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
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


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With this thought, we hereby present to you

# **RULES OF INTERPRETATION:** **A COMPARATIVE STUDY**

AUTHORED BY - ADITYA AGARWAL & MANEET MANGARAJ

## **ABSTRACT**

The interpretation of statutes remains one of the most vital and intellectually challenging functions of the judiciary. Every piece of legislation, however carefully drafted, is bound to encounter gaps, ambiguities, and unforeseen contexts once it meets the complexities of real life. This research paper explores the various rules of interpretation-including the Literal Rule, Golden Rule, Mischief Rule, Purposive Rule, and Rule of Harmonious Construction alongside supporting principles such as Eiusdem Generis, Noscitur a Sociis, and Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius.

Through a comparative analysis of jurisprudence from India, the United Kingdom, and the United States, this paper examines how these interpretive techniques have evolved and how they continue to shape judicial reasoning. The discussion highlights the philosophical foundations of each rule, their relationship with constitutional frameworks, and the broader consequences of interpretive choice on justice, coherence, and legislative intent.

By engaging with landmark decisions such as Heydon's Case, Grey v. Pearson, K.P. Varghese v. Income Tax Officer, Pepper v. Hart, and Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, this paper argues that interpretation is far from a mechanical or purely textual task it is an art of balancing fidelity to legislative words with fidelity to the spirit of the law. The conclusion drawn is that no single rule can serve as a universal formula; rather, a harmonious and purposive approach, grounded in context and constitutional principle, ensures justice and legislative coherence in a modern legal order.

**Keywords:** Statutory Interpretation, Judicial Discretion, Literal Rule, Purposive Approach, Legislative Intent, Comparative Analysis, Common Law Systems, Constitutionalism.

## INTRODUCTION

The act of interpreting statutes is much more than decoding words on a page, it is an exercise in understanding the law's purpose, its social setting, and the intent of those who framed it. Even the most meticulously drafted legislation cannot anticipate every factual situation or every linguistic uncertainty. When ambiguity arises, judges must step in to give meaning to the text in a way that aligns with justice, legislative intent, and constitutional values.

In doing so, courts rely on what are known as the rules of interpretation, which have developed over centuries within common law systems. These rules serve as guiding frameworks that help judges determine meaning when the law itself does not speak clearly. The Literal Rule directs judges to interpret words in their plain and ordinary sense. The Golden Rule allows slight modification when a literal interpretation would lead to absurdity. The Mischief Rule encourages courts to look back at the "mischief" or defect that the statute intended to remedy. The Purposive Rule, a more modern development, urges judges to interpret statutes in line with their broader purpose and societal objectives. Finally, the Rule of Harmonious Construction helps reconcile conflicts between different provisions of the same statute.

Alongside these major rules, auxiliary principles such as *Ejusdem Generis*, *Noscitur a Sociis*, and *Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius* assist in clarifying meaning through context and association. Together, these doctrines represent different judicial philosophies ranging from strict adherence to the text to a broader appreciation of purpose and context.

The choice of interpretive rule can drastically influence the outcome of a case. In *Grey v. Pearson*, the House of Lords firmly applied the literal rule, stating that words must be interpreted in their ordinary sense unless that leads to absurdity. In contrast, the celebrated *Heydon's Case* established the Mischief Rule, emphasizing that judges must look at the law's intent and remedy the defect that Parliament sought to cure. These two classic cases reflect the enduring tension between textual certainty and interpretive flexibility a tension that defines much of modern judicial reasoning.

A comparative study of these jurisdictions reveals that interpretation is not a uniform or mechanical process it is shaped by the constitutional context in which courts operate. In the UK, the emphasis lies on parliamentary sovereignty; in India, on constitutional supremacy and

judicial activism; and in the US, on separation of powers and judicial restraint. Yet, across all these systems, the core aim remains the same which is to uphold the law in both letter and spirit, ensuring justice while maintaining legislative coherence.

Interpretation, therefore, is not merely about resolving ambiguity it is about maintaining the delicate balance between legislative intent, judicial discretion, and constitutional philosophy. The interpretative process transforms statutes from static texts into living instruments of justice.

## RESEARCH GAP

Despite extensive judicial and academic discussion about statutory interpretation, significant gaps remain in understanding how interpretative choices shape the justice system across jurisdictions. Much of the scholarship focuses on defining the various interpretive rules the Literal, Golden, Mischief, and Purposive Rules but comparatively fewer studies analyse how the same statutory text can lead to different outcomes depending on which interpretive rule is applied in different legal systems.

In India, for instance, constitutional courts often invoke the Purposive or Harmonious Construction Rule to protect fundamental rights and uphold constitutional morality, even where the text appears rigid. By contrast, in the United Kingdom, where parliamentary sovereignty forms the backbone of constitutional order, courts traditionally favoured a Literal or Golden approach to ensure fidelity to legislative language. Meanwhile, the United States judiciary has witnessed a long-standing tension between textualism championed by Justice Scalia and purposivism, reflected in cases like *Church of the Holy Trinity* and *Chevron*.

Existing research tends to treat these methods as isolated doctrines, without sufficiently examining their comparative implications. There is also limited exploration of how judicial philosophy, constitutional structure, and political context affect the selection of interpretive rules. For example, Indian courts often prioritize social justice and equity considerations, while British courts generally emphasize institutional restraint and legislative supremacy. The impact of these interpretive preferences on legislative intent, judicial innovation, and legal certainty remains underexplored.

Moreover, with the growing complexity of modern legislation particularly in fields like

environmental regulation, taxation, and digital governance the boundaries between interpretive rules have blurred. Courts increasingly adopt contextual and purposive interpretations that combine elements of multiple doctrines. This evolving interpretive landscape demands fresh scholarly engagement to assess whether traditional rules still serve their original function or whether a context-sensitive, hybrid approach better promotes justice and coherence in the twenty-first century.

## RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

This study aims to provide a comprehensive and comparative analysis of the principal rules of statutory interpretation within common-law systems. It seeks not only to explain each rule in theory but also to demonstrate their practical application and impact on judicial reasoning.

The specific objectives of this research are:

- To define and critically analyze the major rules of statutory interpretation-Literal, Golden, Mischief, Purposive, and Harmonious Construction-and the associated interpretive principles of Eiusdem Generis, Noscitur a Sociis, and Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius.
- To illustrate how each interpretive rule functions in practice through landmark judicial precedents from India, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
- To evaluate the influence of interpretive choice on legislative intent, judicial discretion, and constitutional balance.
- To identify the strengths and limitations of each rule in achieving justice, certainty, and coherence in statutory construction.
- To determine whether a blended or purposive-harmonious approach offers a more effective interpretive framework for modern, complex legislation.
- By pursuing these objectives, the paper aspires to highlight that interpretation is not an end in itself it is a method by which courts breathe life into legislative words, ensuring that statutes remain relevant, just, and constitutionally sound.

## RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Guided by the above objectives, the following core research questions shape this study:

- How do different rules of statutory interpretation influence the meaning and legal effect of the same statutory provision?

- What factors constitutional, philosophical, or contextual guide judicial preference for one interpretive rule over another in India, the United Kingdom, and the United States?
- To what extent does interpretive choice affect legislative intent, justice delivery, and legal predictability?
- Can a balanced or hybrid approach combining elements of purposive and harmonious interpretation enhance consistency and fairness in statutory interpretation?

In essence, this research asks whether courts can and should transcend rigid interpretive categories to adopt an approach that is contextually sensitive, constitutionally faithful, and socially responsive.

## ANALYSIS

### 1. Literal Rule

The Literal Rule is often regarded as the starting point of statutory interpretation. It requires that words used in a statute be understood in their ordinary, natural, and grammatical sense, without inferring any external intention unless the meaning is ambiguous. The logic behind this rule is straightforward: the legislature expresses its will through words, and the judiciary must not rewrite or reinterpret that will.

In India, the literal approach is not absolute. The Supreme Court has consistently held that while words must generally be given their plain meaning, interpretation must also consider the context, purpose, and legislative intent. In *State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh*, the Court observed that "the first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislature must be found in the words used by it, giving them their plain, grammatical meaning unless such interpretation leads to an absurd result." Similarly, in *M. Pentiah v. Muddala Veeramallappa*, the Court emphasized that where two interpretations are possible, one leading to an unjust or unconstitutional outcome must be avoided."

In the United States, literal interpretation has been prominently used by textualist judges, such as Justice Scalia, who argued that judicial restraint requires adherence to statutory language, regardless of external considerations. In *Lamie v. United States Trustee*, the Supreme Court held that the omission of a few words from a bankruptcy statute could not be corrected by the Court, even if it appeared to be a drafting error, because "it is beyond our province to rescue Congress from its drafting errors." This illustrates a strict textualist commitment like the

traditional British model.

The strength of the literal rule lies in its predictability and legislative respect. It ensures that judges do not stray beyond the boundaries set by Parliament or Congress. Yet, its weakness is equally apparent rigid adherence to words can sometimes defeat the very purpose of the statute. As language is inherently limited, statutes drafted in one era often fail to anticipate future circumstances. When applied inflexibly, literalism risks producing outcomes that are legally correct but morally or socially unjust.

## 2. Golden Rule

The golden rule is a bit advanced than the literal rule. It permits judges to deviate from a strict literal reading as at instances, literal rule makes the statute ridiculous, inconsistent, or repugnant. The Golden Rule essentially aims to prevent results that Parliament could never have intended while maintaining legislative purpose.

Golden Rule has been applied to uphold constitutional harmony. In *Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh*, the Supreme Court applied the rule to avoid a literal reading that would have made a statutory provision unworkable. Similarly, in *Nasiruddin v. Sitaram Agarwal*, the Court held that while literal meaning is generally preferred, it must yield where it leads to irrational or unjust consequences. This demonstrates the Indian judiciary's tendency to blend literal and purposive reasoning, often guided by the overarching principles of justice and equity enshrined in the Constitution.

In the United States, although the term "Golden Rule" is seldom used, similar reasoning can be seen in cases where the Supreme Court avoids literal readings to prevent unjust outcomes. In *United States v. Kirby*, the Court refused to interpret a statute literally to convict a sheriff for arresting a mail carrier under a warrant, reasoning that "all laws should receive a sensible construction" and that Congress could not have intended to punish lawful conduct". This pragmatic flexibility shows that even textualist systems acknowledge the need for reasonableness in interpretation.

Thus, the Golden Rule represents a judicial middle ground it respects the words of the statute but tempers their application with common sense. It allows courts to correct unintended absurdities without rewriting the law, ensuring that justice and logic coexist within statutory

construction.

### 3. Mischief Rule

The Mischief Rule, also known as the Rule in Heydon's Case, represents one of the earliest purposive approaches in English law. It directs judges to consider four key aspects:

- What the law was before the statute was enacted;
- What "mischief" or defect the previous law failed to address;
- What remedy the Parliament intended to provide; and
- The true reason for the remedy".

The primary objective of this rule is to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy, ensuring that the law fulfils its intended social purpose. This rule marked a clear departure from rigid literalism by allowing judges to look beyond the text and examine the historical context and purpose of the legislation.

In *Smith v. Hughes*, a landmark English case, prostitutes were charged under the Street Offences Act 1959 for soliciting from balconies rather than streets. Although the literal meaning of the Act did not cover such conduct, the Court held that the statute's purpose was to curb public solicitation, and thus the accused were rightly convicted. This case perfectly illustrates the flexibility of the Mischief Rule in adapting law to changing circumstances.

Indian courts have embraced the Mischief Rule with enthusiasm, particularly in cases concerning social welfare and constitutional interpretation. In *Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar*, the Supreme Court applied the rule to interpret Article 286 of the Constitution, emphasizing that the Court must consider the mischief sought to be remedied by constitutional limitations on taxation. Likewise, in *Kanailal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhu Khan*, the Court reiterated that the judge's duty is "to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. "is

In the United States, a similar purposive approach was seen in *Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States*, where the Supreme Court refused to apply a statute prohibiting the import of foreign labourers to a church that had hired an English pastor. The Court held that although the statute's language covered the act, its spirit and purpose did not, and thus the church was not guilty. This case is often cited as a classic illustration of purposive reasoning over literal

adherence.

The Mischief Rule thus reflects a deeper philosophy of judicial activism, where courts interpret statutes as living instruments aimed at advancing social good. However, its broad scope also raises concerns about judicial overreach, as judges may substitute their sense of justice for the legislature's intention. Nonetheless, when applied carefully, the Mischief Rule remains one of the most effective tools for achieving substantive justice and social purpose through interpretation.

#### **4. The Purposive Rule**

The Purposive Rule represents the modern evolution of statutory interpretation. It directs judges to look beyond the mere words of a statute to discover the purpose and legislative intent. Unlike the Literal or Golden Rules, which centre on textual meaning, the purposive approach emphasizes the "spirit of the law" asking why Parliament enacted the statute, not merely how it worded it.

The foundation of the purposive approach can be traced to Lord Denning, who advocated that judges should not be "mechanical tools" but "constructive participants" in giving effect to Parliament's true will". This shift in philosophy gained prominence in *Pepper v. Hart*, where the House of Lords allowed the use of parliamentary debates (Hansard) to ascertain legislative intent marking a clear departure from the strict literalism of earlier jurisprudence.

In India, the purposive approach is deeply intertwined with constitutional interpretation. The Supreme Court, in *K.P. Varghese v. Income Tax Officer*, adopted a purposive reading of Section 52 of the Income Tax Act to prevent tax evasion while protecting honest taxpayers". The Court emphasized that statutory construction must further the object of the law, not frustrate it. Similarly, in *Bangalore Water Supply v. A. Rajappa*, it interpreted the word "industry" in a wide, purposive sense to include public utility services, thus advancing labour welfare.

The purposive rule's primary strength lies in its adaptability. It allows law to evolve with society, ensuring justice in changing social, technological, and moral contexts. However, it also invites criticism for judicial overreach, as broad purposive readings may lead judges to substitute their own policy preferences for legislative intent. Nevertheless, most modern courts

agree that purposive interpretation is indispensable in a constitutional democracy where statutes are not ends in themselves but instruments of justice.

### **5. The Rule of Harmonious Construction**

The Rule of Harmonious Construction is grounded in the belief that statutes must be read as a coherent whole. When two provisions of a law appear to conflict, courts should interpret them in a way that gives effect to both, rather than rendering one redundant. This principle reflects the presumption that the legislature does not enact contradictory provisions.

The Rule of Harmonious Construction embodies the constitutional philosophy of balance between rights and duties, freedom and order, and judicial restraint and creativity. It reinforces the idea that interpretation must strive for unity and coherence, rather than contradiction or exclusion.

### **6. Ejusdem Generis**

A contextual construction concept is the Ejusdem Generis Rule, which means "of the same kind or nature." It is applicable when general terms come after a list of specific terms; in these situations, the general terms are understood to encompass only items belonging to the same class as the specified terms.

In *Powell v. Kempton Park Racecourse Co.*, the House of Lords held that the term "other place" in a list referring to "house, office, room, or other place" meant only indoor places, excluding outdoor areas<sup>21</sup>. Indian courts have followed the same reasoning; in *Amar Chandra Chakraborty v. Collector of Excise*, the Supreme Court applied ejusdem generis to limit the general expression "other intoxicating substances" to those similar in nature to alcohol.

The rule, however, is not mechanically applied. It presupposes that the specific words form a recognizable category, and that the legislative intent indicates such limitation. In the absence of a clear category, the rule does not operate. In the U.S., this doctrine appears under the "noscitur a sociis" and "associated words" canons of interpretation, serving a similar purpose of restricting overbroad interpretation".

### **7. Noscitur a Sociis**

The Latin maxim "noscitur a sociis" translates to "a word is known by the company it keeps."

This principle emphasizes that the meaning of ambiguous or general words should be derived from the context of the surrounding words.

The doctrine promotes semantic harmony and contextual consistency. By interpreting words in their relational setting, courts ensure that statutory meaning aligns with legislative intent and avoids overextension. However, excessive reliance on context may risk diluting the clarity of explicit language, especially when the statutory scheme is already unambiguous.

#### **8. Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius,**

"Expressio unius est exclusio alterius" states that when one thing is mentioned explicitly, another is implied to be excluded. It is predicated on the idea that when the legislature enumerates some items, it purposefully leaves out others.

In *Tempest v. Kilner*, the English court held that a statute referring to "goods, wares, and merchandise" did not apply to "stocks and shares," as these were not included in the express enumeration". Indian courts have also used this maxim in cases like *Hiralal Rattanlal v. State of Uttar Pradesh*, where the Supreme Court held that when certain categories are expressly included in tax law, others must be deemed excluded.

In the United States, this canon is often invoked to prevent judicial additions to a statute. In *Expressio Unius* reasoning, the Court in *Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entertainment Inc.* observed that the explicit authorization of copyright enforcement to "legal or beneficial owners" implied the exclusion of others. <sup>26</sup>

While this principle supports legislative precision and textual clarity, courts apply it cautiously. As Justice Holmes once remarked, "It is one of the weakest of all the canons of construction," because omission may not always signify exclusion". Thus, while the maxim ensures discipline in interpretation, it must yield where it conflicts with legislative purpose or equity.

### **COMPARATIVE DISCUSSION**

A comparative study of statutory interpretation reveals that the philosophy and methodology of interpretation are deeply shaped by each jurisdiction's constitutional framework and judicial culture. While the principles of the Literal, Golden, Mischief, and Purposive Rules are shared across the common law world, their application varies significantly between India, the United

Kingdom, and the United States.

### **1. The United Kingdom: Deference to Parliamentary Sovereignty**

The British legal system has historically been rooted in the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, which dictates that courts must respect and apply Parliament's expressed will. Consequently, British judges traditionally preferred the Literal and Golden Rules, which preserve textual fidelity and minimize judicial intrusion. The classic articulation of this philosophy is found in *R v. Judge of the City of London Court*, where Lord Esher declared that courts must follow the clear words of Parliament, even when doing so results in apparent absurdity.

However, as statutory complexity increased, a shift toward purposive interpretation emerged, particularly in the late twentieth century. The landmark case *Pepper v. Hart* symbolized this transformation by allowing reference to parliamentary debates as an aid to interpretation, provided the legislation was ambiguous. This change reflected a recognition that absolute literalism could no longer serve modern governance. Contemporary British interpretation, therefore, seeks a measured balance between textual fidelity and purposive reasoning respecting parliamentary intent while ensuring laws remain fair and functional.

### **2. India: Harmonizing Text with Constitutional Morality**

The Indian judiciary, while inheriting British interpretive traditions, has redefined them through the prism of a written Constitution and the doctrine of constitutional supremacy. Indian courts employ a context-sensitive and purposive approach, interpreting statutes in harmony with fundamental rights and directive principles. In *K.P. Varghese v. Income Tax Officer*, the Supreme Court explicitly held that statutory interpretation must not defeat the object of the law, and that "the task of interpretation is not to discover the literal meaning of the words but the purpose behind them".

Furthermore, the Rule of Harmonious Construction has become central to Indian constitutional interpretation, ensuring coherence between competing provisions. In *Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore*, the Court reconciled religious freedom with the abolition of untouchability, demonstrating how harmonious construction preserves constitutional unity.

Indian interpretation also reflects a moral dimension: the belief that justice and equity form

part of legislative intent. Thus, in social welfare and human rights contexts, courts often invoke the Purposive and Mischief Rules to expand statutory reach. The interpretive philosophy here aligns closely with substantive justice that law must serve people, not merely its text. This approach underscores India's dynamic constitutionalism, where interpretation becomes an instrument for social transformation.

### **3. The United States: Textualism and the Spirit of the Law**

The United States offers a distinctive interpretive spectrum characterized by an ongoing tension between textualism and purposivism. Rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers, American courts have long debated the proper limits of judicial interpretation.

Modern American jurisprudence attempts to balance these competing philosophies through the Chevron doctrine, which defers to administrative agencies' reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes. This reflects an institutional compromise: courts recognize that interpretation cannot be wholly mechanical, yet they remain cautious not to usurp legislative or executive functions.

Thus, the U.S. interpretive model illustrates a pluralist approach, acknowledging that textual clarity, legislative purpose, and institutional competence must all interact in the interpretive process.

### **4. Convergence and Divergence**

Across jurisdictions, two clear trends emerge. First, there is a universal movement away from rigid literalism toward more contextual and purposive reasoning. Second, each system retains its unique equilibrium based on constitutional structure. The U.K. emphasizes parliamentary supremacy and legislative intent; India integrates moral and constitutional principles; and the U.S. balances textual precision with pragmatic purposivism.

Yet, divergence persists. British courts avoid moral reasoning beyond statutory context, while Indian courts openly invoke justice and equity as interpretive tools. American courts, though formally textualist, often reach purposive outcomes through structured doctrines like Chevron. What unites them all is the shared conviction that interpretation is not mechanical it is a judicial art guided by logic, morality, and constitutionalism.

## CONCLUSION

The study of the rules of interpretation reveals that statutory construction is far more than a technical exercise it is an essential judicial craft that bridges law and justice, text and purpose, and Parliament and the people.

Each interpretive rule contributes a distinct value to this process. The Literal Rule ensures respect for legislative supremacy; the Golden Rule prevents absurdity; the Mischief Rule promotes remedial justice; the Purposive Rule aligns law with social objectives; and the Rule of Harmonious Construction preserves constitutional coherence. The auxiliary canons *Ejusdem Generis*, *Noscitur a Sociis*, and *Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius* ensure contextual and linguistic precision.

In comparative perspective, the evolution of interpretation across India, the United Kingdom, and the United States demonstrates a gradual but definitive movement toward purposive, harmonious, and justice-oriented reasoning. While textual fidelity remains vital, courts increasingly acknowledge that language cannot capture every human contingency. The interpretive function, therefore, is to animate statutes with purpose and principle to translate legislative text into living law.

The Indian judiciary has pioneered a model of interpretation grounded in constitutional morality, ensuring that laws are read in harmony with fundamental rights and social justice. The U.K. maintains its allegiance to Parliament but now recognizes the value of context and purpose in achieving fairness. The U.S., through its balance of textualism and purposivism, reflects an enduring struggle between judicial restraint and pragmatic governance.

The enduring lesson, therefore, is that rules of interpretation are not rigid formulas but guiding philosophies. When applied judiciously and harmoniously, they ensure that the law speaks not only with the voice of Parliament but also with the conscience of justice.