

INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

WHITE BLACK LEGAL LAW JOURNAL

ISSN: 2581-8503

Peer - Reviewed & Refereed Journal

The Law Journal strives to provide a platform for discussion of International as well as National Developments in the Field of Law.

DISCLAIMER

ABOUT WHITE BLACK LEGAL

White Black Legal – The Law Journal is an open-access, peer-reviewed, and refereed legal journal established to provide a scholarly platform for the examination and discussion of contemporary legal issues. The journal is dedicated to encouraging rigorous legal research, critical analysis, and informed academic discourse across diverse fields of law.

The journal invites contributions from law students, researchers, academicians, legal practitioners, and policy scholars. By facilitating engagement between emerging scholars and experienced legal professionals, *White Black Legal* seeks to bridge theoretical legal research with practical, institutional, and societal perspectives.

In a rapidly evolving social, economic, and technological environment, the journal endeavours to examine the changing role of law and its impact on governance, justice systems, and society. *White Black Legal* remains committed to academic integrity, ethical research practices, and the dissemination of accessible legal scholarship to a global readership.

AIM & SCOPE

The aim of *White Black Legal – The Law Journal* is to promote excellence in legal research and to provide a credible academic forum for the analysis, discussion, and advancement of contemporary legal issues. The journal encourages original, analytical, and well-researched contributions that add substantive value to legal scholarship.

The journal publishes scholarly works examining doctrinal, theoretical, empirical, and interdisciplinary perspectives of law. Submissions are welcomed from academicians, legal professionals, researchers, scholars, and students who demonstrate intellectual rigour, analytical clarity, and relevance to current legal and policy developments.

The scope of the journal includes, but is not limited to:

- Constitutional and Administrative Law
- Criminal Law and Criminal Justice
- Corporate, Commercial, and Business Laws
- Intellectual Property and Technology Law
- International Law and Human Rights
- Environmental and Sustainable Development Law
- Cyber Law, Artificial Intelligence, and Emerging Technologies
- Family Law, Labour Law, and Social Justice Studies

The journal accepts original research articles, case comments, legislative and policy analyses, book reviews, and interdisciplinary studies addressing legal issues at national and international levels. All submissions are subject to a rigorous double-blind peer-review process to ensure academic quality, originality, and relevance.

Through its publications, *White Black Legal – The Law Journal* seeks to foster critical legal thinking and contribute to the development of law as an instrument of justice, governance, and social progress, while expressly disclaiming responsibility for the application or misuse of published content.

LEGAL CHALLENGES IN SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN DIGITAL ELECTORAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF INDIA, THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE UNITED STATES, AND ESTONIA

AUTHORED BY - RISHIKESH R

I. Introduction

Something extraordinary happened in April 2024 that barely registered as a legal problem. Over six weeks, approximately 969 million Indian citizens exercised their constitutional right to vote under Article 326, their identities verified against a fully digitised national database maintained by the Election Commission of India (ECI) and accessible to any person with an internet connection, without restriction, identification, or purpose requirement. The residential addresses, demographic details, and photographs of these citizens practically the entire adult population of the world's most populous democracy were available for bulk download through the National Voters' Service Portal (NVSP) as the election unfolded. Political parties had received complete digital copies of those rolls under Rule 95A of the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, months earlier, and had been running sophisticated analytics operations against them since.

None of this generated a legal challenge. None of it attracted regulatory scrutiny. None of it produced a single published judicial ruling on its constitutional adequacy. The silence is the problem.

The Representation of the People Act, 1950 (RPA 1950) was enacted by a Parliament that had never heard the word "database." Rule 95 of the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, authorises inspection of the electoral roll at the office of the Electoral Registration Officer during working hours and certified copies of individual entries. It says nothing about the internet, nothing about bulk download, and nothing about analytics platforms processing voter data across political campaigns. The statute was adequate for its time; it is constitutionally untenable for ours.

This paper argues three things. First, the ECI's current practices of unrestricted digital bulk disclosure and unregulated political party data analytics fail the three-part proportionality test established by the nine-judge bench in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 (Puttaswamy I) India's governing constitutional standard for privacy analysis. Second, the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (DPDP Act) applies to the ECI as a Data Fiduciary within Section 2(i), generating obligations of security, purpose limitation, and Data Principal rights that the current framework wholly ignores. Third, the comparative experience of the United Kingdom, the United States, and Estonia offers specific statutory mechanisms the ERAA 2013 two-register model, the CISA security standards framework, and the Riigikogu Election Act's audit requirements that are constitutionally transferable to India and practically achievable within the existing legislative architecture.

The paper proceeds in six parts. Part II establishes the legal problem through the Puttaswamy proportionality analysis of Rule 95 and Rule 95A. Part III analyses the DPDP Act's application to the electoral context. Part IV conducts the comparative assessment. Part V advances specific reform proposals. Part VI concludes.

II. The Constitutional Problem: Rule 95, Rule 95A, and the Puttaswamy Standard

A. The Proportionality Framework

Puttaswamy I settled, through six separate opinions of a nine-judge bench, that privacy is a fundamental right protected by Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution of India. The governing analytical standard articulated most precisely by Justice D.Y. Chandrachud in concurrence requires that any state measure restricting the right to privacy satisfy three cumulative conditions: it must be sanctioned by law (the legality limb); it must pursue a legitimate state aim (the legitimate aim limb); and it must employ the least restrictive means adequate to achieve that aim, with the restriction not disproportionate to the benefit achieved (the necessity and proportionality of means limbs). See K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1, 305 (Chandrachud J., concurring) (drawing on European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence on the quality-of-law requirement and proportionality analysis).

The standard was reaffirmed and applied to large-scale government identification databases in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (Aadhaar), (2018) 1 SCC 809, where the majority upheld the Aadhaar scheme while striking down Section 57 of the Aadhaar Act as disproportionate,

and where Justice Chandrachud's dissent applying a stricter necessity analysis found the entire scheme constitutionally infirm for failing to demonstrate the unavailability of less restrictive alternatives. The divergence between majority and dissent in Puttaswamy II is significant for electoral data analysis: the outcome of the proportionality inquiry depends substantially on how stringently the court requires the state to discharge the burden of demonstrating necessity.

B. The Digital Bulk Publication Practice and Rule 95

Rule 95 of the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, provides: "Any person may inspect the electoral roll of any constituency at the office of the Electoral Registration Officer during the hours of the office on working days and may obtain a certified copy of an entry or entries in the electoral roll on payment of the prescribed fee." The provision was framed in 1960 for a world of physical attendance, paper records, and one entry at a time. It authorises inspection at a designated location during specified hours; it authorises certified copies of individual entries. It does not, by any reasonable reading, authorise the practice of making complete constituency voter rolls containing the residential addresses, ages, photographs, and disability status of hundreds of thousands of voters available as bulk downloadable PDF files through a publicly accessible internet portal without any identification requirement, purpose declaration, or access record.

The Puttaswamy legality analysis requires that the legal basis for a privacy restriction be "accessible and foreseeable" the affected person must be able to identify, from the text of the applicable provision, what restrictions on their rights may follow. This formulation, drawing on the European Court's jurisprudence in cases including Malone v. United Kingdom (1984) 7 EHRR 14 and Silver v. United Kingdom (1983) 5 EHRR 347 as referenced in Chandrachud J.'s concurrence, requires more than a general statutory authority; it requires specific and foreseeable legislative sanction for the specific restriction imposed. A registered voter reading Rule 95 would understand that their registration information could be inspected at the ERO office and that certified copies of individual entries were available on payment of a fee. No reasonable reading of that text would lead them to foresee that the complete electoral roll their residential address, demographic data, and photograph serial number alongside those of every other voter in the constituency was downloadable in bulk by any person worldwide without restriction. The foreseeability requirement of the legality limb is not met. The practice fails at the first step.

Even assuming the legality defect were remedied by legislative amendment, the necessity analysis presents an independent and equally fatal objection. The legitimate aim served by

public accessibility of the electoral roll is electoral transparency: enabling voters, candidates, and citizens to verify registration accuracy, a value the Supreme Court grounded in democratic legitimacy in People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 399. That this is a legitimate aim is not contested. The question is whether unlimited bulk digital download is the least restrictive means of achieving it. At least three alternatives achieve the same aim with substantially lower privacy burden: an authenticated individual-entry search portal, which enables verification of any specific entry without enabling bulk extraction; a simplified public roll containing only name, constituency, and serial number (excluding residential address, photograph, and demographic details); and the tiered access model employed by the United Kingdom under the Representation of the People (England and Wales) Regulations 2001, SI 2001/341, which limits full-register access to specified recipients for specified purposes while making a simplified register publicly available. The Court of Queen's Bench in R (Robertson) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWHC 1760 (Admin) held that unlimited public access to the full electoral register including residential addresses failed the Article 8(2) ECHR necessity test, noting that the compelled electoral disclosure of addresses created a privacy interest that could not be overridden for commercial or unlimited public purposes. The Robertson reasoning is directly applicable under Puttaswamy: the existence of demonstrably available less restrictive alternatives defeats the necessity argument for unlimited bulk access.

C. Political Party Access and Rule 95A

Rule 95A of the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, inserted in 1989, provides that a copy of the electoral roll shall be made available to every recognised national party and State party in such form and subject to such conditions as the ECI may direct. The provision was enacted for a world of paper rolls and physical canvassing; its purpose was to enable political parties to identify and contact registered voters in the constituencies where they competed. The digital transformation of electoral data has converted this administrative convenience into a mechanism for comprehensive voter surveillance.

Recognised parties today receive complete digital copies of constituency rolls in some cases covering millions of voters which are uploaded to analytics platforms and cross-referenced with commercially acquired data including mobile number directories, social media profiles, consumer purchase histories, and caste and community affiliation datasets. The resulting profiles enable psychographic targeting: the delivery of personalised political messages calibrated to each voter's identified psychological susceptibilities. This is not canvassing; it is

a form of political influence whose systematic use of personal data without legal constraint raises serious constitutional questions.

The Puttaswamy analysis of Rule 95A identifies constitutional inadequacy at all three levels. On legality: Rule 95A authorises supply of the roll; it does not authorise expressly or impliedly the use of supplied data for analytical cross-referencing with commercial datasets, psychographic profiling, or transfer to third-party analytics firms. The subsequent uses are not sanctioned by the provision as drafted, meaning the privacy restrictions they impose on voters lack the specific legal basis Puttaswamy requires. On necessity: the canvassing aim that Rule 95A legitimately serves can be achieved through purpose-restricted supply a roll provided for electoral communication purposes only, during the relevant electoral period, without analytics use or secondary transfer rather than through the unlimited supply that current practice permits. The United Kingdom's full register regime under the 2001 Regulations, reg. 93(3), demonstrates exactly this: political party access to the full register is legally restricted to "electoral purposes" with criminal sanctions for further disclosure. A less restrictive alternative exists and works. On proportionality of means: the privacy burden of unrestricted Rule 95A supply enabling permanent retention of voter profiles, cross-referencing with commercial data, and the use of psychographic targeting across multiple electoral cycles — is disproportionate to the canvassing aim. The Information Commissioner's Office (UK), in its Investigation into the Use of Data Analytics in Political Campaigns: A Report to Parliament (ICO, November 2018), found that UK political parties had engaged in precisely these practices without lawful bases and issued enforcement notices requiring deletion of unlawfully retained voter profiles. India's Rule 95A creates the same conditions unrestricted access without purpose limitation without any equivalent regulatory authority.

The constitutional significance of Helen Nissenbaum's contextual integrity framework, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, and the Integrity of Social Life (Stanford University Press 2010), is directly operative here. Voter registration data is disclosed in the institutional context of exercising the franchise under Article 326; the norms of that context contemplate use for electoral verification and administration, not commercial profiling. The transfer of voter data from the electoral administration context to the campaign analytics context violates contextual integrity a violation that the Puttaswamy framework translates into a legal requirement of purpose limitation that Rule 95A currently ignores.

III. The DPDP Act 2023 and Electoral Data: An Unresolved Statutory Question

A. The ECI as Data Fiduciary

Section 2(i) of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, defines "Data Fiduciary" as "any person who alone or in conjunction with other persons determines the purpose and means of processing of personal data." The Election Commission determines what voter information is collected under Section 17 of the RPA 1950, how it is stored on the NVSP, and how it is disclosed under Rules 95 and 95A. On all three dimensions of the definition who, purpose, and means the ECI satisfies the Section 2(i) criteria. Section 2(s) defines "person" to include "the State and any authority or body of persons established by or under law," which encompasses the ECI as a constitutionally established authority. The conclusion that the ECI is a Data Fiduciary follows from the straightforward application of unambiguous statutory language.

B. The Section 17 Exemptions

Section 17(1) of the DPDP Act exempts processing for national security, state security, sovereignty and integrity, friendly foreign relations, public order, prevention of crime, and related grounds. None applies to the ECI's core electoral data processing maintenance of voter rolls, conduct of elections, and supply of rolls to political parties are civic administrative functions, not national security operations. Section 17(2) empowers the Central Government to exempt specified instrumentalities of the state from the Act's provisions by notification where necessary for the purposes of sub-section (1). The ECI has not been so notified. Even if it were, the notification would itself be subject to Puttaswamy proportionality review; an exemption removing all data protection obligations from the body maintaining 970 million citizens' personal data could not satisfy the necessity limb.

C. Section 8 Security Obligations

If the ECI is a Data Fiduciary, Section 8 requires it to implement "appropriate technical and organisational measures" to prevent personal data breach. Applied to a database of the scale, sensitivity, and democratic significance of the NVSP voter registration system, "appropriate" measures are considerable. Paul M. Schwartz and Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1814 (2011), establish that the definition of personal data must extend to aggregated profiles a registered voter's name, address, constituency, and demographic data, combined with commercially

available identifiers, constitute personally identifiable information of high specificity and sensitivity. The CISA Election Infrastructure Security Resource Guide (U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security 2021) identifies the minimum security standards that international best practice requires for voter registration databases: AES-256 encryption at rest and in transit, mandatory multi-factor authentication for administrative access, comprehensive tamper-evident audit logging retained for a minimum of 22 months, annual independent penetration testing, and a formally documented incident response plan. None of these is currently legally mandated for the NVSP. The gap between what Section 8's "appropriate measures" standard requires and what current electoral law mandates is total.

D. Data Principal Rights and Voter Remedies

Chapter III of the DPDP Act establishes enforceable rights of Data Principals registered voters against Data Fiduciaries. Section 11 creates a right to access information about one's personal data and its processing. Section 12 creates rights of correction and erasure. Section 14 establishes a right to grievance redressal before the ECI's grievance officer, with escalation to the Data Protection Board under Section 28. These rights would transform the voter's legal position vis-à-vis the ECI: from a passive subject of administrative processing to an active rights-holder with enforceable entitlements. Their realisation depends entirely on the confirmation of the ECI's Data Fiduciary status and the constitution of the Data Protection Board prerequisites that must be addressed as a matter of legislative urgency.

IV. Comparative Assessment: Transferable Mechanisms

A. The United Kingdom's Two-Register Model

The United Kingdom's response to the constitutional challenge identified in R (Robertson) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWHC 1760 (Admin) was legislative rather than judicial: the Representation of the People (England and Wales) Regulations 2001, SI 2001/341, rr. 92–113, as strengthened by the Electoral Registration and Administration Act 2013 (ERAA 2013), established a two-register structure. The full register containing complete voter data including residential addresses is accessible only to specified recipients (candidates and political parties for electoral purposes only; police; courts; credit reference agencies for fraud prevention; academic researchers under data protection conditions) and may be used solely for the purpose for which it was supplied, with criminal sanctions for further disclosure under the Electoral Administration Act 2006. The edited register from which voters who have

exercised their opt-out are excluded is publicly available for any purpose including commercial use.

The analytical significance of this framework for the Indian context is threefold. First, it demonstrates that the transparency interest in electoral rolls can be fully served by a tiered access model: the full register serves verification and electoral administration needs while the edited register serves general public access. Second, it demonstrates that purpose restriction on political party access is legislatively workable: reg. 93(3)'s restriction to "electoral purposes" has been operationally effective and judicially enforced. Third, the Robertson decision establishes, in a jurisdiction with a constitutional privacy framework analogous to Puttaswamy, that unlimited public access to the complete register including residential addresses fails the proportionality test. This precedent is directly applicable in India under the Puttaswamy framework.

The adaptation required for India is two-fold. The simplified public roll should, as a design default, exclude residential addresses for all voters not merely those who opt out because the safety risk from unlimited address disclosure is structural, not individual. Additionally, a specific safety exemption modelled on California's Cal. Elec. Code 2194 allowing voters with documented safety concerns to register with an alternative address addresses the specific Indian vulnerability arising from domestic violence, communal tension, and electoral violence risks.

B. The United States: Critical Infrastructure Designation and Binding Standards

Presidential Policy Directive 21 (Feb. 12, 2013) designated election infrastructure as critical infrastructure under the US federal framework, making it eligible for Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) protective services. The 2016 Russian interference with state voter registration systems documented by the Senate Intelligence Committee's bipartisan assessment demonstrated both the reality of the threat and the inadequacy of the US response: designation without binding legal obligation produced voluntary engagement with CISA resources that was uneven across states, leaving the most vulnerable systems without adequate protection.

India's constitutional and legislative architecture enables a response that the US federal system cannot achieve: the Parliament of India has plenary legislative competence over elections under Entry 72 of List I of the Seventh Schedule, enabling the imposition of binding mandatory security standards on a single centralised national electoral database. Section 70 of the Information Technology Act, 2000, empowers the Central Government to designate specified computer resources as "protected systems," rendering unauthorised access a criminal offence

and engaging CERT-In's protective mandate. Section 70A empowers the Central Government to issue binding security standards rules for protected systems. The combination a Section 70 designation of the NVSP and ECI's principal IT systems, followed by Section 70A security standards regulations incorporating the CISA Guide's minimum requirements as binding legal obligations achieves everything the US model attempts and more, because it operates through legally binding statutory obligations rather than voluntary engagement. The adaptation from the US model is precisely this: converting the CISA Guide's minimum standards from voluntary best-practice guidance into binding regulations enforceable by CERT-In.

C. Estonia: Independent Audit as a Constitutional Requirement

The Riigikogu Election Act (RT I, 2002, 57, 355, as amended through 2023) contains the most detailed statutory specification of digital voting system security obligations in any operational democracy. Section 65 requires independent security assessment before each election by assessors approved by the National Audit Office, with results published. Section 62(5) requires that the source code of the voting client software be made publicly available for independent expert review. J. Alex Halderman & J.M. Springall, Security Analysis of the Estonian Internet Voting System, in Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security 703 (ACM Press 2014), subjected the system to exactly this kind of expert review and identified significant security vulnerabilities demonstrating both the value of the audit requirement and its constitutional significance: a system with undetected vulnerabilities that could allow manipulation fails the constitutional guarantee of free and equal elections, not merely a technical reliability standard.

The principle that technical security failures in electoral systems are constitutional failures is transferable to India independently of internet voting. The NVSP voter registration database, which conditions the entitlement of 970 million citizens to participate in elections, requires the same security scrutiny that the Riigikogu Election Act requires for the voting system. The absence of any independent security audit of the NVSP meaning that vulnerabilities could exist in India's voter registration infrastructure without any official knowledge or public accountability is a constitutional deficiency. The adaptation required for India is to mandate independent CERT-In-approved security assessment of the ECI's principal IT systems before each general election, with results reported to Parliament and published in summary form. The full open-source disclosure required by the Riigikogu Election Act raises legitimate security concerns in India's adversarial political context; the adaptation is confidential deposit of source code with a designated independent technical committee for confidential expert review,

achieving the constitutional function of independent scrutiny without the security risk of full public disclosure.

V. Specific Reform Proposals

Three tiers of reform, each calibrated to the constitutional deficiencies identified, respond to the analysis of Parts II through IV.

Tier One: Subordinate Legislation

The most urgent reforms require only amendment to the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, under Section 28 of the RPA 1950 an executive act requiring no Parliamentary bill. Rule 95 should be replaced with a three-tier access structure: a Tier One restricted full roll accessible only to registered voters (verifying their own entries through authenticated portal), candidates, electoral officials, courts, and law enforcement; a Tier Two political party copy governed by the amended Rule 95A; and a Tier Three simplified public roll containing only name, sex, part number, serial number, and constituency with no residential address, photograph, date of birth, or disability status. Voters with safety concerns should be entitled to exclusion from the Tier Three roll on application to the ERO. The amended Rule 95 provides specific, foreseeable statutory authority for each tier of access, resolving the legality deficit. Tiered access restricted to less privacy-invasive versions of the roll for general public purposes resolves the necessity and proportionality deficits.

Rule 95A should be amended to impose: a statutory purpose restriction limiting use of supplied data to electoral canvassing and direct voter communication in connection with the specific election for which supply was made; a prohibition on combining roll data with commercial, social media, or telecommunications datasets for profiling; a prohibition on onward transfer without a written data processing agreement; a mandatory retention period of 90 days post-election with certified destruction thereafter; minimum security standards including AES-256 encryption and multi-factor authentication; a 72-hour breach notification obligation to the ECI and the Data Protection Board; and suspension of access entitlement for violation. The amended Rule 95A provides the purpose limitation required by the Puttaswamy necessity analysis and the security obligations required by the DPDP Act's Section 8.

Tier Two: Executive Notifications (No Primary Legislation Required)

Two notifications under existing statutory authority can be issued immediately. First, a Central Government notification under Section 70 of the IT Act designating the NVSP voter

registration database, the ECI Election Management System, and the Results Management System as protected systems, followed by Section 70A security standards regulations incorporating the CISA Guide's minimum requirements as binding legal obligations enforceable by CERT-In. Second, a Central Government notification under Section 2(i) read with Section 16(1) of the DPDP Act confirming the ECI's Data Fiduciary status and the inapplicability of the Section 17 exemptions to its electoral data processing, and under Section 10 designating the ECI as a Significant Data Fiduciary requiring appointment of a Data Protection Officer, periodic DPIAs, and independent data audit.

Tier Three: Primary Legislation (Parliamentary Amendment to RPA 1950)

Two new sections of the RPA 1950 should be enacted. Section 17A should impose binding security standards for electoral information systems, including the mandatory security measures identified in the Tier One and Tier Two reforms; the requirement to commission CERT-In-approved independent security assessment before each general election; and Parliamentary reporting of assessment results within 30 days of receipt. Section 17B should establish breach notification obligations notification to the Data Protection Board within 72 hours and to affected voters where high risk to their interests arises and a voter remedy mechanism before the Data Protection Board for harms arising from security failures, unauthorised disclosure, and Rule 95A violations.

The institutional prerequisite for all enforcement mechanisms is the constitution of the Data Protection Board under Section 19 of the DPDP Act. The Board's jurisdiction should expressly extend to electoral data processing by the ECI and political parties. Its composition should include at least one member with electoral law expertise. Its powers should include proactive investigation of political party electoral data practices, modelled on the ICO's proprio motu investigation of Cambridge Analytica and UK political parties.

VI. Conclusion

The legal problem this paper has analysed is not hypothetical or future-oriented. It exists today, in the gap between the constitutional standard established by Puttaswamy I and the statutory framework governing the personal data of 970 million Indian voters. That gap has three dimensions: no specific statutory authority for digital bulk access to complete voter rolls (the legality deficit); no purpose limitation, security obligation, or retention requirement governing political party use of electoral data (the necessity and proportionality deficit) and no breach

notification obligation, voter remedy mechanism, or independent security audit requirement for the infrastructure maintaining the most consequential personal database in India.

The Puttaswamy standard is India's own constitutional contribution to comparative privacy jurisprudence. The reforms proposed here do not require India to adopt foreign legal values; they require India to apply its own constitutional standard to its own electoral law, and to borrow from the comparative experience of the United Kingdom, the United States, and Estonia specific legislative mechanisms that have demonstrably worked in analogous contexts. The UK two-register model responds to the same tension between electoral transparency and voter privacy that India faces, and resolves it through the same proportionality logic that Puttaswamy demands. The Estonian audit requirement responds to the same constitutional imperative of verifiable and secure electoral administration. The US critical infrastructure experience specifically, the lesson that acknowledgment without binding obligation is inadequate points toward the legally stronger Indian implementation that Parliament can achieve.

The digital transformation of India's electoral administration has outrun its legal framework by three decades. The constitutional tools to close the gap are available. The legislative mechanisms have been identified. The comparative precedents demonstrate workability. What India's democratic system requires now is the institutional will to act before the gap generates harms to voter safety, to democratic integrity, and to the constitutional order that Puttaswamy established that are irreversible.

Sources:

Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890). | Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 477 (2006). | Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 1609 (1999). | Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1814 (2011). | Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1934 (2013). | Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, and the Integrity of Social Life (Stanford University Press 2010). | Gautam Bhatia, The Transformative Constitution: A Radical Biography in Nine Acts (Harper Collins India 2019). | Anup Surendranath, Privacy and the Constitution: The Transformative Potential of Puttaswamy, 30 Nat'l L. Sch. India Rev. 1 (2019). | Sayantan Chanda, Data Privacy and Elections in India: Microtargeting the Unseen Collective, 9 Indian J.L. & Tech. 1 (2022). |

Vrinda Bhandari & Faiza Rahman, The Aadhaar Judgment and the Future of Privacy in India, 7 Indian L. Rev. 1 (2019). | Richard Briffault, The Contested Right to Vote, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 1506 (2002). | Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1605 (1999). | Vikram David Amar, Election Law and the Laws of Democracy, 65 Vand. L. Rev. 1389 (2012). | Lorna McGregor, Daragh Murray & Vivian Ng, International Human Rights Law as a Framework for Algorithmic Accountability, 68 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 309 (2019). | Cristina Blanco-Vizarreta, The Challenges of E-Voting Implementation: A Comparative Constitutional Analysis, 17 Eur. Const. L. Rev. 243 (2021). | J. Alex Halderman & J.M. Springall, Security Analysis of the Estonian Internet Voting System, in Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security 703 (ACM Press 2014). | Jack Goldsmith & Alex Loomis, Defending Democracy (Harvard Kennedy School Shorenstein Center 2021). | Colin J. Bennett & Charles D. Raab, The Governance of Privacy (2d ed., MIT Press 2006). | Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (Atheneum 1967). | Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kotz, Introduction to Comparative Law (3d ed., Clarendon Press 1998). | Information Commissioner's Office (UK), Investigation into the Use of Data Analytics in Political Campaigns: A Report to Parliament (Nov. 2018). | Venice Commission, Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, CDL-AD(2002)023rev2-cor (Council of Europe 2002, updated 2018). | Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Election Infrastructure Security Resource Guide (DHS 2021). | Global Privacy Assembly, Privacy, Voter Surveillance and Democratic Engagement (2021). | United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 25, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7 (1996).