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White Black Legal – International Law Journal · ISSN 2581-8503
India’s Strategic Autonomy in the Trump 2.0 Era: Multi-Alignment, Great-Power Competition and Foreign Policy Choices
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Abstract
INDIA’S
STRATEGIC AUTONOMY IN THE TRUMP 2.0 ERA: MULTI-ALIGNMENT, GREAT-POWER
COMPETITION AND FOREIGN POLICY CHOICES
AUTHORED BY - RAVI DUTT
Research Scholar
Department of
Political Science, University of Delhi
Abstract
The
return of Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States in January 2025
has created a new environment for India’s foreign policy. India has
traditionally sought to preserve strategic autonomy by avoiding formal
alignment with any major power while maintaining relationships with multiple
states according to its national interests. During the Cold War, this approach
was expressed through non-alignment. In the post-Cold War period, and
particularly under Narendra Modi, it has increasingly developed into a policy
of strategic autonomy and multi-alignment. India has simultaneously
strengthened its strategic partnership with the United States, maintained its
longstanding relationship with Russia, managed strategic competition with
China, and participated in institutions such as BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation (SCO), the Quad, G20 and other multilateral platforms.
This
paper examines how the Trump 2.0 era has affected India’s pursuit of strategic
autonomy. It argues that Trump’s transactional approach to trade, technology,
security and burden-sharing creates both opportunities and constraints for New
Delhi. The United States remains important for India’s defence modernization,
advanced technology, economic cooperation and Indo-Pacific strategy. At the
same time, American pressure concerning Russia, trade and energy creates
challenges for India’s freedom of action. India’s relationship with China also
remains central because of the unresolved boundary question and broader
strategic competition. Recent developments indicate that India is responding
not through formal alignment but through a combination of internal strengthening,
diversified partnerships, issue-based cooperation and multilateral engagement.
Thus, Trump 2.0 has not ended India’s strategic autonomy; rather, it has made
its practice more demanding and transactional. The paper concludes that
multi-alignment remains an important instrument through which India seeks to
preserve policy flexibility in an increasingly competitive international
system.
Keywords: India,
Strategic Autonomy, Trump 2.0, Multi-alignment, United States, Russia, China,
BRICS, Indo-Pacific, Foreign Policy
1.
Introduction
The
international system has undergone significant geopolitical transformation in
the twenty-first century. The post-Cold War period was initially characterized
by strong American predominance, but the international distribution of power
has gradually become more complex. China has emerged as a major economic and
military power, Russia continues to possess significant strategic capabilities,
and countries such as India have acquired greater importance in global
politics. At the same time, international institutions and groupings such as
BRICS, the G20, the SCO and the Quad have become important platforms for
diplomatic engagement.
For
India, this changing environment has created both opportunities and challenges.
India seeks closer cooperation with major powers but does not want its foreign
policy to become dependent on any single power. This approach is commonly
described as strategic autonomy. Strategic autonomy refers to the
capacity of a state to make independent foreign-policy decisions according to
its own national interests rather than being compelled to follow the
preferences of another major power.
The idea
has historical roots in India’s non-alignment policy during the Cold War.
However, contemporary strategic autonomy differs from classical non-alignment.
During the Cold War, non-alignment was largely associated with avoiding
membership in competing military blocs. Contemporary India, by contrast,
actively develops partnerships with several major powers at the same time.
India can cooperate with the United States through the Quad and defence and
technology partnerships while maintaining defence and energy relations with
Russia and participating in BRICS and the SCO. It can compete with China in the
Indo-Pacific while simultaneously engaging Beijing through multilateral
institutions.
S.
Jaishankar's The India Way provides an important intellectual
perspective on this approach. It emphasizes the importance of flexibility and
national interest in an uncertain international environment (Jaishankar, 2020).
Similarly, O’Donnell and Papa (2021) demonstrate that India has managed
relationships with Russia and China through a combination of bilateral
diplomacy and multilateral institutions such as BRICS and the SCO. More recent
research by Zomuanthanga and Shekhawat (2026) interprets India's simultaneous
participation in BRICS and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) as an
example of multi-alignment designed to preserve strategic autonomy.
The
return of Donald Trump to the White House in January 2025 has created a new
context for this strategy. The second Trump administration has emphasized
economic nationalism, trade negotiations, technology competition,
burden-sharing and transactional diplomacy. Christopher Clary argues that there
is substantial strategic convergence between India and the United States, but
that India must also manage disagreements arising from American trade and
technology policies. He further argues that the broader direction of Trump’s
foreign policy may reinforce India's commitment to multi-alignment
The
United States has assumed a central role in India's contemporary strategic and
foreign-policy engagements. Cooperation includes defence, technology, trade,
maritime security, intelligence and the Indo-Pacific. Nevertheless, India has
continued to avoid a formal alliance with Washington. Russia remains important
because of longstanding defence cooperation, energy relations and diplomatic
links. This relationship has become more complicated because of the
Russia-Ukraine war and Western sanctions.
China
presents a different challenge. India and China are major neighbouring powers
with extensive economic relations, but their relationship is affected by the
unresolved boundary dispute and strategic competition. The 2020 Galwan Valley
clash significantly changed India's approach to China. Recent scholarship
argues that India has combined military measures with diplomatic and
multilateral forms of soft balancing through institutions such as BRICS, SCO,
RIC and IBSA.
This
article is guided by the following central research question:
How has
the Trump 2.0 era affected India's pursuit and practice of strategic autonomy?
The paper
also addresses three related questions:
- How does India manage its
growing strategic partnership with the United States while maintaining
relations with Russia?
- How does China's rise and
the India-China strategic competition influence India's foreign-policy
choices?
- Does multi-alignment provide
India with sufficient flexibility to preserve strategic autonomy?
The
central argument is that Trump 2.0 has not fundamentally abandoned India's
strategic autonomy, but it has increased the costs and complexity of
maintaining it. India's response has been to deepen cooperation with the
United States where interests converge, preserve important relations with
Russia, manage competition with China, and expand diplomatic options through
multiple institutions and partnerships.
2.
Literature Review
The
literature on Indian foreign policy has increasingly moved from the traditional
concept of non-alignment toward strategic autonomy, multi-alignment and
hedging.
2.1 From Non-Alignment to Strategic Autonomy
Classical
studies of Indian foreign policy emphasize non-alignment as a central principle
of India's Cold War diplomacy. India did not formally join either the US-led or
Soviet-led military bloc. The policy provided India with diplomatic flexibility
and reflected the importance given to sovereignty, independence and freedom of
decision-making.
However,
the international environment changed substantially after the end of the Cold
War. The disappearance of the bipolar system reduced the relevance of
traditional non-alignment. India subsequently developed closer relations with
the United States while simultaneously maintaining relations with Russia, China
and other powers.
Bajpai
and Pant (2013) and Pant (2016) explain the transformation of Indian foreign
policy in the post-Cold War period as a process of adapting to changing global
power structures. India increasingly sought to integrate itself into the
international system while maintaining autonomy in decision-making.
Jaishankar
(2020) provides a more contemporary interpretation. He emphasizes that India
must engage with the world from a position based on its own interests rather
than accepting rigid ideological or geopolitical alignments. This provides an
intellectual foundation for the concept of strategic autonomy.
2.2 Multi-Alignment
O’Donnell
and Papa (2021) provide an important contribution by examining India's
management of relations with Russia and China through the Russia–India–China
triangle. Their analysis demonstrates that India does not treat bilateral
relationships and multilateral institutions as mutually exclusive. Instead, it
uses different platforms to pursue different interests.
India's
membership in BRICS and the SCO while simultaneously strengthening relations
with the United States is particularly important. Such behaviour demonstrates
that strategic autonomy does not require India to maintain equal distance from
all major powers. Instead, it allows India to cooperate differently with
different countries depending on the issue.
Zomuanthanga
and Shekhawat (2026) extend this argument by examining India's engagement with
BRICS and IPEF. They interpret this dual engagement as multi-alignment in a
multipolar system. According to their analysis, India uses different
institutional platforms to balance competing strategic pressures and protect
national interests.
2.3 India–US Relations
The
literature on India-US relations generally identifies a substantial convergence
of interests. These include China's growing power, Indo-Pacific security,
defence technology, maritime security and economic cooperation.
Clary
(2025) provides an important analysis of India-US relations during the second
Trump administration. He identifies significant strategic and ideological
convergence but also highlights possible tensions regarding trade and
technology. His analysis suggests that India's strategic autonomy remains
important even as bilateral cooperation expands.
Recent
analysis by Carnegie and RSIS similarly emphasizes that Trump 2.0 has created
greater uncertainty in the relationship. Carnegie argues that India has
adjusted to a more transactional American approach without abandoning its
broader strategy. RSIS notes that Indian policymakers continue to recognize the
importance of the United States for economic growth, military modernization and
diplomatic objectives, while historical concerns about American reliability
remain relevant.
2.4 India–Russia Relations
Russia
remains an important component of India's strategic autonomy. The relationship
developed significantly during the Cold War and continued after 1991. Defence
cooperation has historically been particularly important.
The
Russia-Ukraine war created a major challenge because India faced pressure from
Western countries to reduce its engagement with Moscow. India nevertheless
continued diplomatic and economic engagement with Russia while simultaneously
strengthening its relationship with the United States and Europe.
This
illustrates the practical nature of Indian strategic autonomy. India does not
necessarily accept the geopolitical preferences of one partner when those
preferences conflict with its own perceived interests.
2.5 India–China Relations
China
represents one of the most significant structural challenges to India's foreign
policy. The 2020 Galwan crisis transformed bilateral relations. India
strengthened military deployments, increased restrictions in sensitive economic
sectors and deepened cooperation with partners such as the United States, Japan
and Australia.
Hall
(2025) argues that India's post-Galwan strategy includes soft balancing through
RIC, BRICS, SCO and IBSA. His research demonstrates that India does not rely
exclusively on military balancing; it also uses multilateral institutions to
protect and advance its interests.
Recent
developments show both competition and limited stabilization. Reuters reported
in September 2026 that India-China relations had moved from the intense
confrontation following Galwan toward cautious stabilization, although
significant disputes and strategic distrust remained.
2.6 Research Gap
Existing
scholarship provides substantial analysis of India's strategic autonomy,
India-US relations, India-Russia relations and India-China competition.
However, the return of Trump in 2025 introduces a relatively new environment in
which these relationships interact simultaneously.
The
research gap addressed by this paper is therefore the combined examination
of Trump 2.0, India's relations with the United States and Russia,
China-related strategic pressures, and multi-alignment as a mechanism of
strategic autonomy.
3.
Conceptual and Theoretical Framework
This
paper uses three interconnected concepts: strategic autonomy,
multi-alignment and hedging.
3.1 Strategic Autonomy
Strategic
autonomy means the ability of a state to make independent decisions regarding
its security, economy and foreign relations. It does not mean isolation from
the international system.
For
India, strategic autonomy involves maintaining sufficient freedom of action to
cooperate with one major power without becoming dependent upon it. India can
therefore deepen defence cooperation with the United States while maintaining
energy and defence links with Russia.
Strategic
autonomy can be understood through four dimensions:
- Political
autonomy – freedom to make independent diplomatic
decisions.
- Strategic
autonomy – freedom to determine national security
priorities.
- Economic
autonomy – reducing excessive dependence on a single
economic partner.
- Technological
autonomy – developing domestic capabilities and
diversified technology partnerships.
3.2 Multi-Alignment
Multi-alignment
is the contemporary operational form of strategic autonomy. It involves
maintaining relationships with several major powers simultaneously.
India's
participation in the Quad, BRICS, SCO, G20 and other institutions demonstrates
this approach. These organizations have different memberships and objectives,
but India uses each according to specific interests.
Thus:
Non-alignment
→ Strategic autonomy → Multi-alignment
This
progression does not mean that earlier policies disappeared completely. Rather,
India's policy has adapted to changing international conditions.
3.3 Hedging
Hedging
refers to maintaining multiple strategic options when the future direction of
international politics is uncertain. Instead of choosing one side, a state
cooperates with competing powers while preparing for different possible
developments.
India's
relations with the United States, Russia and China contain elements of such
behaviour. However, hedging should not be understood as simple neutrality.
India may cooperate closely with one country in one area while competing with
it in another.
3.4 Analytical Framework
The paper
therefore uses the following framework:
External
pressures → National interests → Strategic choices → Multi-alignment →
Strategic autonomy
Trump 2.0
represents an external pressure. India's national interests determine its
response. Strategic choices involve cooperation, balancing, diversification and
institutional engagement. Multi-alignment then provides mechanisms through
which India attempts to preserve strategic autonomy.
4.
Methodology
This
study uses a qualitative research methodology based primarily on
secondary sources.
The
research draws upon academic journal articles, books, government documents,
policy papers and recent analytical reports. Key academic sources include Clary
(2025), O’Donnell and Papa (2021), Hall (2025), and Zomuanthanga and Shekhawat
(2026). Government sources, particularly documents of India's Ministry of
External Affairs, are used to examine India's official positions.
The study
uses descriptive and analytical methods. The descriptive component
identifies major developments in India's relations with the United States,
Russia and China. The analytical component examines how these developments
affect India's strategic autonomy.
The
period of primary attention is 2025–2026, corresponding to the second
Trump administration. However, historical developments from the Cold War and
post-Cold War periods are included to explain the evolution of strategic
autonomy.
The study
does not attempt to predict the future direction of Indian foreign policy.
Instead, it examines current patterns and the choices available to India within
a changing international environment.
5.
Strategic Autonomy and the Evolution of Indian Foreign Policy
India's
strategic autonomy has evolved considerably since independence.
During
the Cold War, India's foreign policy was strongly associated with
non-alignment. India sought to avoid military alliances and maintain diplomatic
independence. Nevertheless, non-alignment did not mean complete neutrality.
India maintained close relations with the Soviet Union while also engaging the
United States and other Western countries.
After the
Cold War, India's strategic environment changed. The collapse of the Soviet
Union reduced India's dependence on Moscow, while economic liberalization
increased India's engagement with Western economies.
The
relationship with the United States gradually expanded. The civil nuclear
agreement, defence cooperation and growing Indo-Pacific engagement reflected
this transformation.
Simultaneously,
India sought to preserve its longstanding strategic relationship with Russia. Defence
cooperation remained important, and new areas such as energy and space
cooperation developed.
Under
Narendra Modi, this approach became increasingly associated with
multi-alignment. India participated in the Quad while remaining a member of
BRICS and the SCO. It strengthened relations with the United States, Japan,
Australia, France and European countries while maintaining relations with
Russia and engaging China.
The
underlying principle is therefore not equal distance but freedom of choice.
This
distinction is important. Strategic autonomy does not require India to reject
partnerships. Rather, partnerships are acceptable when they increase India's
capabilities without eliminating its ability to make independent decisions.
The
contemporary challenge is that major-power competition is becoming more
intense. As rivalry between the United States and China increases, maintaining
relationships with both Western and non-Western institutions becomes more
difficult.
6.
India–US Relations under Trump 2.0
India-US
relations have become one of the most important components of India's external
strategy. Cooperation includes defence, technology, trade, intelligence,
maritime security and the Indo-Pacific.
The
United States is particularly important for India's efforts to develop advanced
defence and technological capabilities. Cooperation with Washington also
supports India's role in the Indo-Pacific and provides opportunities for
greater integration into global supply chains.
However,
Trump 2.0 has introduced greater transactional pressure into the relationship.
Clary
identifies substantial strategic convergence between India and the United
States but also highlights tensions involving trade and technology. He argues
that India must manage Trump's neomercantilist tendencies while maintaining the
broader strategic relationship.
The
Carnegie Endowment's 2026 analysis similarly argues that Trump 2.0 has reduced
India's expectation that Washington will consistently provide strategic
concessions in support of broader geopolitical objectives. According to the
analysis, India has responded through adjustment rather than a fundamental
realignment.
This is
significant for strategic autonomy. A closer relationship with Washington can
strengthen India's military and technological capabilities, but excessive
dependence could reduce policy flexibility.
India
therefore has an interest in deepening cooperation while preserving independent
decision-making.
The Quad
provides a useful example. India cooperates with the United States, Japan and
Australia on maritime security and Indo-Pacific issues but has not converted
the Quad into a formal military alliance.
The
strategic logic is therefore:
Cooperation
without formal alliance.
This
allows India to gain benefits from American capabilities while retaining room
for independent foreign-policy choices.
7.
India–Russia Relations: Energy and Defence
Russia
remains an important element of India's strategic autonomy.
The
India-Russia relationship has deep historical foundations. Defence cooperation
has been one of its strongest pillars. Russia has supplied India with major
military platforms and technologies over several decades.
Energy
has become increasingly important in recent years. India's engagement with
Russian energy has continued despite Western pressure following the
Russia-Ukraine war.
This
creates a complicated situation for India. On one side, India seeks deeper
strategic cooperation with the United States and other Western countries. On
the other, India considers continued engagement with Russia important for
energy security, defence requirements and broader geopolitical interests.
The Trump
2.0 period has increased this tension because Washington has used trade and
economic instruments to encourage countries to reduce reliance on Russian
energy. Yet India's position has remained focused on national interests and
energy security.
This
illustrates the practical meaning of strategic autonomy. India does not
automatically adopt the policy preferences of its strategic partners.
Russia
also remains useful to India in multilateral institutions such as BRICS and the
SCO. Maintaining communication with Moscow also provides India with another
diplomatic channel in a changing international system.
Nevertheless,
India's Russia policy also faces constraints. Russia's growing dependence on
China, the continuing Ukraine war, Western sanctions and changes in global
defence markets create new challenges.
Therefore,
India's Russia relationship is changing, but it has not become irrelevant to
strategic autonomy.
8.
India–China Relations and the Strategic Environment
China
represents perhaps the most complicated external challenge to Indian strategic
autonomy.
A
longstanding and unresolved boundary dispute remains a central issue in
India–China relations. The 2020 Galwan clash was a major turning point. Hall
describes the post-Galwan period as a significant transformation in India's
China strategy, including stronger military preparedness and greater use of
multilateral and minilateral mechanisms.
India has
subsequently strengthened cooperation with the United States, Japan and
Australia through the Quad and other Indo-Pacific initiatives. At the same
time, India has continued to participate in BRICS and the SCO, where China is
also a major member.
This
apparently contradictory behaviour is actually central to India's
multi-alignment strategy.
India
competes with China in the Indo-Pacific and along the Himalayan frontier but
does not completely disengage from China economically or diplomatically.
Recent
developments demonstrate this complexity. Reuters reported in September 2026
that bilateral relations had moved from the severe tensions following Galwan
toward cautious stabilization, while substantial disputes remained.
India's
approach can therefore be described as competition combined with selective
engagement.
China
also influences India's relationship with the United States. The Chinese
challenge creates strong incentives for India and the United States to
cooperate. However, India does not want its China policy to become completely
dependent on Washington.
This
distinction is critical. India's strategic partnership with the United States
is partly strengthened by common concerns regarding China, but India's China
policy remains an Indian policy rather than simply an extension of American
strategy.
Hall's
analysis of India's use of soft balancing in RIC, BRICS, SCO and IBSA further
demonstrates that India uses different institutions for different strategic
purposes.
Thus,
China is both a constraint and a factor encouraging India to diversify its
partnerships.
9.
Multi-Alignment and the Future of Strategic Autonomy
Multi-alignment
has become one of the most visible features of contemporary Indian foreign
policy.
India
simultaneously participates in institutions that represent different
geopolitical orientations. It is part of BRICS and the SCO while also
participating in the Quad and developing closer relationships with Western
powers.
Zomuanthanga
and Shekhawat describe India's simultaneous engagement with BRICS and IPEF as
an example of multi-alignment in a multipolar international system.
The Trump
2.0 period makes this strategy more complicated because major powers
increasingly expect clearer strategic choices.
However,
India continues to have incentives to preserve flexibility.
Its
engagement with the United States provides access to technology, defence
cooperation and Indo-Pacific partnerships.
Its
relationship with Russia provides defence, energy and diplomatic options.
Its
engagement with China is necessary because China is a neighbouring major power
and an important economic actor.
Its
participation in BRICS and other Global South institutions provides alternative
diplomatic platforms.
The
strategy can therefore be understood as diversification of external
relationships.
Nevertheless,
multi-alignment has limitations. Maintaining relationships with competing
powers requires careful diplomacy. Economic dependence, technological
requirements, military needs and trade pressures can reduce the space available
for independent choices.
The more
intense US-China and Russia-West competition becomes, the more difficult it may
become to maintain flexibility.
Therefore,
strategic autonomy depends not only on diplomatic skill but also on domestic
economic strength, technological capability, military capacity and diversified
international partnerships.
10.
Discussion and Findings
The
analysis produces five major findings.
First, strategic autonomy remains a central
principle of Indian foreign policy.
India's
foreign policy has changed significantly since the Cold War, but the underlying
objective of preserving independent decision-making remains important.
Second, strategic autonomy has shifted from
non-alignment toward multi-alignment.
India is
no longer primarily defined by distance from military blocs. Instead, it
actively participates in multiple strategic and economic partnerships.
Third, Trump 2.0 has increased pressure on India's
strategic autonomy.
The
United States remains an important strategic partner, but the more
transactional character of Trump 2.0 creates tensions concerning trade,
technology, Russia and broader foreign-policy priorities. Recent analysis from
Carnegie and RSIS highlights this increased uncertainty.
Fourth, Russia remains relevant despite growing
Western engagement.
India's
continued engagement with Russia demonstrates that closer relations with
Washington do not automatically produce alignment against Moscow.
Fifth, China is a major driver of India's strategic
calculations.
The
post-Galwan environment has strengthened India's security cooperation with the
United States and other Indo-Pacific partners, while India continues to use
multilateral platforms involving China.
The
overall finding is therefore that India's strategic autonomy is adaptive
rather than static.
India
does not seek complete independence from all external relationships. Instead,
it seeks sufficient flexibility to decide when, where and how to cooperate.
11.
Conclusion
India's
strategic autonomy has evolved significantly from the non-alignment of the Cold
War to the multi-alignment of the twenty-first century. The central objective,
however, remains relatively consistent: preserving the freedom to make
foreign-policy decisions according to India's national interests.
The Trump
2.0 era has created a more demanding environment for this strategy. The United
States remains essential to India's defence modernization, technology
development, Indo-Pacific engagement and economic objectives. At the same time,
the transactional nature of the Trump administration has generated additional
pressure regarding trade, technology and India's relationship with Russia.
Russia
continues to occupy an important place in India's strategic calculations
because of defence, energy and diplomatic considerations. The relationship is
changing because of the Ukraine war and Russia's increasing dependence on
China, but India's continued engagement demonstrates that New Delhi does not
view its relationship with Washington as requiring automatic alignment against
Moscow.
China
presents another major challenge. The Galwan crisis transformed India-China
relations and encouraged stronger Indian balancing behaviour. Nevertheless,
India continues to engage China through bilateral diplomacy and multilateral
institutions. This demonstrates that India's China policy combines competition,
deterrence, engagement and institutional participation.
The
evidence therefore suggests that Trump 2.0 has not eliminated India's
strategic autonomy. Instead, it has exposed the practical limits and costs
of maintaining it. The more transactional the international environment
becomes, the more India must diversify partnerships and strengthen its own
capabilities.
Multi-alignment
remains an important instrument in this process. Through simultaneous
engagement with the United States, Russia, China and multiple international
institutions, India seeks to maximize strategic options rather than commit
itself permanently to one geopolitical camp.
Ultimately,
India's strategic autonomy will depend not simply on diplomatic balancing but
also on domestic economic strength, technological capacity, defence
capabilities and the ability to diversify international relationships. The
Trump 2.0 era therefore represents less a departure from India's strategic
autonomy than a significant test of its adaptability.
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How to Cite This Article
RAVI DUTT, India’s Strategic Autonomy in the Trump 2.0 Era: Multi-Alignment, Great-Power Competition and Foreign Policy Choices., White Black Legal – International Law Journal, ISSN: 2581-8503, Vol. 4, Issue 1, September 2026, pp. 783-799. Available at: https://www.whiteblacklegal.co.in/public/details/indias-strategic-autonomy-in-the-trump-20-era-multi-alignment-great-power-competition-and-foreign-policy-choices
Author & Publication Record
Authors: RAVI DUTT
Registration ID: 107098 | Published Paper ID: WBL7098
Year: Sep- 2026 | Volume: 4 | Issue: 1
Approved ISSN: 2581-8503 | Country: Delhi, India
Page No.: 783-799
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