Open Access Research Article
White Black Legal – International Law Journal · ISSN 2581-8503
Between Rights and Targets: The Right to Be Free from the Adverse Effects of Climate Change in India and the International Human Rights Law Gap
Read the Full Research Paper
Access the complete open-access article in PDF format. No login is required.
Abstract
BETWEEN RIGHTS AND TARGETS: THE RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM THE ADVERSE EFFECTS
OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN INDIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GAP
AUTHORED BY -
DIKSHA SINGH & VADITYA KAVYA
Abstract
In
M K Ranjitsinh v Union of India (2024) the Supreme Court of India
declared a distinct ‘right to be free from the adverse effects of climate
change’, grounded in Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. The existing
commentary has concentrated on the domestic environmental law lineage of that
right. This paper instead examines it from the standpoint of international
human rights law, where India’s position is more ambivalent than the judgment
suggests. It argues that the right was articulated without engaging the
international human rights jurisprudence on climate change, and that it sits
uneasily with India’s external posture, notably its abstention on Human Rights
Council Resolution 48/13. It identifies three structural weaknesses in the
right as currently framed (its ambiguous function, its lack of an operational
standard, and its underdeveloped equality and procedural dimensions) and
proposes ways in which courts, Parliament and the National Human Rights
Commission could give it content consistent with India’s obligations.
1. Introduction
In
March 2024 the Supreme Court of India decided what was formally a wildlife
case. The petition concerned the Great Indian Bustard, a critically endangered
bird whose habitat in Rajasthan and Gujarat overlaps with some of the country’s
best solar and wind resources.[1] An
order of 19 April 2021 had restricted overhead power lines across roughly
99,000 square kilometres of that territory.[2] In
recalling that restriction, the Court held that there is a right to be free
from the adverse effects of climate change, drawing on the right to equality in
Article 14 and the right to life in Article 21 of the Constitution of India.[3]
2. The Ranjitsinh Right: Reasoning And Structure
2.1 The
setting
The
right emerged as a means of resolving a conflict between two environmental
goods. The Union sought modification of the 2021 order on the ground that a
blanket requirement to place power lines underground was technically infeasible
and would impede India’s commitments under the Paris Agreement and its
transition away from fossil fuels.[4]
The Court agreed. It recalled the injunction and constituted an expert
committee to determine appropriate measures for the bustard’s habitat.[5]
The declaration of a climate right appears in a preliminary section of the
judgment on ‘the mission to combat climate change’, and its function in the
outcome is therefore indirect.[6]
2.2 The
Court’s route to the right
The
Court began by observing that, despite a series of statutes and national
missions, ‘there is no single or umbrella legislation in India which relates to
climate change’.[7] It then reasoned that the
absence of such legislation did not mean the absence of a right. Articles 48A
and 51A(g), which concern the State’s duty to protect the environment and the
citizen’s duty to do likewise, are not justiciable, but the Court treated them
as indications that the importance of the environment ‘becomes a right in other
parts of the Constitution’, namely Articles 14 and 21.[8]
The
Court relied on the established line of authority reading a right to a healthy
environment into Article 21. It cited M C Mehta v Kamal Nath and Virender
Gaur v State of Haryana, and noted that earlier decisions had recognised
climate change as a serious threat.[9]
That line includes Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v State of Uttar
Pradesh, Subhash Kumar v State of Bihar and Vellore Citizens’
Welfare Forum v Union of India, although the Court did not rely on all of
these.[10]
The Court’s step was to say that the right against the adverse effects of
climate change and the right to a clean environment are ‘two sides of the same
coin’, but that the former should now be articulated as a distinct right.[11]
Two
features of the reasoning deserve emphasis. First, the Court tied the right to
the right to health as part of Article 21, listing air pollution, shifts in
vector-borne disease, drought, crop failure, storms and flooding as threats.[12]
Second, and more unusually, it grounded the right in Article 14. Poorer
communities, the Court said, will suffer more than richer ones when climate
change produces food and water shortages. A person in the Lakshadweep Islands
is disadvantaged relative to a person in Madhya Pradesh when sea levels rise.
Forest dwellers and indigenous communities risk losing homes and culture.[13]
The right was therefore framed as having a distributive dimension, not only a
protective one.
The
Court drew its conclusion by appreciating Articles 14 and 21 ‘in the context of
the decisions of this Court, the actions and commitments of the state on the
national and international level, and scientific consensus.’[14]
It added that courts giving effect to the right must remain alive to other
rights of affected communities, including the right against displacement, and
that different rights must be weighed case by case.[15]
2.3 The
international materials
The
Court then turned to international law, but selectively. It cited a 2019 joint
statement by five UN human rights treaty bodies, the preamble of the Paris
Agreement, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ 2017 advisory opinion on
the environment and human rights, and the work of the UN Special Rapporteur on
human rights and the environment.[16]
It reviewed climate litigation elsewhere, including the Dutch Urgenda
decision, the Committee on the Rights of the Child’s decision in Sacchi,
and the New Zealand Supreme Court’s decision in Teitiota, while stating
that these had no precedential value.[17]
It did not cite the UN Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No 36 or its
views in the Teitiota communication, and it did not mention the Human
Rights Council’s 2021 resolution on the right to a healthy environment. These
omissions matter for reasons developed in Section 3.
3. The international human rights baseline
3.1 Treaty obligations
India
acceded to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) on
10 April 1979.[18] It has not accepted the
individual communications procedures under either covenant, so no climate claim
against India can currently be brought before the Human Rights Committee or the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.[19]
The jurisprudence of those bodies is nonetheless relevant because it interprets
provisions by which India is bound.
The
Human Rights Committee has treated climate change as a threat to the right to
life under Article 6 ICCPR. In General Comment No 36 it described environmental
degradation, climate change and unsustainable development as among the most
pressing and serious threats to the ability of present and future generations
to enjoy the right to life.[20]
In Teitiota v New Zealand it rejected the complainant’s claim on the
facts but accepted that climate-related conditions could, in principle, expose
individuals to a real risk of arbitrary deprivation of life such that removal
would engage non-refoulement obligations.[21]
In Billy v Australia it found that Australia’s inadequate adaptation
measures violated the rights of Torres Strait Islanders under Articles 17 and
27, although it did not find a violation of Article 6.[22]
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has long recognised that
the underlying determinants of the right to health under Article 12 ICESCR
include a healthy environment.[23]
The
Court’s Article 21 reasoning tracks these developments substantively. Yet it
reaches them only indirectly, through a joint statement of treaty bodies and
through the New Zealand Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Teitiota,
rather than through the Human Rights Committee’s own analysis of the same
facts.[24]
3.2
Resolution 48/13 and India’s abstention
On
8 October 2021 the Human Rights Council adopted Resolution 48/13, recognising ‘the
right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment as a human right that is
important for the enjoyment of human rights’.[25]
The vote was 43 in favour, none against and four abstentions: China, India,
Japan and the Russian Federation.[26]
The General Assembly followed in Resolution 76/300 in July 2022.[27]
Three
observations follow. First, Council and Assembly resolutions are not binding,
so India’s abstention carries no legal inconsistency with the Ranjitsinh
right. Secondly, the substantive overlap between the two is nonetheless
striking: a State that declined to endorse the right internationally has,
through its highest court, recognised a closely related right domestically.
Thirdly, the Court did not acknowledge this. A judgment that invokes the
‘actions and commitments of the state on the national and international level’
as a basis for the right[28]
would ordinarily be expected to address a State action that points the other
way.
The
point is not that the Court erred. It is that the right was constructed without
the interpretive resources that international human rights law supplies, and
without addressing the gap between India’s domestic and external positions.
3.3 The
ICJ advisory opinion
The
International Court of Justice delivered its advisory opinion on the Obligations
of States in respect of Climate Change on 23 July 2025.[29]
The opinion was unanimous. The Court held that customary international law
imposes obligations to protect the climate system, that States have human
rights obligations to take necessary measures to protect the climate system and
other parts of the environment, and that breach of these obligations engages
State responsibility.[30]
It rejected the argument that the climate treaties are lex specialis
displacing other rules, and it confirmed that the duty of prevention requires
regulation of private actors.[31]
India
participated in the proceedings. Analysis of the written and oral submissions
indicates that India, with China, emphasised the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) and
pressed for stronger obligations on developed States.[32]
That emphasis is orthodox. Differentiation has been a constant of India’s
climate diplomacy and is a core principle of the climate regime.[33]
The ICJ itself treated CBDR-RC as a guiding principle.[34]
But the Court’s conclusion that human rights obligations apply alongside the
climate treaties undercuts any suggestion that the climate regime exhausts a
State’s obligations towards persons within its jurisdiction.
3.4 The
European comparator
The
European Court of Human Rights’ Grand Chamber decision in Verein
KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz v Switzerland (9 April 2024), delivered some weeks
after Ranjitsinh, shows what a rights-based climate standard can look
like in practice. The Court held that Article 8 of the European Convention
encompasses a right to effective protection by the State from serious adverse
effects of climate change on life, health, well-being and quality of life.[35]
The decision generated positive obligations to adopt and effectively apply
regulations and measures capable of mitigating climate change. It could not
have informed the Indian judgment, which predates it by weeks, but it is a
useful benchmark for the analysis that follows.
4. Receiving international norms in Indian law
India
is a dualist State. Article 51(c) directs the State to ‘foster respect for
international law and treaty obligations’, but Article 253 gives Parliament the
power to legislate to implement international agreements, and the executive’s
power to make treaties does not itself alter domestic law. In Jolly George
Varghese v Bank of Cochin the Supreme Court acknowledged this structure
while reading domestic law in a manner consistent with the ICCPR.[36]
In Gramophone Co of India Ltd v Birendra Bahadur Pandey it held that
national courts should interpret municipal law consistently with international
obligations where there is no conflict.[37]
In Vishaka v State of Rajasthan it went further, relying on
international conventions to fill a legislative vacuum.[38] Apparel
Export Promotion Council v A K Chopra confirmed that courts must give due
regard to international conventions and norms where there is no inconsistency
with domestic law and there is a void.[39]
Ranjitsinh
draws on this line. The Court said it is ‘the duty of the Court to give effect
to international agreements and treaties to which India is a party’, and, while
accepting that India’s climate commitments ‘have not been enacted in domestic
law’, held that it must nevertheless be alive to them.[40]
The formulation is notable for two reasons.
The
first is that the instruments mobilised were chiefly the climate treaties (the
UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement). These bind India as a
State vis-à-vis other States, and are largely concerned with mitigation targets
and means of implementation. They do not confer individual rights, although the
Paris Agreement’s preamble does ask Parties to respect, promote and consider
their human rights obligations when taking climate action.[41]
The human rights covenants, which do confer individual rights and which India
has accepted, were not invoked.
The
second is that Indian law already contains a statutory bridge to those
covenants. The Protection of Human Rights Act 1993 defines ‘human rights’ as
rights relating to life, liberty, equality and dignity guaranteed by the
Constitution or embodied in the International Covenants and enforceable by
courts in India.[42] ‘International Covenants’
means the ICCPR and the ICESCR.[43]
The qualifier ‘enforceable by courts in India' limits the reach of the
definition, since it makes covenant rights actionable only to the extent that
Indian courts already enforce them. But it also means that the Article 21
environmental jurisprudence, once extended to climate harm, brings
climate-related impacts on life and health within the statutory definition and
so within the mandate of the National Human Rights Commission. That connection
has not, to my knowledge, been drawn in the case law or commentary.
5. Three structural weaknesses
5.1 An
ambiguous function: shield or sword?
A
fundamental right ordinarily operates as a claim: an individual or class
asserts that the State has failed in a duty and seeks a remedy. In Ranjitsinh
the right operated in a different way. No petitioner asserted it, no relief
followed from it, and its principal function was to support the recall of a
restriction imposed to protect an endangered species.[44]
This
is not an illegitimate use of a right, since rights may legitimately inform
balancing. But it creates a risk that the right is conceptualised as an
interest of the State in pursuing its energy transition, rather than a claim of
persons against inadequate climate action. The Court’s reasoning at several
points runs together the two senses. It treats renewable energy development as
part of the realisation of the right to a healthy environment, noting benefits
for public health, rural women and energy access.[45]
It also directs courts to weigh the right against other rights, including
displacement,[46] and states that the
choice between undergrounding and overhead lines is a matter of environmental
policy on which the Court should rely on domain experts.[47]
The
risk is compounded by the benchmark the Court chose. The right is assessed in
the light of India's 'international commitments’, including a target of
approximately 50 per cent non-fossil installed electric power capacity by 2030
and net zero by 2070.[48]
If the content of the right is measured against the executive’s own voluntary
targets, it provides no independent check on their adequacy. Under the Paris
Agreement, successive nationally determined contributions are supposed to
reflect each Party’s ‘highest possible ambition’.[49] A
rights-based standard should be capable of asking whether a State's
contribution meets that threshold. As framed in Ranjitsinh, the right is
not.
5.2 No
operational standard
The
second weakness is the absence of any test for when the right is infringed. The
Court tells later courts to be ‘alive’ to other rights and to consider them
‘carefully’, but it does not say what a violation of the right would look like,
who bears the burden, or what remedy is appropriate.[50]
The
contrast with KlimaSeniorinnen is instructive. There the Grand Chamber
identified Article 8 as encompassing a right to effective State protection and
derived from it positive obligations to adopt and apply regulations and
measures capable of mitigating climate change.[51]
That analysis, whatever its limitations, offers courts a structure for review.
Indian courts have not been without such tools in environmental litigation.
They have applied the precautionary principle and the polluter-pays principle
as part of Article 21,[52]
and the National Green Tribunal Act 2010 directs the Tribunal to apply the
principles of sustainable development, precaution and polluter-pays.[53]
The Ranjitsinh Court did not connect these tools to the new right.
The
Court's emphasis on expert deference reinforces the problem. Expert input is
valuable where the factual question is technical. But where the question is
whether State action is adequate to protect rights, a court that defers
wholesale to an executive-appointed expert committee has declined to decide the
question it has just said it can decide.[54]
The right then risks becoming a procedural gate rather than a substantive
standard.
5.3
Underdeveloped equality and procedural dimensions
The
third weakness is that the most promising feature of the judgment is also the
least developed. The Article 14 reasoning identifies climate harm as unequally
distributed and recognises geographical and cultural vulnerability.[55]
This resonates with a body of Article 21 jurisprudence on dignity and the
minimum conditions of life, which holds that the right to live includes the
right to live with human dignity and the basic necessities of life.[56]
The reasoning could readily be linked to the expansive reading of Article 14 as
prohibiting arbitrariness.[57]
It could also be linked to the covenant obligation of non-discrimination in the
enjoyment of economic and social rights.[58]
The judgment does none of this. It states the equality dimension in a handful
of paragraphs and does not translate it into a standard of review, for example
by requiring that climate policy be assessed for its differential impact on
identified vulnerable groups.
Procedural
rights are similarly underdeveloped. The Court's own summary of the
Inter-American Court's advisory opinion notes that violations of environmental
rights affect procedural rights of information, participation and association.[59]
But the Court did not draw out the implication that the right to be free from
climate harm carries correlative obligations to disclose climate risk
information and to enable meaningful participation. Statutory machinery exists
for part of this, including the Right to Information Act 2005 and environmental
impact assessment processes, but its connection to the new right is left
unexplored.
6. Proposals
The
weaknesses identified are capable of remedy without legislative revolution.
Four proposals follow.
First,
courts should give the right content through established doctrinal tools.
A workable approach would treat the right as engaging a due diligence standard:
the State must adopt measures that are reasonably capable of protecting those
within its jurisdiction from foreseeable climate harm, assessed in the light of
its capabilities. The precautionary principle and the polluter-pays principle
already form part of Article 21 jurisprudence and could be used to structure
that inquiry.[60] The ICJ’s confirmation
that States owe a duty of prevention, to be discharged with due diligence and
requiring regulation of private actors, supplies international support for this
approach.[61]
Secondly,
courts should engage with international human rights jurisprudence directly.
The Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No 36 and its views in Teitiota
and Billy, the Council's resolution, and the ICJ’s advisory opinion all
bear on the content of Articles 14 and 21 and would enrich the analysis. Since
India is bound by the ICCPR and ICESCR, the Gramophone and Vishaka
line provides the necessary route. A court that is willing to look to an
advisory opinion of the Inter-American Court, as in Ranjitsinh, is not
constrained from looking to the Human Rights Committee.
Thirdly,
Parliament should legislate. The Court itself
acknowledged that India lacks framework climate legislation.[62]
Article 253 empowers Parliament to legislate to implement the Paris Agreement.
A framework statute could set out substantive duties, procedural rights of
information and participation, and institutional responsibility for monitoring,
thereby converting an unarticulated judicial right into a justiciable statutory
scheme.
Fourthly,
the National Human Rights Commission could use its statutory functions.
Section 12(f) of the 1993 Act charges the Commission with studying treaties and
other international instruments on human rights and making recommendations for
their effective implementation.[63]
Given the link drawn in Section 4 between the Article 21 environmental right
and the statutory definition of human rights, a Commission study on climate
change and the covenants would be a modest but meaningful step.
A
final point concerns India's external posture. Insistence on CBDR-RC is a
position about the allocation of burdens among States. It does not entail that
obligations towards individuals are reduced because other States have
contributed more to the problem. Human rights obligations under the ICCPR are
owed to individuals within the State’s territory and jurisdiction.[64]
The ICJ's finding that the climate regime is not lex specialis confirms
that these obligations operate in parallel with the differentiated allocation
of mitigation duties.[65]
There is therefore no necessary conflict between India's external advocacy of
differentiation and a robust domestic right. Indeed, a credible domestic right
strengthens India's claim in international negotiations to be a State that
takes the human dimension of climate change seriously. This is a strategic
argument, not a legal one, but it points in the same direction as the legal
analysis.
7. Conclusion
Ranjitsinh
is a significant development in Indian constitutional law. By recognising a
right to be free from the adverse effects of climate change, and by grounding
it in both Article 14 and Article 21, the Court acknowledged that climate harm
is simultaneously a threat to life and an issue of distributive justice. Viewed
from the standpoint of international human rights law, however, the right was
constructed without the interpretive resources that law offers, and without
addressing the gap between India's domestic and external positions.
The
right as framed has three weaknesses. Its function is ambiguous, since it
supported the recall of a protective order rather than responding to a claim.
It has no operational standard, and is measured against the State's own targets
rather than an independent threshold. And its equality and procedural
dimensions, although the most promising, are underdeveloped. None is
irremediable. Courts can give the right content through due diligence and
established environmental principles, can engage directly with the
jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee and the ICJ's advisory opinion, and
can be assisted by legislation and by the National Human Rights Commission's
existing powers.
The
right is young, and its development will depend on the cases that come to be
argued under it. Whether it becomes a meaningful protection for the communities
the Court identified (island dwellers, forest dwellers, the rural poor) will
depend on whether future courts treat it as a claim that can be made against
the State, rather than a consideration that can be invoked on its behalf.
[2]ibid para 5.
[3]ibid para 27.
[4]ibid para 7.
[5]ibid paras 61-68.
[6]ibid paras 10-35.
[7]ibid para 19.
[8]ibid para 20.
[9]ibid paras 21-23,
citing M C Mehta v Kamal Nath (2000) 6 SCC 213; Virender Gaur v State
of Haryana (1995) 2 SCC 577; Karnataka Industrial Areas Development
Board v C Kenchappa (2006) 6 SCC 371; and Bombay Dyeing &
Manufacturing Co Ltd (3) v Bombay Environmental Action Group (2006) 3 SCC
434.
[10]Rural Litigation
and Entitlement Kendra v State of Uttar Pradesh (1985) 2 SCC 431;
Subhash Kumar v State of Bihar (1991) 1 SCC 598; Vellore Citizens'
Welfare Forum v Union of India (1996) 5 SCC 647.
[12]ibid para 25.
[13]ibid paras 25-26.
[14]ibid para 27.
[15]ibid.
[16]ibid paras 28-33;
Joint Statement on Human Rights and Climate Change (16 September 2019); Paris
Agreement (adopted 12 December 2015, entered into force 4 November 2016)
FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, annex, preamble; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, The
Environment and Human Rights (Advisory Opinion OC-23/17) (15 November 2017)
Series A No 23; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights
obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable
environment (24 January 2018) UN Doc A/HRC/37/59.
[17]Ranjitsinh (n 1) paras
44–50, discussing State of the Netherlands v Urgenda Foundation
ECLI:NL:HR:2019:2006; Sacchi v Argentina CRC/C/88/D/104/2019 (22
September 2021); and Teitiota v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business,
Innovation and Employment [2015] NZSC 107.
[18]International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into
force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR); International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3
January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR).
[19]Optional Protocol
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16
December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171; Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(adopted 10 December 2008, entered into force 5 May 2013) 2922 UNTS 29. India
is not a party to either.
[20]UN Human Rights
Committee, 'General Comment No 36 on article 6 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, on the right to life' (3 September 2019) UN Doc
CCPR/C/GC/36, para 62.
[23]UN Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 'General Comment No 14: The Right to the
Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art 12)' (11 August 2000) UN Doc
E/C.12/2000/4, para 4.
[25]UN Human Rights
Council, ‘The Human Right to a Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment’ (8
October 2021) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/48/13, para 1.
[26]Voting record as
reported in Yann Aguila, 'The Right to a Healthy Environment' (IUCN World
Commission on Environmental Law, October 2021)
<https://iucn.org/news/world-commission-environmental-law/202110/right-a-healthy-environment>
accessed 5 October 2026.
[27]UNGA Res 76/300
(28 July 2022) UN Doc A/RES/76/300.
[29]Obligations of
States in respect of Climate Change (Advisory Opinion) (ICJ, General List No
187, 23 July 2025).
[30]ibid para 457.
[31]ibid paras 273,
282.
[32]Overseas
Development Institute, Keeping the International Court of Justice Advisory
Opinion Alive at COP30 and Beyond (ODI 2025). The characterisation of
India's submissions is that report's; the written and oral statements
themselves should be consulted on the ICJ website.
[33]Lavanya Rajamani, Differential
Treatment in International Environmental Law (OUP 2006).
[39]Apparel Export
Promotion Council v A K Chopra (1999) 1 SCC 759, as quoted in Ranjitsinh
(n 1) para 57.
[41]Paris Agreement (n 16) preamble; Ranjitsinh (n
1) para 30.
[42]Protection of
Human Rights Act 1993, s 2(1)(d).
[43]ibid s 2(1)(f).
[45]ibid paras 17-18,
34-37.
[46]ibid para 27.
[47]ibid paras 61-62.
[48]ibid paras 15, 38.
[49]Paris Agreement (n
16) art 4(3).
[52]Vellore Citizens'
Welfare Forum
(n 10); Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v Union of India (1996) 3
SCC 212.
[53]National Green
Tribunal Act 2010, s 20.
[55]ibid paras 25–26.
[58]ICESCR (n 18) art 2(2).
[63]Protection of
Human Rights Act 1993, s 12(f).
[64]ICCPR (n 18) art
2(1).
How to Cite This Article
DIKSHA SINGH, VADITYA KAVYA, Between Rights and Targets: The Right to Be Free from the Adverse Effects of Climate Change in India and the International Human Rights Law Gap., White Black Legal – International Law Journal, ISSN: 2581-8503, Vol. Volume 4, Issue VOLUME 4 ISSUE 2, October 2026, pp. 198-212. Available at: https://www.whiteblacklegal.co.in/details/between-rights-and-targets-the-right-to-be-free-from-the-adverse-effects-of-climate-change-in-india-and-the-international-human-rights-law-gap
Author & Publication Record
Authors: DIKSHA SINGH & VADITYA KAVYA
Registration ID: 107134 | Published Paper ID: WBL7134 & WBL7135
Year: Oct- 2026 | Volume: 4 | Issue: 2
Approved ISSN: 2581-8503 | Country: Delhi, India
Page No.: 198-212
Full Text Preview
Open in New Tab
Copied