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As stated by Salmond-“the essence of law lies in the spirit, not its letter, for the letter is significant only as being the external manifestation of the intention that underlies it”.

Interpretation refers to the process of determining the actual meaning of the words used in a statute by giving them their natural and ordinary meaning. It is an art of discovering the true sense of an enactment. However, the court is not expected to interpret the law randomly. Therefore, certain principles have been developed over time by the courts, which are commonly known as “rules of interpretation”. These principles guide the court in interpreting the law in a systematic and consistent manner.[1]

The object of interpretation of statutes is to determine the intention of the legislature conveyed expressly or impliedly in the language used.



Interpretation of statute is the process of ascertaining the true meaning of the words used in a statute. When the language of the statute is clear, there is no need for the rules of interpretation. But, in certain cases, more than one meaning may be derived from the same word or sentence. It is therefore necessary to interpret the statute to find out the real intention of the statute. Thus, the purpose of Interpretation of Statutes is to help the Judge to ascertain the intention of the Legislature, and not to control that intention or to confine it within the limits, which the Judge may deem reasonable or expedient.[2]




  • This is a case of appeal by Special Leave.
  • The Appellant was working as an Electrical Superintendent in the Mangalore City Corporation.
  • During the period between 1st May, 1961 and 25th August, 1987, it was discovered that he had accumulated assets that exceeded his known sources of income. So, a chargesheet was filed against him for accusation of offences under Section 13(1)(e) read with Section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. It was filed on 15th March, 1994.
  • The accused was bailed on 6th June, 1994. Charges were framed against him on 10th August, 1994 and the case proceeded for Trial on 8th November, 1994. However, the Trial never commenced.
  • So, because of failure of Trial, Judge acquitted the accused on 23rd February, 1999. This was done following the precedent of Raj Deo Sharma Vs. State of Bihar[4], which laid that after lapse of two years of the date of Trial, the judge is obligated to acquit the accused.
  • Then State of Karnataka through DSP Lokayukta, Mangalore, appealed before High Court for setting aside the acquittal of the accused by the Trial Court. The High Court, vide the impugned order, allowed the appeal, set aside the order of acquittal and remanded the case to the Trial Court, forming an opinion that a case charging an accused with corruption was an exception to the directions made in Raj Deo Sharma case.
  • The High Court however condoned the delay of 55 days in filing the appeal against acquittal by the State, but also allowed the appeal itself. Moreover, no notice of any such actions was given to the accused.
  • So, appellant made the appeal before the Supreme Court to quash this order.




  • Is Right to Speedy Trial accurately contained in Article 21 of the Indian Constitution?
  • Is the Judiciary allowed to draw or prescribe an outer limit, i.e. set bars of limitation, when the Legislature or the Statutes have chosen not to do so?



There are few Statutory Interpretation Rules and Tools that are applied in the following case. They are:

  • Expansive or Liberal Rule of Interpretation of Constitutional Provisions
  • The Presumption of Legislature doesn’t commit Mistakes or make omissions
  • Precedents as the External Aid of Construction.
  • The Principle of Separation of Powers as fundamental principle of Constitution.

Article 21: Right to Life and Personal Liberty[5] with respect to Right to Speedy Trial-

The terms ‘Life and Liberty’ are very comprehensive terms and if interpreted liberally it includes a person’s right to a speedy trial. The concept of speedy trial is essential in preventing the miscarriages of justice and unjust imprisonment, and ensures that justice is served by facilitating a fair and equitable trial for all individuals.


Justice P.N.Bhagvati in the case of Hussainara Khatoon(iv) v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar[6], stated “There’s no doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21.” The case formed the basis of this right in India.


The primary objective of the concept of speedy trial is to protect the innocent from unjust and excessive punishment. However, due to the large backlog of cases in the courts, delays often occur unintentionally, resulting in significant mental and financial burdens on litigants.[7]


For criminal cases, the case of Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab[8], highlighted the right. SC held “The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21 as essential part of the Fundamental Right to Life and Liberty guaranteed and preserved in our Constitution. This right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint imposed by arrest and consequent incarceration and continues at all the stages of investigation, enquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any possible prejudice that may result from impermissible and avoidable delay from the time of the commission of the offence till it consummates into a finality, can be averred.”


One of the most important cases of Right to Speedy Trial, which dictates the guidelines for it is Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Naik[9]. It was a landmark judgment and was held illuminating and exhaustive of Article 21-Right to Speedy Trial. The Court thoroughly considered all aspects of the matter related to the speedy trial and gave due attention to all the arguments presented before the Bench.[10]


In Antulay case, apart from guidelines, importance precedence was laid that:

  • Right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial.
  • It is neither advisable nor practicable to fix any time limit for trial of offences because time required to complete trial of a case depends on the nature of the case.

The second point was however, countered in the case of Common Cause Vs. Union of India(I)[11] and Common Cause Vs. Union of India(II)[12]. Among other time-limits that were set for delay in trial or proceedings, the cases laid that “Where the cases pending in Criminal courts for more than two years under IPC or any other law for the time being in force are compoundable with the permission of the Court and if in such a case trials have still not commenced, the Criminal Court shall, after hearing the public Prosecutor and other parties or their representatives before it, discharge or acquit the accused, as the case may be, and close the case.”


Another attempt of the judiciary to set time-limit for criminal proceedings was made in the case of Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar[13]. It prescribed time limits for completion of prosecution evidence on completion of 2 years in cases of offences punishable with imprisonment for period not exceeding 7 years and on completion of 3 years in cases of offences punishable with imprisonment for period exceeding 7 years.

So, the Trial court in Ramachandra Rao case[14] following the precedent of Raj Deo Sharma[15] acquitted the accused.


The Constitution Bench in the case had to interpret whether the time-limits said by the precedents of Common Cause Vs. Union of India and Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar is allowed, as they ran counter to the precedent set by Abdul Rehman Antulay's case, the latter being five-Judge Bench decision.


So, a 7-judge Bench was set to resolve this issue in Ramachandra’s case.

It was found that courts cannot set time-limit for criminal proceedings, as it’ll be then performing a legislative function, against the Doctrine of Separation of Powers and against the Doctrine of binding precedents.


However, courts can exercise their powers under Sections 309[16], 311[17], 258[18] of CrPC to effectuate Right to Speedy Trial. Section 482 of CrPC[19], granting Inherent powers to Court would also help courts to achieve it.


  1. LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS: Principle of incidental or ancillary powers

The principle of incidental and ancillary powers is a fundamental rule of interpreting the Constitution. According to this principle, the words in the Constitution that grant legislative power should be interpreted in the broadest possible sense. If the words are expansive, they should be understood in a way that maximizes their effect.[20]


Article 21 of the Indian Constitution is one of the fundamental rights, which states that "No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law." Over the years, the judiciary has interpreted this article expansively to include various rights such as the right to privacy, right to live with dignity, etc.



The court in the case held- “Article 21 isn’t to be read narrowly in the sense drearily dictated by dictionaries; they are organic terms to be construed meaningfully. The Courts have allowed Article 21 to stretch its arms as wide as it legitimately can. The mental agony, expense and strain which a person proceeded against in criminal law has to undergo and which, coupled with delay, may result in impairing the capability or ability of the accused to defend himself have persuaded the constitutional courts of the country in holding the right to speedy trial a manifestation of fair, just and reasonable procedure enshrined in Article 21.”



Courts also use Presumptions while interpreting statutes. In the following case, court presumed that no statutes give time-limit for criminal proceedings for a reason.


The legislature generally does not put a limit on criminal proceedings because the purpose of the criminal justice system is to ensure that justice is served, which includes holding individuals accountable for their actions and protecting society from potential harm. Putting a limit on criminal proceedings could potentially allow criminals to escape justice, which could lead to a breakdown of the rule of law and erode public trust in the justice system. Additionally, some crimes may not come to light until many years after they were committed, and victims of those crimes may not feel ready or able to come forward immediately. Without a time-limit on criminal proceedings, victims and law enforcement agencies have more time to investigate and prosecute crimes, which can result in a greater number of criminals being brought to justice.


So, courts have to take into view the legislative intent behind the omission of time-limit from the statutes. When interpreting a statute, it is important to avoid adding or removing any words from the text. This means that words should not be treated as impractical or omitted simply because they appear inconsistent with the court's interpretation. Instead, each word should be given its normal meaning and significance within the context of the statute. This approach ensures that the operative art of the enactment is not altered and that the intended meaning of the statute is upheld.[21]





Stare Decisis is a Latin term meaning- “to stand by that which is decided”. It’s covered under Article 141 of the Indian Constitution[22]. This is also covered in Doctrine of Binding Precedents.


Stare decisis is a legal principle that requires courts to adhere to past decisions when deciding similar cases. This means that courts must follow legal precedents established by prior rulings in cases by SC with comparable circumstances and facts. In other words, the principle of stare decisis ensures consistency and uniformity in the application of the law.[23]


In the following case, the court held that Common Cause and Raj Sharma case is against law laid down by Constitution as it runs counter to the Doctrine of Binding Precedents. These judgments were against the precedence laid down in the case of Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Naik[24], which clearly laid down that “it is neither advisable nor practicable to fix any time-limit for trial of offences.” So, the validity of these judgments to set precedence was revoked.


So, the court held for two reasons we hold such bars of limitation uncalled for and impermissible:

  • It leads to impermissible legislation, an activity beyond the power which the Constitution confers on judiciary, and
  • Such bars of limitation fly in the face of law laid down by Constitution Bench in A.R. Antulay's case and, therefore, run counter to the doctrine of precedents and their binding efficacy.



The doctrine of separation of powers is a principle of the Indian Constitution that mandates that the three branches of government-the legislature, executive, and judiciary, should function independently of each other.[25]


It is not a rule of interpretation but a fundamental principle that guides the interpretation and application of the Indian Constitution. The doctrine is a basic feature of the Constitution, which cannot be altered by any amendment or legislation. However, the principle is relevant in the interpretation of the Constitution, especially when there is a conflict between the functions of different branches of government.


However, the doctrine was accepted as a part of basic structure of Doctrine in the case of Indira Gandhi vs. Raj Narain[26]. It was held “the separation of the judiciary from the other organs is taken very seriously so that the common man’s liberty can in no circumstances be compromised and a fair remedy is available to any individual citizen of the state”.

So, Constitution provision needs to be interpreted through this doctrine, because:

  • It is contained in its basic structure, and declared as a precedent in Indira Gandhi case.
  • The doctrine is implicit in the Constitution as its guiding principle.



These rules of Interpretation have been correctly applied by the court.

The 7-judge Bench used these interpretation rules because it’s not the duty of the court to perform legislative functions, known as Judicial Activism. They held that “Courts can declare the law, they can interpret the law, they can remove obvious lacunae and fill the gaps but they cannot entrench upon in the field of legislation properly meant for the legislature”. 


If they do so, it’ll be violative of Doctrine of Separation of Powers. The principle aims to ensure that no single branch of the government becomes too powerful[27]. So, Judiciary is not meant to legislate even if it feels necessary.


The court held “Bars of limitation, judicially engrafted, are, no doubt, meant to provide a solution to the aforementioned problems. But a solution of this nature gives rise to greater problems like scuttling a trial without adjudication, stultifying access to justice and giving easy exit from the portals of justice. Such general remedial measures cannot be said to be apt solutions.”. It was further held the act of setting time-limits on criminal proceedings, after which the trial court must necessarily acquit or discharge the accused, constitutes a form of legislation. Such directives cannot be issued by the judiciary as they fall outside the realm of judicial law-making power, even constitutional articles such as 32, 21, 141, and 142 are liberally interpreted. These directions, which would apply to both current and future cases, are beyond the scope of the judiciary's authority.


P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka is a very important case, where Judicial legislation was checked for the first time by a 7-Judge Bench. The court held that giving legislative directions is not a legitimate judicial function.[28]


Case following this precedent is CBI v. Dr.Narayan Waman Nerukar[29].

The respondent was accused of offences under Sections 3 and 5 of the Official Secrets Act 1923 and Section 120-B of the IPC, 1860. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate took cognizance of the case and hence HC was approached by the Respondent. HC quashed the proceedings and acquitted him on the ground that there has been unnecessary delay, placing its reliance on the case of Common Cause v. UOI[30]. CBI approached SC against this.


The SC referred to 7-judge Bench judgment of P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka[31]. It was observed that Common cause case has been over-ruled here. It was held “The time-limits or bars of limitation prescribed in the several directions made in the previous cases could not have been so prescribed or drawn and, therefore, are not good law. Criminal courts are not obliged to terminate trial of criminal proceedings merely on account of lapse of time, as prescribed by the directions made in the aforesaid cases.”

So, HC judgment was quashed.



The case of P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, is important for the subject of interpretation of statutes because it deals with the basic principles of statutory interpretation. In this case, the Supreme Court of India emphasized that the role of the judiciary is to interpret the law and not to make laws. The court also upheld that Right to Speedy Trial is implicit in Article 21. Overall, the case of P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka provides guidance on how to interpret statutes and reinforces the principle that the judiciary must respect the separation of powers and the role of the legislature in making laws.



Legislation is that source of law which consists in the declaration of legal rules by a competent authority. When judges by judicial decisions lay down a new principle of general application of the nature specifically reserved for legislature, they may be said to have legislated, and not interpreted the law. It’s not difficult to perceive the dividing line between permissible legislation by judicial directives and enacting law the field exclusively reserved for legislature. So, while prescribing various periods of limitation, adverted to above, the Court transgressed the limit of judicial legislation.


The case puts a check on judicial-legislation and forbids courts from prescribing any time-limit for proceedings, when legislature has chosen not to. It’s because in matters related to the right to speedy trial, there cannot be a standard formula that can be applied universally. Each case must be examined on its own merits, taking into consideration its unique circumstances and factors. It is crucial to avoid making broad generalizations in this regard. Criminal courts possess certain powers under Sections 309, 311, and 258 of the CrPC, which can be used to ensure that the right to a speedy trial is upheld.




[1] Interpretation of Statutes, FAIRFIELD INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGY (Mar. 6, 2023), http://www.fimt-ggsipu.org/study/ballb406.pdf.

[2] The Indian Law, Interpretation of Statutes, THE INDIAN LAW (Mar. 20, 2022), https://theindianlaw.in/interpretation-of-statutes/#:~:text=Thus%20the%20purpose%20of%20Interpretation,may%20deem%20reasonable%20or%20expedient.

[3] P. Ramachandra Rao v. Union of India, (2002) 4 SCC 578.

[4] Raj Deo Sharma Vs. State of Bihar (1998) 7 SCC 507.

[5] Article 21, The Constitution of India, 1950.

[6] Hussainara Khatoon(iv) v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81.

[7] Prateek Handa, Constitutional Right to Speedy Trial, LEGAL SERVICES INDIA (Mar. 9th, 2023), https://www.legalservicesindia.com/article/571/Constitutional-Right-to-Speedy-Trial.html#:~:text=Speedy%20trial%20is%20a%20fundamental,purpose%20of%20enforcing%20such%20right.

[8] Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569: 1994 SCC (Cri) 899.

[9] Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Naik, (1992) 1 SCC 225.

[10] Dr. Dharminder Kumar, Judicial Pronouncements On Speedy Trial In India: An Analysis, 2(5) JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES AND RESEARCH 72, 79-80 (2019), https://thelawbrigade.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Dharminder.pdf.

[11] Common Cause Vs. Union of India, (1996) 4 SCC 33.

[12] Common Cause Vs. Union of India, (1996) 6 SCC 775.

[13] Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar, (1998) 7 SCC 507.

[14] P. Ramachandra Rao v. Union of India, (2002) 4 SCC 578.

[15] Ibid.

[16] The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, § 309, No. 1, Acts of Parliament, 1872 (India).

[17] The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, § 311, No. 1, Acts of Parliament, 1872 (India).

[18] The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, § 258, No. 1, Acts of Parliament, 1872 (India).

[19] The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, § 482, No. 1, Acts of Parliament, 1872 (India).

[20] VN Shukla, “Constitutional Law”, 6th Ed., Wadhwa Nagpur: Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 2010, p575.

[21] Tanvi, Presumptions in statutory interpretation, LEGALRAJ (May 23, 2020), https://www.legalraj.com/articles-details/presumptions-in-statutory-interpretation.

[22] Article 141, The Constitution of India, 1950.

[23] Julie Young, Stare Decisis: What It Means in Law, With Examples, INVESTOPEDIA (Jun. 24, 2022), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/stare_decisis.asp.

[24] Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Naik, (1992) 1 SCC 225.

[25] Aishwarya Talwar, Separation of Powers and Judicial Activism in India, LAWCTOPUS (Nov. 13, 2015), https://www.lawctopus.com/academike/separation-of-powers-and-judicial-activism-in-india/.

[26] Indira Gandhi vs. Raj Narain, 1975 AIR 865.

[27] Nidhi Chhillar, Separation of Powers – Meaning And Concept, LAWCORNER (Oct. 16, 2020), https://lawcorner.in/separation-of-powers/.

[28] Dr G.B. Reddy and Pavan Kasturi, A Comprehensive Analysis on Judicial Legislation in India, SCC ONLINE (Mar. 4, 2022), https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2022/03/04/a-comprehensive-analysis-on-judicial-legislation-in-india/.

[29] CBI v. Dr.Narayan Waman Nerukar (2002) 7 SCC 6 : (AIR 2002 SC 2977 : 2002 AIR SCW 3484).

[30] Common Cause Vs. Union of India, (1996) 6 SCC 775.

[31] P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578.


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