proposition is unclear, the reason is insufficient, the legal bridge
is assumed rather than explained, the rule is not properly applied, or the
conclusion exceeds what the reasoning establishes. Such a method is compatible
with the Supreme Court's established insistence that reasons are the links
between material and conclusion.
Nyāya
should consequently be treated as an indigenous analytical resource for
contemporary legal reasoning. It does not replace precedent, statutory
interpretation, constitutional doctrine or modern theories of justification.
Rather, it offers a disciplined way of asking whether judicial conclusions have
been adequately earned by the reasons that precede them. In a constitutional
democracy, where judicial authority depends substantially upon the public
justification of coercive decisions, that question remains fundamental.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
PRIMARY SOURCES
·
Kranti Associates (P) Ltd v Masood Ahmed
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·
Modern Dental College and Research Centre
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·
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v State of
Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116.
·
State of Orissa v Sudhansu Sekhar Misra
AIR 1968 SC 647.
·
Union of India v Dhanwanti Devi (1996) 6
SCC 44.
·
Union of India v Mohan Lal Capoor (1973) 2
SCC 836.
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Shroff v Mistry (2011) 2 SCC 380.
·
K S Puttaswamy v Union of India (2017) 10
SCC 1.
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Alexy R, A Theory of Legal Argumentation
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Chakrabarti KK, Classical Indian
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[1] Union of India v
Mohan Lal Capoor (1973) 2 SCC 836, 853; Kranti Associates (P) Ltd v Masood
Ahmed Khan (2010) 9 SCC 496, paras 47–51.
[2] Nyāya Sūtra
1.1.32; see also Jonardon Ganeri, ‘Ancient Indian Logic as a Theory of
Case-Based Reasoning’ (2003) 31 Journal of Indian Philosophy 33, 35–39.
[3] Bimal Krishna
Matilal, Jonardon Ganeri and Heeraman Tiwari (eds), The Character of Logic in
India (State University of New York Press 1998) 31–59.
[4] Jonardon Ganeri,
‘Ancient Indian Logic as a Theory of Case-Based Reasoning’ (2003) 31 Journal of
Indian Philosophy 33.
[5] Kisor Kumar
Chakrabarti, Classical Indian Philosophy of Mind: The Nyāya Dualist Tradition
(State University of New York Press 1999) 115–140.
[6] Nyāya Sūtra
1.1.32; see also Stephen H Phillips, Classical Indian Metaphysics: Refutations
of Realism and the Emergence of ‘New Logic’ (Open Court 1997) 30–34.
[7] Bimal Krishna
Matilal, Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge
(Clarendon Press 1986) 214–225.
[8]
Ganeri (n 2) 39–44.
[9] Matilal, Ganeri and Tiwari (eds) (n 3) 1–30.
[10] See Nyāya Sūtra
1.2.4–1.2.8; Karl H Potter (ed), Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, vol 2:
Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology: The Tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika up to Gaṅgeśa
(Motilal Banarsidass 1977) 234–252.
[11] Sharad
Birdhichand Sarda v State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116, 153–54.
[12] Union of India v
Mohan Lal Capoor (1973) 2 SCC 836, 853.
[13] Kranti Associates
(P) Ltd v Masood Ahmed Khan (2010) 9 SCC 496, paras 47–51; Shroff v Mistry
(2011) 2 SCC 380, para 17.
[14]
Ganeri (n 2) 35–45; Matilal, Ganeri and Tiwari (eds) (n 3) 31–59.
[15] Sharad
Birdhichand Sarda (n 11) 153–54.
[16] ibid 163–64.
[18] State of Orissa v
Sudhansu Sekhar Misra AIR 1968 SC 647, 651; Union of India v Dhanwanti Devi
(1996) 6 SCC 44, 50.
[19] Modern Dental
College and Research Centre v State of Madhya Pradesh (2016) 7 SCC 353, paras
59–70; K S Puttaswamy v Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1, paras 310–318
(Chandrachud J).
[21] Jonardon Ganeri, ‘Ancient Indian
Logic as a Theory of Case-Based Reasoning’ (2003) 31 Journal of Indian
Philosophy 33; Bimal Krishna Matilal, The Character of Logic in India (State
University of New York Press 1998).
How to Cite This Article
VELUGUBANTLA UMIKA, Nyāya Logic and Judicial Reasoning: Applying the Five-Member Syllogism to Indian Judicial Decisions., White Black Legal – International Law Journal, ISSN: 2581-8503, Vol. Volume 4, Issue VOLUME 4 ISSUE 2, October 2026, pp. 627-663. Available at: https://www.whiteblacklegal.co.in/details/nyaya-logic-and-judicial-reasoning-applying-the-five-member-syllogism-to-indian-judicial-decisions
Author & Publication Record
Authors: VELUGUBANTLA UMIKA
Registration ID: 107168 | Published Paper ID: WBL7168
Year: Oct- 2026 | Volume: 4 | Issue: 2
Approved ISSN: 2581-8503 | Country: Delhi, India
Page No.: 627-663
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