Open Access Research Article
White Black Legal – International Law Journal · ISSN 2581-8503
INDIA’S LEGAL RESPONSE TO CRYPTOCURRENCY FRAUD
Read the Full Research Paper
Access the complete open-access article in PDF format. No login is required.
Abstract
INDIA’S LEGAL RESPONSE TO CRYPTOCURRENCY FRAUD
AUTHORED BY - ADV ANOOP MAHOBIA
AFFILIATION - PRSU RAIPUR
Abstract
Cryptocurrency fraud reveals a fundamental flaw in
legal systems which have always been built around identifiable intermediaries,
territorial transactions and traditional forms of property. The case of India
shows this issue clearly. Cryptocurrency activity is not banned in itself nor
is it thoroughly regulated by a specific piece of legislation; rather, the
legal approach is spread out over criminal law, cyber law,
anti-money-laundering rules, taxation, securities regulation, foreign-exchange
controls and administrative enforcement. This article critically looks at
whether this scattered system is sufficient to prevent, investigate and deal
with cryptocurrency fraud. Based on doctrinal legal analysis, case studies and
comparative regulatory analysis, it examines the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023,
the Information Technology Act, 2000, the Prevention of Money Laundering Act,
2002, the role of the Reserve Bank of India, SEBI, FIU-IND and the Enforcement
Directorate, and the constitutional importance of the case Internet and Mobile
Association of India v. Reserve Bank of India. It contends that the main issue
is not a complete lack of law, but a misalignment between the risks posed by
technology and the specific mandates of the institutions involved. The paper
also compares the multi-agency enforcement model in the United States, the
European Union’s harmonised Markets in Crypto-Assets framework and Singapore’s
licensing and consumer-protection model. It suggests an Indian framework based
on risk, featuring a specific digital-asset statute, activity-based licensing
of virtual digital asset service providers, unified KYC/AML and travel-rule
compliance, a specialised cyber-forensic capability, cross-border cooperation,
mandatory cybersecurity and custody standards, and accessible investor redress.
The article concludes that effective regulation should shift from the reactive
practice of classifying crypto fraud into old legal categories to one of
technology-neutral but crypto-aware governance.
Keywords: Cryptocurrency fraud; Virtual
Digital Assets; Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita; PMLA; IT Act; FIU-IND; Investor
Protection; MiCA; VASP; Blockchain Forensics
1. Introduction
Money has repeatedly changed form in response to
technology, social organisation and the needs of commerce. Cryptocurrency
represents a particularly disruptive stage in that history because value can be
transferred through distributed networks without the conventional
intermediation of a central bank or financial institution. The architecture
that makes crypto-assets attractive—pseudonymous addresses, decentralised
validation, programmable transactions and borderless transferability—also
creates new opportunities for fraud. The research manuscript on which this
article is based identifies Ponzi schemes, phishing, fake initial coin
offerings (ICOs), pump-and-dump manipulation, exchange hacks, rug pulls, money
laundering and impersonation scams as recurring forms of abuse in the Indian
ecosystem. The underlying problem is therefore not simply whether
cryptocurrency is 'legal', but whether the legal system can identify actors,
classify conduct, freeze or recover assets, preserve digital evidence, protect
victims and allocate responsibility across multiple institutions.
The Indian position has developed through incremental
and sometimes contradictory measures. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) issued a
2018 circular directing regulated entities not to deal with or provide services
to businesses dealing in virtual currencies. The Supreme Court subsequently
struck down that circular in Internet and Mobile Association of India v.
Reserve Bank of India, holding the restriction disproportionate under Article
19(1)(g). The judgment did not create a positive right to an unregulated crypto
market; rather, it demonstrated the constitutional limits of a sweeping
prohibition and left the legislative question open.
Since then, the regulatory centre of gravity has
shifted toward risk containment. Crypto-assets became taxable as virtual
digital assets (VDAs), VDA service providers were brought within the
anti-money-laundering architecture in 2023, and FIU-IND has increasingly used
registration and compliance mechanisms against offshore and domestic service
providers. The current position is therefore better described as partial
regulation without a comprehensive crypto statute. Importantly, the position
has continued to evolve in 2026: the Income-tax Act, 2025 contains dedicated
crypto-asset reporting architecture, while FIU-IND continues active enforcement
against non-compliant VDA service providers.
This article advances a central proposition: India's
problem is a regulatory patchwork rather than a complete legal vacuum. Existing
laws can prosecute substantial portions of crypto fraud, but their
effectiveness declines where the offence depends on anonymous developers,
decentralised protocols, offshore service providers, smart-contract
manipulation or rapid movement across multiple wallets and jurisdictions. The
resulting gap is institutional as much as doctrinal.
2. Research Questions and Methodology
The article is guided by five questions: (i) how do
decentralisation, pseudonymity, irreversibility and borderless transfer
challenge the application of Indian criminal law; (ii) whether the BNS, IT Act
and PMLA provide an adequate basis for investigation and prosecution; (iii) how
institutional fragmentation among RBI, SEBI, FIU-IND, ED and police agencies
affects enforcement; (iv) what lessons can be drawn from the United States,
European Union and Singapore; and (v) what institutional and legislative reforms
can provide investor protection without suppressing legitimate technological
innovation?
The methodology is doctrinal and comparative. Primary
legal materials include statutes, judicial decisions, regulatory instruments
and official government materials. The underlying dissertation also uses case
studies of major Indian cryptocurrency frauds, including GainBitcoin, Morris
Coin, Bux Coin-related litigation and WazirX-related disputes. The comparative
component examines the United States’ SEC/FinCEN model, the European Union’s
Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCA), and Singapore’s Payment Services
Act and related Monetary Authority of Singapore requirements. Because
cryptocurrency law is unusually time-sensitive, this article updates the
dissertation’s 2025 position with official Indian materials available through
11 September 2026.
3. The Technology of Fraud: Why Cryptocurrency Creates
a Distinct Legal Problem Decentralisation, pseudonymity and irreversibility
Cryptocurrency transactions are generally recorded on
distributed ledgers rather than in a central institutional ledger. A wallet
address may reveal the transaction history associated with that address without
automatically revealing the natural or legal person controlling it. This is
better understood as pseudonymity rather than perfect anonymity. That
distinction is legally important: blockchain records may be highly useful as
evidence, but the evidentiary bridge between a wallet and a human actor frequently
requires exchange records, device evidence, communications, IP information, KYC
material or other off-chain evidence.
The relative irreversibility of confirmed transactions
creates a second problem. In ordinary payment systems, fraudulent transfers may
sometimes be reversed, frozen or recalled through an intermediary. In a public
blockchain, a victim who voluntarily transfers assets to a fraudster cannot
ordinarily invoke a central operator to reverse the transaction. Legal remedies
must therefore depend on identifying the beneficiary, freezing assets when they
enter an identifiable service, tracing proceeds, obtaining judicial orders and
cooperating with foreign authorities.
4. India’s Existing Legal Architecture
4.1 Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023
The BNS supplies the general criminal-law foundation
for fraud. Section 318 addresses cheating and is relevant where deception
induces a victim to part with property or act to his or her detriment. Section
314 addresses dishonest misappropriation of property, while Section 316
addresses criminal breach of trust. Section 111 on organised crime may become
relevant where the factual and statutory requirements are satisfied in
coordinated, serious criminal activity. These provisions are sufficiently
technology-neutral to reach many crypto-fraud transactions.[1]
The difficulty is not that cheating suddenly ceases to
be cheating because Bitcoin is used. The difficulty lies in attribution, proof
of dishonest intention, the legal characterisation of the digital asset as
property, and territorial jurisdiction. In a traditional fraud, investigators
may identify the account holder, intermediary and place of transaction
comparatively quickly. In a crypto scheme, the promoter may use pseudonymous
wallets, overseas exchanges, mixers and decentralised protocols. Thus, the substantive
offence may be straightforward while the evidentiary and jurisdictional pathway
to the offender is not.
4.2 Information Technology Act, 2000
The IT Act remains important where the fraudulent
conduct is technologically mediated. Sections 43 and 66 may apply to
unauthorised access and dishonest or fraudulent acts involving computer
resources; Section 66C addresses identity theft; and Section 66D addresses
cheating by personation using computer resources. These provisions are
particularly relevant to phishing, fake exchange interfaces, account takeover,
credential theft and hacking of wallets or exchanges.[2]
Its limitation is historical design. The Act predates
blockchain-based cryptocurrencies and therefore does not provide a
comprehensive law of digital assets, decentralised autonomous organisations,
smart-contract liability or crypto-asset custody. The law can often reach the
cyber component of a crypto offence, but it does not necessarily regulate the
underlying digital-asset business model. This creates a distinction between
'cybercrime involving crypto' and 'fraud inherent in a crypto product or market'.
4.3 Prevention of Money Laundering Act and FIU-IND
The PMLA is the most important example of India
adapting an existing financial-crime statute to digital assets. The 2023
notification brought specified VDA activities within the reporting-entity
architecture, including exchange between VDAs and fiat currency, exchange
between different VDAs, transfer of VDAs, safekeeping or administration, and
specified financial services connected with the issue or sale of VDAs. FIU-IND
registration therefore provides a compliance gateway even in the absence of a
comprehensive crypto licensing law.[3]
This development significantly changes the proposition
that India has 'no regulation'. It has regulation, but it is principally
activity-based AML/CFT regulation rather than a complete market-conduct and
investor-protection regime. FIU-IND's continuing enforcement against offshore
VDA service providers demonstrates that the regulatory perimeter is
increasingly being asserted on the basis of activity and targeting of the
Indian market rather than only physical presence.
The PMLA nevertheless has structural limits. Money
laundering is ordinarily parasitic on proceeds of crime; it is not a substitute
for a complete substantive law governing every form of crypto fraud. Further,
tracing a blockchain transaction does not by itself prove who controlled the
relevant wallet or establish the underlying scheduled offence. The effective
model must therefore connect blockchain analytics, KYC records, device
evidence, banking information and conventional criminal investigation.
4.4 Taxation and the emerging crypto-asset reporting
architecture
Tax law has produced an important form of legal
recognition without creating legal-tender status. The VDA framework introduced
a 30% tax rate on income from transfers of VDAs, subject to the statutory
rules, and a 1% TDS regime in specified circumstances. More recently, the
Finance Act, 2025 expanded the statutory VDA definition with a crypto-asset
limb effective from 1 April 2026 and introduced dedicated reporting
architecture for crypto-asset transactions. Under the Income-tax Act, 2025,
Section 509 requires prescribed reporting entities to furnish statements
relating to crypto-asset transactions; the 2026 framework also introduced
penalties for non-compliance.[4]
These developments are significant because they
strengthen the information infrastructure available to the state. They should
not, however, be mistaken for comprehensive investor protection. Tax reporting
answers the question 'what transaction information must be reported to tax
authorities?'; it does not fully answer 'who may operate an exchange?', 'what
cybersecurity standard must it meet?', 'what disclosures must a token issuer
make?', or 'what remedy does a defrauded consumer receive?'
4.5 SEBI, RBI and institutional fragmentation
SEBI's jurisdiction is strongest where a crypto
product or scheme falls within existing securities or collective-investment
concepts. The underlying research notes the relevance of Section 11AA of the
SEBI Act to pooled investment arrangements. Yet the absence of a general
statutory classification of cryptocurrencies as securities limits SEBI's
ability to act as a universal crypto regulator.[5]
The RBI occupies a different institutional position.
Its monetary and banking mandate gives it substantial authority over regulated
financial entities and payment systems, but not a free-standing mandate to
regulate every private digital asset. The 2018 circular and its subsequent
invalidation illustrate the constitutional boundary: financial regulation must
remain proportionate to the demonstrated harm and within statutory authority.
FIU-IND and ED fill important AML and
proceeds-of-crime functions, while state police, cyber cells and
economic-offence units often handle the originating fraud. The result is a
multi-agency ecosystem without a single institution carrying end-to-end responsibility
for crypto market integrity. This fragmentation is the central institutional
weakness identified by the research.
5. Judicial Response and Case Studies
5.1 Internet and Mobile Association of India v. RBI
The Supreme Court's 2020 judgment is foundational
because it demonstrates that regulatory caution cannot automatically justify a
total restriction. The Court examined proportionality and held that the RBI's
banking restriction was excessive in light of the evidentiary record. The
decision did not declare cryptocurrencies legal tender, nor did it prevent
Parliament from legislating. Its deeper lesson for crypto policy is
methodological: the state must match the intensity of the regulatory response
to demonstrable risk and statutory authority.[6]
5.2 GainBitcoin: the archetype of the crypto-Ponzi problem
The GainBitcoin matter, as analysed in the source
research, illustrates how an apparently technological investment proposition
can resemble a conventional Ponzi scheme. Investors were promised fixed or
unusually high Bitcoin-linked returns, and the scheme allegedly used
multi-level structures and subsequent token substitutions. The case exposes the
weakness of relying on the novelty of the asset as a defence against ordinary
fraud law. The core conduct—inducement by deception and diversion of investor funds—can
fit established criminal categories; the difficulty is scale, evidence, asset
tracing and coordination.[7]
5.3 Morris Coin: fictitious token, real liability
The Morris Coin case study is particularly valuable
because it shows how the 'crypto' label can be used to create an appearance of
technical legitimacy. Investors were solicited with promises concerning token
issuance, exchange listing and high returns, while the underlying token
allegedly did not exist in the promised form. The case illustrates the
regulatory gap at the boundary between traditional cheating and unregulated
token issuance. It also demonstrates why disclosure, licensing and promoter
accountability are necessary before a fraud occurs rather than only after funds
disappear.[8]
5.4 Bux Coin litigation and the limits of territorial
enforcement
The Bux Coin-related litigation discussed in the
research demonstrates the transnational dimension of crypto fraud. A
purportedly Dubai-connected enterprise, a digital exchange and investors across
multiple Indian states created a jurisdictional mosaic. Courts were required to
balance the seriousness of the alleged economic offence with personal liberty,
while also imposing conditions designed to prevent recurrence. Such litigation
shows that Indian courts can apply existing penal and state-specific depositor
laws, but it also shows the cost of doing so in the absence of uniform
digital-asset legislation.[9]
5.5 WazirX: the consumer-protection gap
The WazirX episode is different from an investment
Ponzi because it centres on exchange security and consumer redress. The
research records the July 2024 breach involving a very large loss of
crypto-assets and the subsequent consumer litigation. The NCDRC's 2025
disposition, as discussed in the source, illustrates the jurisdictional problem
created by contractual choice-of-law and the absence of a specialised Indian
mechanism for crypto disputes. The case exposes an important policy gap: AML
supervision of an exchange does not automatically create a comprehensive regime
governing custody, segregation of customer assets, cybersecurity, insurance, or
compensation following an exchange failure.[10]
6. Enforcement Challenges
6.1 Attribution and digital evidence
The most persistent enforcement problem is
attribution. A public ledger can show the movement of assets but may not
identify the person behind a wallet. Investigators therefore need a chain of
evidence connecting blockchain addresses to exchanges, devices, communications,
bank accounts and persons. This requires technical capacity that is unevenly
distributed across India's policing and prosecution systems.
6.2 Mixers, DeFi and technological escalation
Mixing services and privacy-enhancing technologies can
obscure transaction trails. DeFi introduces another problem: there may be no
conventional intermediary against whom a regulator can immediately impose KYC,
governance or cybersecurity duties. Smart contracts can automate transactions,
but code does not resolve the legal question of who bears responsibility when a
developer intentionally embeds a vulnerability or uses administrative
privileges to extract liquidity.
6.3 Jurisdiction and international cooperation
Crypto fraud is structurally transnational. A victim
may be in India, the promoter in another jurisdiction, the exchange in a third,
and the assets distributed across wallets controlled through multiple
jurisdictions. Mutual legal assistance, exchange cooperation, asset-freezing
orders and recognition of digital evidence must therefore operate faster than
conventional cross-border litigation. The absence of harmonised rules creates
opportunities for regulatory arbitrage.
6.4 Institutional capacity and public awareness
Technical capacity is only one side of the problem.
Victims frequently lack knowledge of wallet security, private keys, phishing
and the legal risks of unrealistic returns. Public education is therefore a
preventive regulatory tool. The research rightly treats investor education not
as a peripheral issue but as part of the legal response to fraud.
7. Comparative Regulatory Models
7.1 United States: enforcement power with institutional
fragmentation
The United States demonstrates the strengths and
weaknesses of a multi-agency model. The SEC addresses crypto-assets and
offerings that fall within securities law; FinCEN applies anti-money-laundering
obligations to covered financial businesses; the Department of Justice
prosecutes criminal offences; and other agencies may assert jurisdiction
depending on the asset and activity. The Howey framework has allowed courts and
regulators to analyse certain token offerings as investment contracts.[11]
The United States has also begun an institutional
clarification process. The SEC established a Crypto Task Force in January 2025
to work toward a clearer regulatory framework and continues public engagement.
The American experience demonstrates that strong enforcement cannot fully
compensate for classification disputes and overlapping mandates.
7.2 European Union: harmonisation through MiCA
The EU's MiCA model offers a different lesson: instead
of relying primarily on case-by-case classification, it creates a dedicated
framework for crypto-assets and crypto-asset service providers, with
requirements concerning authorisation, disclosure, governance and consumer
protection. MiCA distinguishes categories such as asset-referenced tokens and
e-money tokens and imposes obligations on service providers.[12]
For India, the major lesson is institutional
coherence. A harmonised statutory perimeter can reduce the uncertainty that
arises when each regulator attempts to fit a new asset into an old category.
The Indian model need not copy MiCA, but it should adopt the principle that
crypto-asset activities should be classified by function and risk rather than
by technological label.
7.3 Singapore: licensing, AML and consumer safeguards
Singapore's Payment Services Act provides an
activity-based licensing structure for digital payment token services,
supported by anti-money-laundering and technology-risk requirements. The
Monetary Authority of Singapore has also adopted a consumer-oriented approach
that includes risk disclosures and restrictions on misleading promotion. The
model demonstrates how a jurisdiction can permit innovation while imposing
entry, governance and operational standards.[13]
8. Toward an Indian Risk-Based Crypto-Fraud Framework
8.1 Enact a dedicated Digital Asset Regulation Act
India should move from a collection of partial
controls toward a dedicated, technology-neutral statute. The statute should not
necessarily legalise every crypto product or treat every token as a security.
Instead, it should define the regulatory perimeter and allocate
responsibilities by activity and risk. It should define digital assets,
crypto-asset service providers, custodians, exchanges, issuers, brokers, token
promoters and relevant decentralised activities, while expressly preserving the
legal status of sovereign currency and CBDC.
8.2 Introduce activity-based VASP licensing
Registration with FIU-IND is an important AML gateway
but should be complemented by a licensing regime for market conduct and
operational risk. Exchanges, custodians, brokers, transfer providers and token
issuers should face proportionate licensing thresholds. Requirements should
include fit-and-proper criteria, minimum capital where appropriate, segregation
of customer assets, cybersecurity audits, incident reporting, business
continuity, record retention and governance.
8.3 Build a specialised crypto-fraud investigation
architecture
A national digital-asset fraud coordination mechanism
should connect FIU-IND, ED, cybercrime police, state economic-offence units,
RBI, SEBI and tax authorities. The objective should be operational rather than
bureaucratic: one complaint should trigger coordinated tracing, rapid
preservation of evidence, identification of exchange touchpoints and assessment
of whether PMLA, BNS, IT Act, tax or securities provisions apply.
8.4 Make blockchain analytics a standard investigative
capability
The underlying research identifies Chainalysis,
CipherTrace and Elliptic-type tools and the potential use of machine learning
to identify suspicious smart-contract patterns. India should build an
accountable public-sector capability rather than rely entirely on private
vendors. AI-assisted risk scoring should be used as an investigative lead, not
as a substitute for human adjudication. Systems should maintain audit trails,
preserve explainability and comply with constitutional privacy and evidentiary
requirements.[14]
8.5 Create mandatory consumer-protection standards
A crypto customer should receive clearer legal
protection than exists under the present fragmented model. Exchanges should
disclose material risks, conflicts of interest, custody arrangements and
security incidents. Customer assets should be segregated where appropriate. A
specialised ombudsman or digital-asset dispute mechanism should provide
low-cost redress for smaller claims. For proven fraud, law should facilitate
rapid asset freezing and restitution without prejudging criminal liability.
8.6 Address DeFi without pretending that decentralisation
eliminates responsibility
A future statute should distinguish genuinely
decentralised protocols from entities that exercise meaningful control over
code, treasury, governance, front-end access or user assets. Regulation should
focus on functional control and risk creation. A person who can materially
alter a protocol, control liquidity or profit from user transactions should not
escape regulation merely by describing the project as 'decentralised'. At the
same time, open-source software development should not automatically become a regulated
financial activity.
8.7 Strengthen international cooperation
India should deepen cooperation through FATF
standards, mutual legal assistance, regulator-to-regulator channels and
structured exchange of information with major crypto jurisdictions. The FATF
Travel Rule principle is particularly relevant because it seeks to preserve
originator and beneficiary information across VASP transfers. Cross-border
asset recovery should become a specialised operational field.[15]
9. Testing the Hypothesis and Answering the Research
Questions
The research hypothesis that the existing Indian
framework is doctrinally inadequate is supported, but with an important
qualification. It would be inaccurate to describe Indian law as incapable of
addressing crypto fraud. Cheating, criminal breach of trust, cyber offences,
money laundering, tax reporting and certain securities or depositor-protection
offences can all be used depending on the facts. The deficiency is systemic: no
single framework provides a complete pathway from market entry to prevention, detection,
prosecution, asset recovery and consumer redress.
The first research question is answered by identifying
pseudonymity, decentralisation, irreversibility and cross-border operation as
the main sources of difficulty. The second is answered by showing that BNS, IT
Act and PMLA are useful but functionally incomplete. The third is answered
through the institutional analysis: overlapping mandates create regulatory
seams, while technical capacity varies. The fourth is answered by the
comparative section: India can combine the EU's statutory coherence, Singapore's
licensing and consumer protection, and the US's specialised enforcement
capabilities. The fifth is answered by the proposed risk-based framework.
10. Conclusion
Cryptocurrency fraud should not be treated as a
problem created solely by a new form of money. It is a problem created by the
collision between new technological infrastructure and legal institutions
designed around intermediaries, territoriality and identifiable assets. India
has moved beyond a purely prohibitory approach. Yet the regulatory patchwork
remains inadequate for the full lifecycle of crypto fraud. A victim of a rug
pull needs more than the possibility of prosecuting cheating after the event. A
customer of an exchange needs custody and cybersecurity standards before an
attack. A token issuer needs disclosure duties before collecting public money.
Investigators need rapid access to KYC and blockchain intelligence before
assets cross multiple jurisdictions. And courts need a coherent statutory
vocabulary for determining rights, duties and remedies.
The appropriate Indian response is therefore neither
unconditional prohibition nor laissez-faire. It is risk-based governance.
Parliament should establish a clear statutory perimeter; regulators should
allocate obligations according to activity and risk; FIU-IND and investigative
agencies should operate through interoperable intelligence systems; exchanges
and custodians should satisfy measurable governance and cybersecurity
standards; and consumers should receive meaningful disclosure and redress. Such
a framework would not guarantee the disappearance of crypto fraud—no financial
system can—but it would reduce the structural advantages currently enjoyed by
fraudsters and improve the capacity of the Indian legal system to identify,
disrupt, punish and remediate digital-asset crime.
The deeper lesson is constitutional as well as
regulatory. Internet and Mobile Association of India v. RBI demonstrates that
disruptive technology must be governed through lawful and proportionate state
action. A mature Indian crypto policy should therefore combine financial
stability, innovation, privacy, consumer protection, technological competence
and the rule of law. The objective should not be to make cryptocurrency
risk-free; it should be to make the legal system capable of responding to the
risks that cryptocurrency creates.
[3]Prevention
of Money Laundering Act 2002, ss 3, 5, 8, 12; Financial Intelligence
Unit–India, ‘Registration of Virtual Digital Asset Service Providers as
Reporting Entity under PMLA’ (4 July 2023).
[7]Ganesh
Shivkumar Sagar v State of Gujarat, Special Leave to Appeal (Crl) No 268 of
2023 (Supreme Court materials discussed in the source research).
[8]Enforcement
Directorate, materials concerning the Morris Coin investigation and attachment
of assets.
[9]Divyesh
Dhansukhbhai Darji v State of Gujarat, R/Criminal Misc Appl Nos 16743 &
17068 of 2021 (Guj HC).
[11]US
Securities and Exchange Commission, ‘Crypto Task Force’ materials (2025–2026);
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Bank Secrecy Act guidance concerning
convertible virtual currency and money services businesses.
[13]Payment
Services Act 2019 (Singapore); Monetary Authority of Singapore, requirements
applicable to Digital Payment Token service providers.
[15]Financial
Action Task Force, standards concerning virtual assets and virtual asset
service providers, including the Travel Rule.
How to Cite This Article
ADV ANOOP MAHOBIA, INDIA’S LEGAL RESPONSE TO CRYPTOCURRENCY FRAUD., White Black Legal – International Law Journal, ISSN: 2581-8503, Vol. 4, Issue 1, September 2026, pp. 825-840. Available at: https://www.whiteblacklegal.co.in/public/details/indias-legal-response-to-cryptocurrency-fraud
Author & Publication Record
Authors: ADV ANOOP MAHOBIA
Registration ID: 107101 | Published Paper ID: WBL7101
Year: Sep- 2026 | Volume: 4 | Issue: 1
Approved ISSN: 2581-8503 | Country: Delhi, India
Page No.: 825-840
Full Text Preview
Open in New Tab
Copied