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White Black Legal – International Law Journal · ISSN 2581-8503
COMPETITION LAW AS A SAFEGUARD AGAINST MONOPSONY POWER: A STUDY OF INDIAN AGRICULTURAL MARKETS AND FARMER EXPLOITATION
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Abstract
COMPETITION LAW AS A SAFEGUARD AGAINST MONOPSONY
POWER: A STUDY OF INDIAN AGRICULTURAL MARKETS AND FARMER EXPLOITATION
Abstract
Even though farming emerged as the backbone of the
Indian economy, a sizable portion of the population still made money from it.
However, due to the unequal power of negotiation between buyers and sellers in
the agricultural sector, farmers could occasionally not be ready to secure an
appropriate price for their commodities. Few merchants, processing companies,
associations, or procurement authorities have a substantial influence over the
conditions of trade in certain procurement marketplaces. The existence of
monopsony power and how it affects farmers' wellbeing are crucial questions in
this situation.
The type and degree of monopsony power in India's
agricultural sector are investigated in this paper, along with if the present
structure of competition law can adequately address these problems. Special
emphasis is placed on the Competition Act of 2002's laws pertaining to market
dominance, misuse of dominant authority, and anti-competitive transactions.
In some chosen industries, like dairy, sugarcane, cotton, and food grains, wherein purchasing power may have a big influence on traditional farmers, the study also looks at the purchasing processes.
In some chosen industries, like dairy, sugarcane, cotton, and food grains, wherein purchasing power may have a big influence on traditional farmers, the study also looks at the purchasing processes.
Keywords:
Monopsony power, Competition law, Anti-competitive transactions, Agricultural
sector.
INTRODUCTION
A major percentage of the Indian population depends on
farming as their main source of income, and it serves a crucial role in the
country's economy. In addition to ensuring food security, the agricultural
sector plays a significant role in generating employment, development of rural
areas, the production of essential supplies for industries, and general
economic growth. Many of people across the nation still rely heavily on farming
for their livelihoods, despite the growing importance of the service and
manufacturing industries. As a result, farm-related prosperity and the smooth
operation of India's agricultural markets have long been important objectives
of national policy[3].
The abundance of cultivators engaged in the
cultivation and sale of different agricultural products is a defining feature
of Indian agricultural markets. A variety of buyers, including merchants,
processors, exporters, cooperatives, purchasing agencies, structured retail
chains, and major agricultural-related firms, purchase these commodities. In
contrast, agricultural production is dispersed among numerous marginal and
small-scale farmers in several industries, and there are relatively few
consumers in other areas. This disparity frequently places the farm in an
unfair negotiation position and reduces their ability to bargain for favourable
contract terms and prices[4]. The frameworks of agricultural supply networks have
undergone significant alterations recently. Because to the rapid expansion of
major food manufacturing firms, structured retail distribution networks,
suppliers, and farming-related businesses, monopolies on the buying segment of
the agricultural sector have increased in recent times. For a comparatively
small portion of purchasing across a number of industries, usually are a few
high-volume buyers. This monopoly may strengthen farmers' bargaining power and
restrict their purchasing options, particularly if producers[5]
do not have any alternatives.
Numerous significant concerns regarding purchaser
power within agriculture have been brought about by the trend towards increased
consumer dominance. Generally speaking, buyer power increases when consumers
have the ability to influence the market through things like the prices they
pay providers. The market may exhibit either monopsony or oligopoly
characteristics if a small number of purchasers purchase goods from numerous
farmers. These could have a detrimental effect on farmers' earnings, market accessibility,
and even market results. International organizations that prioritize the need
to consider purchaser power in competition rules, such as the International
Competition Network[6]
(ICN) and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
have highlighted these issues.
Maintaining that the purchasing authority of suppliers
(monopolies and cartels) is not utilized in an adverse competitive manner has
been the fundamental goal of competition law. However, it is acknowledged that
excessive purchasing power can lead to problems with competition law concern[7]
in today's cutthroat environment. Farmers' capacity to obtain equitable market
circumstances and offer what they produce at competitive prices may be
adversely affected by the monopsony or oligopoly dominance of major purchasers
in agriculture purchasing marketplaces.
Meaning of Monopsony
A marketplace situation known as monopsony, or
standard, occurs when there is just one purchaser and multiple sellers. In a
market like this, the purchaser has a lot of negotiating leverage and can
influence the conditions and the cost of the items purchased. In a monopolistic
arrangement, one supplier has significant control over the supply of a good
service[8],
whereas in a monopsony, which means that a single purchaser has significant
influence over the need for a good. As a consequence, the vendor may have
limited options and the purchaser is potentially able to determine the seller's
parameters and cost. If a manufacturing
corporation, a purchasing firm, or a local vendor is the only significant
purchaser[9]
of the farmer's produce, monopsony conditions may arise in the farming
industry. Due to their immediate requirement to market their produce upon
harvest, peasants are frequently the most vulnerable to the use of standard
monopsony power.
Concentration - The Size of the Market and Purchaser
Power
The
purchasing power is closely associated with monopsony products. Purchase power
is the ability of purchasers to influence conditions regarding trade, pricing,
and results because of their standing in the market and financial resources.
Buyers that account for a sizable portion of purchases in a particular market
usually possess this kind of influence. In the vendor's perspective, consumers
are able to negotiate more when their purchasing capacity is greater. Although
farmers are usually small-scale producers and dispersed, buyer power may be
particularly strong in agricultural purchase markets. In contrast, purchasers
might have more availability of knowledge, transportation systems, facilities
for storage, and financial resources. Buyers may be able to determine the
conditions and expenses of purchase thanks to this disparity. International
organizations like the International Competition Network and the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have recognized purchasing
power and buyer dominance as important competition concerns[10].
Experts have emphasized that focusing too much on the purchasing side of the
market could lead to market abnormalities, which would be detrimental to
manufacturers.
Purchaser
Power and its Financial Effect on Farmers
There are
several detrimental effects when farmers and other agricultural producers have
excessive buying power. A reduction in leverage is one of the most significant
effects. Farmers might not be able to demand reasonable rates for their
products if there aren't many purchasers. Although agricultural products are
often volatile and cannot be stored indefinitely, farmers may be obliged to
agree to lower than the optimum price.
This has
a major effect as well because it reduces farm-gate pricing. Strong purchasers
may be able to negotiate a cheaper price for agricultural produce than the
going rate. This directly affects farmers' income and may make farming less
appealing. The financial viability of farming techniques, particularly for
marginal and small-scale farmers, may be threatened by low prices if they are
not sustained over time.
Market
dependence might also result from purchasing power. The farmer is financially
reliant on the single buyer if they rely on them for a significant amount of
the produce. They are more vulnerable to kinds of manipulation because of this
dependence, including unethical business practices, late payments, restricted
terms of agreements, etc. Additionally, increased buyer dominance may make it
more difficult for farmers to offer their agricultural products in highly
competitive markets, which could jeopardize access to the market. As a result,
farmers might lose out on the benefits of consumer competition.
Monopolies
Problems in Markets for Farming Procurement
Monopsony
power is a common feature of agricultural purchasing marketplaces. In terms of
demand, there are frequently thousands of farmers manufacturing agricultural
goods. One large standardized processor, government organization, cooperative,
supplier, retail supply chain, or agricultural business company may control all
aspects of demand-based purchase. The development of purchasing power and its
effects on market results may be facilitated by this structural disparity.
According
to the OECD, only a small percentage of purchasers may account for a sizable
portion of purchases made from farmers[11],
making purchasing power a recurrent subject in the agricultural sector.
Similarly, studies on Competition Policy in Farming in India have found that a
lack of competition can negatively affect conventional agricultural producers,
especially little as well as less inventive farmers who possess no alternative
means of selling. Farmers may have limited options when it pertains to buyer
selection in several industries, such as dairy, sugarcane, cotton, and
food-grain purchasing.
The
existence of monopsony-related issues in agricultural purchasing markets raises
a number of issues regarding the function of competition legislation. It is
crucial to assess whether competition legislation is sufficient to address
purchasers' market power considering its historical emphasis on market power on
the "seller side." Therefore, an assessment of the Competition Act of
2002 is required to determine if it is adequate to prevent powerful purchasers
from engaging in anti-competitive practices and to maintain fair, effective,
and competitive agriculture sectors for farmers.
Purchasing
Power and the Structure of Competition Law
The
Competition Act of 2002 was enacted to protect the needs of consumers, promote
competition in Indian marketplaces[12],
and guaranty the liberty of commerce enjoyed by all involved. The Act seeks to
prevent actions that can seriously harm competition and to encourage the smooth
operation of markets. Competition law[13]
rules are sufficiently comprehensive to encompass unfair practices that utilize
purchasing power, despite the fact that competition law is often thought
thereof in the context of opposing monopolistic power and consumer protection.
Consequently, the Act provides a framework for evaluating and addressing
monopsony power issues in agriculture-related procurement markets.
Anti-Competition
Agreements
Agreements
that cause or are likely to cause an “appreciable adverse effect on competition”
(AAEC) in India are prohibited by Section 3 of the Competition Act, 2002[14].
The phrase specifically refers to bidding manipulation contracts, production or
supply restrictions, market distribution, and price manipulation. Although
seller cartels[15] are
typically the subject of Section 3, cartels on the purchasing side of the
market are not prohibited under the phrase. Additionally, buyers who set the
buying price or buy terms in a manner that is anti-competitive and harmful to
providers may be subject to the provision. In the agricultural sector,
purchasers may become less competitive and farmers' negotiating strength may be
weakened if market participants agree to cut procurement costs or engage in
synchronized buying. Because of this, Section 3 is an important instrument for
dealing with collusive behaviour that may be utilized to boost monopsony
strength.
Misuse of
Dominant Position: Section 4[16]
No
company abuses its position of dominance. The Competition Act, 2002, simply
states that dominance is unlawful when it is abused, not that dominance is
unlawful in and of itself. A company may be accused of violating its dominant
position if it imposes arbitrary or discriminatory terms and conditions, sets
unfair prices, restricts production or technological advances, denies access to
the market, or uses its dominant position in one sector to gain a dominant
position in another. Although a dominating seller is the focus of Section 4
discussions, a dominant purchaser can also benefit from Section 4. A consumer
with substantial market dominance can obtain an unfair purchasing clause, the
ability to set prices, or the ability to exploit a supplier in the absence of
competing purchasers. Such actions could harm farmers and cause distortions in
the market in agribusiness purchasing markets. Therefore, Section 4 provides a
strong legal basis for addressing problems resulting from typical monopsony.
Evaluation
of a Significantly Adverse Impact on Competition - Section 19
The
Competition Commission of India (CCI) has the authority to look into alleged
violations of Sections 3 and 4 and Section 19[17],
which also provides guidelines on what should be taken into account when
assessing whether the behaviour has a noticeably negative impact on
competition. Numerous variables, including barriers to entrance, lack of
competition, customer advantages, improvements in manufacturing or
distribution, and advancements in technology, science, and the economy, all
contribute to this. In the framework of farming-related purchasing markets,
these parameters could assist the CCI in determining whether the acts of dominant
procurement institutions are probable to violate competition, limit farmers'
market prospects, or result in discriminatory purchasing methods for farmers.
Therefore, Section 19 is crucial for figuring out how buyer strength affects
the market.
May the
Competition Act, 2002 be used to combat purchaser monopoly?
The Competition Act of 2002[18]
makes no reference of monopsony in its entirety. But the Act's wording is broad
enough to cover purchaser-side market dominance. When buyers engage in mutually
beneficial conduct to lower the buying price or arrange the procurement,
Section 3 may be applied. Similarly, if a dominant buyer has excessive power to
negotiate or exploits providers by enforcing unfair terms and conditions,
Section 4[19]
may be activated.
International competition authorities and organizations have also realized that excess purchasing power might produce competition difficulties in addition to supplier power. In traditional agricultural markets, when numerous farmers can sell their goods to a small number of customers, it is particularly important. Therefore, the Competition Act can offer a framework for addressing standard monopoly power; nevertheless, the extent of its implementation and efficacy will rely on how it is interpreted and applied in real-world situations.
International competition authorities and organizations have also realized that excess purchasing power might produce competition difficulties in addition to supplier power. In traditional agricultural markets, when numerous farmers can sell their goods to a small number of customers, it is particularly important. Therefore, the Competition Act can offer a framework for addressing standard monopoly power; nevertheless, the extent of its implementation and efficacy will rely on how it is interpreted and applied in real-world situations.
Purchasing power in farming can arise in a variety of
plausible situations. For example, farmers might have no alternative options to
sell their sugarcane when it is only supplied to one sugar mill in the
vicinity. Problems under Section 4 of the Competition Act may arise from the
mill's actions if it imposes unfair terms for the procurement, delayed in
payments, or excessively low prices. Such actions may be investigated by the
Competition Commission of India (CCI) as potential abuses of dominance. If a food
manufacturing company, supplier, or farming enterprise imposes reduced pricing
on agricultural commodities or places discriminating terms and conditions on
purchases from farmers, it may also raise concerns about purchasing power.
When the competing buyers' coordinated buying becomes
significant, Section 3[20]
may be applicable. For instance, there may be less competition between buyers
and a detrimental effect on farmers if multiple cotton ginning mills, grain
dealers, or procurement agencies decide to purchase agricultural produce at a
set low price. Due to its denial of market pricing authority and reduction of
agricultural producers' bargaining leverage, it may be deemed an
anti-competitive arrangement.
India's Farm Marketing Structure
Markets when farmers sell their produce to processing
firms, merchants, exporters, traditional cooperatives, governmental
organizations, and agriculture-related businesses are known as farming
procurement markets. Markets are crucial for connecting and moving agricultural
products from farmers to manufacturing facilities, businesses, and retail
outlets. In India, a high number of farmers and a small number of purchasers
typically control the agriculture-related procurement market. This could result
in a situation whereby buyers as well as sellers have different power to
negotiate. Consumers may have more resources, storage, shipping, and market
knowledge than farmers, who often operate on a small scale and produce
perishable goods that need to be sold quickly. This mismatch may have an impact
on contract terms, procurement costs, and purchaser availability, which may
result in purchasing power.
Purchasing Sugar Cane and Sugar Mills
The sugar business is one of the greatest notable
instances of India's agriculture having a market having buyer dominance.
Because sugar cane is heavy and costly to ship, specific producers may be
forced to use particular sugar mills in particular regions due to regulatory
constraints. This explains why nearby sugar mills are the primary market for
sugar cane growers. As a result, farmers have few options and must rely on
nearby sugar mills to sell their sugarcane harvest13. Due of this reliance, the
mill may have a stronger negotiation position and the farmers may have less
negotiating leverage. The government's
Fair and Remunerative
Price (FRP) is designed to protect sugarcane producers' interests, however there continue to be some concerns around payment delays, fewer buyer options, and dependence on local mills. Therefore, the sugar industry is a good example of how structural factors can increase buyer power in markets for agricultural procurement.
Price (FRP) is designed to protect sugarcane producers' interests, however there continue to be some concerns around payment delays, fewer buyer options, and dependence on local mills. Therefore, the sugar industry is a good example of how structural factors can increase buyer power in markets for agricultural procurement.
Dairy Procurement Markets
The dairy
business is an additional significant area of agricultural purchasing where
purchasing power problems might arise. The majority of milk producers sell what
they produce to commercial dairy firms or dairy cooperatives. In certain
regions, a small number of purchasers possess an extensive network of vendors,
processing facilities, and buyers that enable them to obtain milk. Since milk
must be sold right away and is extremely perishable, dairy farmers have few
possibilities for other buyers. When making a purchase, this may offer the
buyer a stronger bargaining position. Although Indian dairy farmers have
benefited greatly from cooperative models, the emergence of large dairy
corporations has sparked concerns regarding pricing strategies, procurement
procedures, and the potential for small farmers to receive fair prices.
Markets for Food Grain Purchases
In India, food grains are purchased by both public and
private entities. Government organizations, like the Food Corporation of India,
buy wheat and rice using a mechanism known as the Minimum Support Price (MSP),
which is intended to ensure food security as well as support farmers' prices.
Government procurement shields some commodities and regions from buyer
exploitation. However, not every agricultural commodity and every region should
be covered under MSP procurement. In many cases when farmers sell their
produce, private dealers, commission agents, processors, and wholesalers
continue to be important players. Purchaser
competition can impact purchasing costs and negatively impact farmers'
negotiating strength if there are just a few successful buyers. Consequently,
it is crucial to examine the function of government involvement in food grain
purchasing, private purchasing, and purchasing power using the food grain
purchasing market as a standardized structure.
Market
Competition and Farming Chains of Supply
The centralized nature of farming supply networks is
one of the identified risks. Generally speaking, commodities from agriculture
go through multiple phases prior to the time they become available by the final
consumers. These processes consist of buying, processing, storage, shipping,
distribution by standard, and retail sale, all of which are considered to be
part of a farming supply chain. In recent years, major processors, exporters,
conventional retail chains, and agriculture-related businesses have made a more
significant entry into the farming supply chains in India, that has contributed
establish greater concentration across the chain. As companies' purchasing
capacity may increase as they expand their purchasing chains and acquire more
control over the downstream processes. As
businesses expand their supply chains and increase their control over bottom
operations, their ability to purchase goods may rise dramatically. Procurement
markets may become less competitive, and manufacturers may have fewer options
if there are fewer customers. International organizations like the
International Competition Network and the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development have observed that concentration in the
agricultural supply chain may increase consumer purchasing power and decrease
manufacturer bargaining power, raising concerns about competition.
Effects of purchasing capacity on farmers
The consumer's power determines the power of farmers
and traditional agricultural markets. The initial strategy is the diminished
ability to negotiate. Farmers may be compelled to accept contractual terms and
prices imposed by buyers if there are few buyers prepared to purchase. In
regions where volatile agricultural products cannot be preserved for extended
periods of time, this problem becomes more important. Additionally, buyer
dominance may result in fewer purchasing costs than in a market with competition,
which may result in cheaper rates for farms and fewer benefits for investment
in farming.
Relying on the market is different. Farmers are
vulnerable to developments in standardized procurement procedures, late
payments, tight contractual conditions, and other business activities due to a
relatively small percentage of purchasers. Because there are fewer purchasers
accessible to agricultural producers, purchaser competition may also have an
impact on market access. These may have a detrimental effect on the wellbeing
of farmers by reducing their revenue, increasing financial instability, and limiting
their ability to develop and make investments. Due to their potential lack of
resources, market knowledge, and bargaining strength, marginal and small-scale
farmers are more at risk than big farmers.
The aforementioned issues show that, in certain Indian
farm procurement marketplaces, purchasing power is both a hypothetical and a
real issue. The dominance of purchasing power in some industries, such as
dairy, sugarcane, and food grains, raises significant concerns about the
adequacy of legal and regulatory frameworks[21].
The Competition Act of 2002's ability to effectively remove buyer-side market
power and guaranty legitimate competition in farm purchasing markets in the
benefit of farmers is based on these issues.
Monopsony Power technique in U.S.A.
Some of the countries which has shown a special
interest in the idea of
monopoly as a matter of competition law. The misuse of monopsony-like power, similar to the misuse of Antitrust-related laws, like the Sherman Antitrust Act[22], can target monopolistic power in vendors. Act of 1890 and the Clayton Act of 1914.
monopoly as a matter of competition law. The misuse of monopsony-like power, similar to the misuse of Antitrust-related laws, like the Sherman Antitrust Act[22], can target monopolistic power in vendors. Act of 1890 and the Clayton Act of 1914.
In Mandeville Island Farms V. American Crystal Sugar
Co.[23],
sugar refiners plotted to reduce the quantity that sugar crop farmers were
paid. In the U.S. case, the Supreme Court ruled that any contract by purchasers
to keep costs lower would be considered governed by antitrust laws, just as any
contract by suppliers to increase costs would. The Court emphasized that
purchasers are equally covered by competition law, as well as that especially
purchaser cooperation can have a big impact on vendors, or manufacturers.
The US strategy demonstrates that antitrust
legislation may be used to stop purchasers, including farmers, from engaging in
anti-competitive behaviour and that purchaser-side market authority is assigned
equal weight as vendor-side market dominance.
International Competition Network (ICN) & OECD
Approaches
International organizations have placed more and more
importance on the role of purchasers in competition law. The purchaser aspect
of the agricultural trade system can have extremely crowded markets, and
monopoly power can lower incomes for farmers and stifle competition, according
to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). However,
the OECD states that both the vendor and the purchaser must be considered when
examining a market's framework and the competitive implications of market
dominance.
In a comparable manner, purchasing power has been
identified by the International Competition Network (ICN) as a major problem
for competition. ICN is aware that an increase in purchasers may result in
lower supplier pricing, less opportunities in the marketplace, and market
imbalances of competitive procedures. Because of this, several competition
authorities worldwide have expanded their focus beyond classic monopoly issues
to include the effects of purchasing power and monopsony, respectively.
Conclusion
Agriculture continues to be the primary source of
income for the vast majority of Indians, and it continues to play a significant
role in the country's economy. The well-being, competitiveness, and growth of
both farmers and rural communities, especially in this crucial sector, depend
on an effective, equitable, and competitive utilized for farming market. A
large number of buyers in specific agricultural goods markets has raised
concerns about the use of purchasing power and its impact on farmers.
According to the study's findings, monopsony and
oligopoly power are legitimate competition issues that need to be given more
weight in the Indian competition law system. While purchaser power is
frequently discussed in relation to competition law (monopoly and vendor-side
supremacy), the current state of the supply chain for agricultural products
provides a clear illustration of the opposite: purchaser power is detrimental.
If only a small fraction of consumers purchases a big percentage of a product, farmers
may have less negotiation power with buyers, less marketing options, and
cheaper rates.
Additionally, the research shows that the Competition
Act of 2002 has sufficient legislative discretion to address purchaser-side
market strength. Sections 3 and 4 apply to both monopsony and oligopoly-related
behaviour and are fairly generic. However, the success of these regulations is
largely dependent on implementation goals, market assessment, and competition
authorities' understanding of the procurement-related competition problems.
Although the term "monopsony" is seldom used, buyer power has to be questioned
and increasingly institutionalized.
[1] Research Scholar, Department of
Law, Netaji Subhas University, Jamshedpur, Jharkhand.
[2] Assistant Professor, Department of
Law, Netaji Subhas University, Jamshedpur, Jharkhand
[3] Ministry of Agriculture and
Farmers Welfare, Government of India, Agriculture and Farmers Welfare (Government of India); Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations, India at a Glance: Agriculture, Food and Rural Development.
[4] Committee on Doubling Farmers'
Income, Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare, Government of India,
Report of the Committee on Doubling Farmers' Income, vol I–XIV (2017–2018);
Competition Commission of India, Market Study on E-Commerce (January 2020).
[5] Competition Commission of India,
Market Study on E-Commerce (January 2020); OECD, Competition Issues in the Food
Chain Industry (OECD Policy Roundtable, 2013).
[6] International Competition Network,
Report on Competition and the Food Sector (ICN, 2012); OECD, Purchasing Power
and Competition in the Food Chain (OECD Policy Roundtable, 2008).
[7] OECD, Purchasing Power and Buyers'
Cartels (OECD 2022) 5–8.
[8] OECD, Glossary of Statistical
Terms: Monopsony (OECD); see also OECD, Purchasing Power and Buyers' Cartels
(OECD 2022).
[10] International Competition Network,
Report on Competition and the Food Sector (ICN 2012); OECD, Purchasing
Power and Buyers' Cartels (OECD 2022).
[11] OECD, Purchasing Power and Buyers'
Cartels (OECD 2022) 5–8.
[12] Competition Act 2002 (India),
Preamble and s 18; Competition Commission of India, ‘Basic Introduction to
Competition Law’ (CCI)
[14] Section 3 of the Competition Act,
2002
[15] In Re: Alleged Buyer/Purchase
Cartel, Case No 05 of 2018, Competition Commission of India
[17] Competition Act 2002 (India),
Section 19; Competition Commission of India, ‘Antitrust’ (CCI), explaining the
Commission's functions under the Competition Act 2002
[18] Competition Act of 2002
[19] Section 4 of Competition Act, 2002
[20] Section 3 Competition Act of 2002
[21] Competition Commission of India, Competition
Policy in Indian Agriculture (CCI); OECD, Competition in the Food Supply
Chain (OECD Publishing 2024).
[22] Sherman Antitrust Act 1890, 15 USC
§§ 1–2; Clayton Act 1914, 15 USC §§ 12–27.
[23] Mandeville Island Farms, Inc v
American Crystal Sugar Co, 334 US 219, 221–23 (1948)
How to Cite This Article
VIPIN KUMAR, DR. RAJU KUMAR BHAGAT, COMPETITION LAW AS A SAFEGUARD AGAINST MONOPSONY POWER: A STUDY OF INDIAN AGRICULTURAL MARKETS AND FARMER EXPLOITATION., White Black Legal – International Law Journal, ISSN: 2581-8503, Vol. Volume 4, Issue VOLUME 4 ISSUE 2, October 2026, pp. 1-15. Available at: https://www.whiteblacklegal.co.in/public/details/competition-law-as-a-safeguard-against-monopsony-power-a-study-of-indian-agricultural-markets-and-farmer-exploitation
Author & Publication Record
Authors: VIPIN KUMAR & DR. RAJU KUMAR BHAGAT
Registration ID: 107123 | Published Paper ID: WBL7123 & WBL7124
Year: Oct- 2026 | Volume: 4 | Issue: 2
Approved ISSN: 2581-8503 | Country: Delhi, India
Page No.: 1-15
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