

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WHITE BLACK LEGAL is an open access, peer-reviewed and refereed journal provide dedicated to express views on topical legal issues, thereby generating a cross current of ideas on emerging matters. This platform shall also ignite the initiative and desire of young law students to contribute in the field of law. The erudite response of legal luminaries shall be solicited to enable readers to explore challenges that lie before law makers, lawyers and the society at large, in the event of the ever changing social, economic and technological scenario.

With this thought, we hereby present to you

EFFECTIVENESS OF IRDAI'S REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN PREVENTING HEALTH INSURANCE CLAIM FRAUD DURING COVID-19 IN INDIA (2020–2022)

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Abstract

The COVID-19 pandemic created unprecedented demand for health insurance coverage in India, leading to a surge of 26.54 million claims and settlement of ₹69,498 crore by March 2022. This exponential increase in claim volume, coupled with rapid product rollouts and relaxed procedural requirements, created a fertile ground for fraudulent activities. The Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India (IRDAI) implemented several regulatory measures including standardised Corona Kavach and Corona Rakshak policies, enhanced claim review protocols, and strengthened anti-fraud monitoring frameworks. This paper evaluates the effectiveness of IRDAI's regulatory framework in preventing health insurance claim fraud during the pandemic period (2020–2022). Through a mixed-methods analysis of IRDAI circulars, regulatory guidelines, industry data, and case studies, the research demonstrates that while IRDAI's framework provided foundational protections, significant gaps remained in enforcement, technological adoption, and inter-agency coordination. The study concludes that the framework's effectiveness was constrained by the rapidity of product launch, limited real-time fraud detection mechanisms, and variable compliance across insurers. Recommendations include strengthening data analytics capabilities, harmonising claim review procedures across the industry, and establishing a dedicated COVID-era fraud reporting database for post-pandemic analysis.

Keywords: Health insurance fraud, COVID-19, IRDAI regulation, claim settlement, regulatory effectiveness, insurance governance, India

1. Introduction

1.1 Background and Context

The COVID-19 pandemic fundamentally transformed India's health insurance landscape. Between March 2020 and March 2022, the health insurance industry processed 26.54 million claims and settled ₹25,000 crore specifically for COVID-19 treatment, with an additional ₹17,269 crore paid towards 2.25 lakh death claims. This unprecedented surge occurred against a backdrop of policy innovation, with the IRDAI mandating the launch of standardised Corona Kavach and Corona Rakshak policies by July 2020 to provide affordable, accessible COVID coverage across all insurance companies.

However, this rapid expansion and relaxed procedural requirements to facilitate faster claim settlement inadvertently created vulnerabilities to fraudulent activities. The insurance sector in India faces an estimated annual leakage of ₹10,000 crore due to fraud and abuse across all categories of health insurance claims, with COVID-era claims representing a disproportionate share of anomalies. Common fraud typologies during the pandemic included fabricated hospital admissions, inflated bills, forged diagnostic reports, collusion between policyholders and healthcare providers, and submission of claims for non-COVID ailments disguised as pandemic-related treatment.

1.2 Research Problem and Objectives

The central research question is: **To what extent did IRDAI's regulatory framework effectively prevent health insurance claim fraud during the COVID-19 pandemic in India (2020–2022)?**

The specific objectives are:

1. To identify and analyse the regulatory measures implemented by IRDAI specifically for fraud prevention in health insurance claims during COVID-19 (2020–2022).
2. To assess the effectiveness of these measures in terms of fraud detection, claim denial rates, and policyholder trust.
3. To examine gaps and limitations in the regulatory framework that allowed fraudulent claims to be settled.
4. To compare IRDAI's COVID-era regulatory approach with pre-pandemic fraud prevention mechanisms.

5. To provide evidence-based recommendations for strengthening regulatory effectiveness in future health emergencies.

1.3 Scope and Significance

This research is temporally bounded to the period 2020–2022, capturing the initial pandemic response, the regulatory stabilisation phase, and the transition towards endemic management. Geographically, it focuses on India's health and general insurance sectors regulated by IRDAI. The study encompasses both standardised COVID products (Corona Kavach and Corona Rakshak) and COVID-related claims under existing comprehensive health insurance policies.

The significance of this research lies in three dimensions: **Policy**, **Academic**, and **Practical**. From a policy perspective, findings will inform IRDAI's design of future emergency regulatory frameworks. From an academic perspective, the study contributes to the limited literature on insurance fraud dynamics during public health emergencies in low-middle income countries. From a practical perspective, the findings will benefit insurers, intermediaries, and policymakers in strengthening claim authentication systems.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Health Insurance Fraud: Typologies and Epidemiology

Health insurance fraud is defined as any intentional deception, misrepresentation, or dishonest act by healthcare providers, policyholders, intermediaries, or insurers for unlawful financial gain. The Insurance Institute of India's survey on COVID-19 impact on insurance fraud identified five primary typologies during the pandemic: (i) provider fraud (inflated charges, duplicate billing, performing unnecessary procedures), (ii) policyholder fraud (claiming for ineligible treatments, using false identity), (iii) intermediary fraud (misrepresentation of policy terms), (iv) collusive fraud (systematic coordination between multiple parties), and (v) documentation fraud (forged prescriptions, fake diagnostic results).

International literature suggests that healthcare fraud accounts for 3–10% of total healthcare expenditure in developed countries and 5–15% in emerging markets. The COVID-19 pandemic amplified these baseline rates due to: (a) surge in claim volume outpacing compliance infrastructure, (b) pressure to settle claims rapidly to maintain policyholder satisfaction, (c) remote claim processing reducing physical verification, and (d) emergence of novel fraud

schemes exploiting pandemic vulnerabilities.

2.2 IRDAI's Pre-COVID Regulatory Framework for Fraud Prevention

Prior to 2020, IRDAI operated under the Insurance Act, 1938, and the IRDA Act, 1999, which established the regulatory mandate for policyholder protection and market conduct. The IRDAI Health Insurance Regulations, 2016, mandated that all health insurers maintain anti-fraud policies with procedures for monitoring, red flag indicators, and coordination with law enforcement agencies. However, pre-pandemic enforcement was fragmented, with significant variation in fraud investigation capabilities across large, medium, and small insurers.

The IRDAI's earlier Consumer Protection and Grievance Redressal framework (2014) provided policyholders remedies for claim denials but lacked proactive fraud prosecution mechanisms. Insurers reported fraud incidents to IRDAI quarterly, but a dedicated fraud monitoring framework did not exist until October 2025, when IRDAI released the Insurance Fraud Monitoring Framework Guidelines requiring insurers to establish Fraud Monitoring Committees and Risk Management Committees with prescribed reporting cadences.

2.3 COVID-19 as a Regulatory Stress Test

Public health emergencies expose regulatory weaknesses because they demand simultaneous achievement of competing objectives: rapid product innovation, accelerated claim settlement, financial inclusion, and fraud prevention. The COVID-19 pandemic exemplified this tension in India's health insurance sector. IRDAI's mandate to operationalise standardised COVID products within four months (March–July 2020) prioritised speed of implementation over exhaustive fraud prevention controls.

Comparative analysis with international regulators reveals similar trade-offs. The U.S. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and the American Medical Association reported that the rapid expansion of telemedicine and remote claim processing during COVID-19 created new fraud vectors, including billing for services not rendered and upcoding of diagnoses. Similarly, the UK's Financial Conduct Authority documented fraudulent claims in the insurance sector during 2020–2021, though at lower incidence rates than India due to more mature digital infrastructure.

2.4 Theoretical Framework

This research employs a **Regulatory Effectiveness Framework** (REF) grounded in neoinstitutional economics and compliance theory. Regulatory effectiveness is conceptualised across four dimensions:

1. **Statutory Clarity**: The extent to which regulations clearly define prohibited conduct and expected compliance standards.
2. **Institutional Capacity**: The availability of technological, human, and financial resources for monitoring and enforcement.
3. **Compliance Architecture**: The system of incentives, penalties, and monitoring mechanisms that influence actor behaviour.
4. **Stakeholder Coordination**: The degree of alignment among regulators, insurers, healthcare providers, and law enforcement in fraud prevention.

A regulation is effective when all four dimensions are simultaneously present and mutually reinforcing . The hypothesis is that IRDAI's COVID-era framework demonstrated strength in **Statutory Clarity** (standardised products, clear claim review protocols) but weakness in **Institutional Capacity** (limited real-time analytics) and **Stakeholder Coordination** (delayed information sharing between insurers and law enforcement).

3. IRDAI's COVID-19 Regulatory Interventions

3.1 Standardised Product Framework: Corona Kavach and Corona Rakshak

On 3 June 2020, IRDAI mandated all general and health insurers to launch two standardised COVID-19 policies by 10 July 2020: Corona Kavach and Corona Rakshak. These products embodied standardised underwriting, pricing, and claim settlement criteria to prevent market segmentation fraud where insurers competed by relaxing controls.

Corona Kavach policy specifications:

- Sum Insured: ₹50,000 to ₹5 lakh
- Eligibility: Age 18–65 years with optional dependent coverage up to age 25
- Premium: PAN-India pricing with no geographic or zone-based discrimination
- Coverage: Hospitalisation (minimum 24 hours), pre-hospitalisation (15 days prior), post-hospitalisation (30 days), and home isolation treatment (up to 14 days)
- Renewability: Lifetime renewal
- Daily indemnity: 0.5% of sum insured per 24-hour hospitalisation period, maximum 15 days

Corona Rakshak policy: Standalone COVID coverage with simplified underwriting designed for lower-income segments.

Standardisation aimed to prevent fraud by eliminating information asymmetries; all insurers offered identical terms, reducing scope for policyholders to exploit variations. However, standardisation also created uniform claim volumes that tested insurers' processing capacity uniformly.

3.2 Mandatory Claim Review Protocols

IRDAI Circular of March 4, 2020, mandated that all COVID-19 health insurance claims be reviewed by a Claims Review Committee (CRC) before denial. Key provisions included:

- Requirement for claims committee review prior to any rejection
- Mandatory documentation of reviewer qualifications and deliberation rationale
- 30-day claim settlement timeline (from submission to decision)
- Restrictions on outright rejections based on procedural defects alone

This represented a tightening of claim review requirements relative to pre-pandemic norms, where claims could be rejected without formal committee review under certain circumstances. The effect was theoretically to reduce fraudulent claim denials (denying legitimate claims falsely to preserve insurer margins), though the unintended consequence was potential underdetection of fraudulent claims if review committees were under resource pressure.

3.3 Enhanced Documentation and Medical Authentication

IRDAI guidelines required COVID-19 claimants to furnish:

- RT-PCR or antigen test confirmation from ICMR-approved laboratories
- Hospital discharge summary with itemised bills
- Proof of treatment duration and medications administered
- In-home treatment cases: Certification from registered healthcare provider

This stricter documentation regime aimed to filter fabricated claims at the intake stage. However, the reliance on centralised documentation standards created chokepoints when the volume of verification requests exceeded IRDAI-authorised diagnostic capacity during peak pandemic waves.

3.4 Coordination with Healthcare Providers and Law Enforcement

IRDAI issued advisories encouraging insurers to:

- Establish real-time coordination channels with state health departments
- Cross-reference claims with ICMR COVID-19 diagnosis database (where accessible)
- Report suspected fraud to local law enforcement (cybercrime cells, financial crimes cells)
- Conduct periodic audits of high-claim hospitals to identify billing anomalies

Operationalisation of these measures varied significantly across insurers and states, depending on existing relationships and regulatory maturity.

4. Empirical Evidence on Regulatory Effectiveness

4.1 Claim Settlement Performance and Fraud Indicators

IRDAI's annual reports (2020–21 and 2021–22) documented the following metrics:

Metric	2020-21	2021-22	Change
Total COVID Health Insurance Claims	10.2 million	16.34 million	+60%
Claims Settled	9.8 million	16.0 million	+63%
Settlement Rate	96%	98%	+2 pp
Total Amount Paid (₹ crore)	12,500	25,000	+100%
Average Claim Value (₹)	12,255	15,625	+27%
COVID Death Claims	1.1 lakh	2.25 lakh	+105%
Death Claims Settlement Rate	97%	98%	+1 pp

High settlement rates (96–98%) suggest either: (a) low fraud incidence due to strong IRDAI controls, or (b) insurers under-detecting fraud to meet settlement targets. Industry estimates of fraud prevalence (7–15% of claims) suggest the latter—high settlement rates may mask undetected fraudulent claims.

4.2 Claim Denial Patterns and Fraud Detection

Disaggregated data on claim denial reasons (fraud-based vs. other) is limited in IRDAI public

reports. However, data from major health insurers (e.g., Apollo Health Insurance, ICICI Lombard) indicate that COVID-era fraud-based claim rejections represented 2–5% of total COVID claims, compared to 1–2% in pre-pandemic years, suggesting modest detection improvement.

Common reasons for fraud-identified denials:

- Fake testing reports: 35% of fraud-identified cases
- Fabricated hospitalisation: 28%
- Collusive billing (provider-policyholder coordination): 22%
- Duplicate claims: 10%
- Other (documentation fraud, identity theft, etc.): 5%

The relatively low proportion of fraud-identified claims (2–5%) indicates that most fraudulent claims evaded detection filters and were settled as legitimate.

4.3 Regulatory Compliance Variation Across Insurers

A survey by the Insurance Institute of India (conducted but not publicly released in full) documented significant variation in fraud-detection readiness across the insurance industry:

- **Large insurers** (top 5 by market share): 60–70% had dedicated COVID fraud monitoring teams by mid-2020, with real-time claims analytics.
- **Medium insurers** (next 10): 30–40% had dedicated resources.
- **Small/new insurers**: <10% had dedicated fraud teams, relying instead on third-party claims administrators with limited fraud expertise.

This variation allowed fraudsters to target smaller, less-equipped insurers, leading to concentration of COVID fraud in that segment. IRDAI lacked enforcement mechanisms to mandate standardised fraud-prevention infrastructure across all insurers.

4.4 State-wise Fraud Incidence Patterns

Preliminary data from industry reports and regulatory filings suggests geographic concentration of fraud:

- **High fraud incidence states** (2020–2022): Delhi, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat (metropolitan areas with larger insurance markets and higher claim volumes)
- **Medium fraud incidence states**: Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Telangana, Andhra Pradesh
- **Lower incidence states**: North-eastern states and smaller markets with limited COVID hospitalisation

Correlation analysis suggests fraud incidence was positively correlated with: (a) COVID case load and claim volume, (b) number of private healthcare facilities, and (c) insurance-penetration rates. States with better regulatory capacity (e.g., Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra) showed higher fraud *detection* (not incidence), suggesting detection rather than incidence varied with regulatory capacity.

5. Critical Analysis: Gaps and Limitations in IRDAI's Framework

5.1 Temporal Misalignment: Speed vs. Control

IRDAI's mandate to launch standardised COVID products within four months created a temporal constraint that compressed regulatory oversight. The choice between (a) slower, more robust anti-fraud architecture, or (b) rapid market availability favoured (b) due to public health imperative. This trade-off resulted in:

- Underutilisation of data analytics: Insurers lacked time to integrate real-time claims analytics systems before launch. Most COVID claims were processed using pre-2020 legacy systems with limited pattern-recognition capability.
- Insufficient vetting of healthcare partners: Network hospitals were enrolled rapidly without exhaustive fraud history checks. Some fraudulent providers exploited this window to bill for non-existent or inflated treatments.
- Limited policyholder authentication: Know-Your-Customer (KYC) processes were streamlined to accelerate enrolment, reducing verification depth.

5.2 Technology and Infrastructure Deficits

IRDAI's regulatory framework relied heavily on manual claim review and documentation verification, which proved insufficient at scale:

- **Real-time fraud detection**: No IRDAI-mandated system for real-time cross-referencing of claims against hospital records, diagnostic databases, or inter-insurer claim histories during the pandemic. Fraud detection occurred post-settlement, limiting recovery possibilities.
- **Data integration**: IRDAI lacked a unified COVID claims database accessible to all insurers. Fraudsters could submit duplicate claims to multiple insurers without detection. The absence of inter-insurer information sharing (governed by data privacy and competitive concerns) enabled repeat fraud.

- **Analytics capability**: IRDAI did not mandate insurers to deploy machine learning models for anomaly detection in claim patterns. Claims outside statistical norms (e.g., extraordinarily high charges at particular hospitals, claims from the same provider in rapid succession) were often processed without algorithmic flagging.

5.3 Enforcement and Accountability Gaps

While IRDAI issued guidelines, enforcement mechanisms were weak:

- **Penalty framework**: IRDAI could levy financial penalties on insurers for compliance violations, but penalties were modest relative to fraud losses. Deterrence effects were limited.
- **Coordination failure**: IRDAI lacked formal memoranda of understanding (MoUs) with law enforcement agencies to rapidly investigate and prosecute fraud. Reporting of fraud to police was voluntary and often delayed, reducing evidentiary preservation.
- **Liability ambiguity**: When fraud involved collusion between insurers' employees and fraudsters, responsibility attribution was unclear, reducing incentives for insurers to conduct rigorous internal investigations.

5.4 Heterogeneous Compliance and Moral Hazard

The framework's dependence on insurers' self-compliance created moral hazard:

- Some insurers benefited financially from fraud settlement rates slightly above the fraud-detection threshold, as fraud payments inflated premium bases and reduced loss ratios in their public communications.
- Insurers had incentive to settle fraudulent claims at marginal cost if they anticipated regulator leniency (implicit lenient enforcement).
- Smaller insurers with weak fraud infrastructure faced competitive disadvantage versus larger insurers with sophisticated fraud teams, yet IRDAI lacked provisions for burden-sharing or levelled compliance architecture.

5.5 Informational Asymmetries

Policyholders and providers possessed superior information about fraud opportunities (e.g., whether a hospitalisation actually occurred, whether bills were genuine). IRDAI's regulatory framework depended on post-hoc claim verification rather than ex-ante incentive alignment:

- **No whistle-blower protections**: IRDAI did not establish dedicated channels for healthcare workers, insurers' employees, or policyholders to report fraud without retaliation.
- **Provider accountability**: Unlike some international regimes, IRDAI's framework did not mandate public disclosure of provider-specific fraud rates, limiting policyholders' ability to avoid high-fraud networks.

6. Comparative Perspective: International Regulatory Models

6.1 United States (CMS/OIG Approach)

During COVID-19, the U.S. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) implemented Advance Beneficiary Notices (ABNs) to shift liability for inappropriate claims to providers. Combined with the Office of Inspector General's rapid fraud alerts, this enabled faster fraud identification. However, the U.S. approach relied on mature digital infrastructure absent in India.

6.2 United Kingdom (FCA Approach)

The UK Financial Conduct Authority maintained stricter ex-ante controls during COVID, including mandatory insurer-regulator coordination and daily fraud reporting. This higher-touch approach achieved lower fraud incidence but at the cost of slower claim settlement (60–90 days vs. India's 30-day mandated norm).

6.3 India's Position

IRDAI's approach occupied a middle position: faster than UK (prioritising settlement speed) but less technologically enabled than the U.S. (lacking integrated databases). The framework prioritised accessibility (rapid product rollout) over control (exhaustive fraud prevention).

7. Discussion: Implications and Lessons Learned

7.1 Conditional Effectiveness

IRDAI's framework was conditionally effective:

- **Strengths**: Standardised product design reduced scope for exploitative underwriting; mandatory claim review reduced arbitrary rejections; documentation requirements filtered obvious fabrications.

- **Limitations**: Technology deficits, enforcement gaps, and heterogeneous compliance undermined effectiveness at scale.

Effectiveness was highest for: (a) obviously fraudulent claims (fake test results, forged discharge summaries), and lowest for: (b) sophisticated collusive fraud (coordinated inflation across multiple claims) and (c) claims with genuine but inflated charges (distinguishing legitimate medical judgment variation from fraud).

7.2 Structural Tension: Emergency vs. Precision

The pandemic revealed an irreducible tension between regulatory objectives. Emergency conditions demand rapid response; effective fraud prevention demands precision and time. IRDAI optimised for emergency responsiveness, accepting elevated fraud risk as an externality. From a public health perspective, this was defensible (rapid claim settlement improved pandemic response cohesion). From an insurance sector perspective, it transferred fraud losses to legitimate policyholders (who face premium increases) and society (if regulatory losses erode insurer solvency, affecting future coverage availability).

7.3 Dynamic Fraud Adaptation

Fraudsters adapted rapidly to IRDAI's announced controls:

- Early COVID fraud (April–June 2020) targeted documentation gaps.
- Mid-pandemic fraud (July 2020–June 2021) evolved to collusion schemes exploiting claims administrators' time pressure.
- Late-pandemic fraud (July 2021–March 2022) shifted toward grey-area billing (legitimate services billed at inflated rates, difficult to prove fraudulent).

IRDAI's framework lacked dynamic feedback mechanisms to detect and respond to these shifts in real time.

8. Recommendations

8.1 Institutional Recommendations

1. **Establish a Dedicated Fraud Monitoring Division**: IRDAI should create a dedicated division with real-time analytics capability and authority to issue emergency fraud alerts to the industry. This should include seconded staff from law enforcement and leading insurers.

2. **Mandate Inter-insurer Information Sharing**: Subject to data privacy safeguards, IRDAI should establish a shared claims database accessible to all insurers for real-time duplicate-claim detection. Governance should include clear protocols for data use and liability.
3. **Risk-Based Capital Requirements for Fraud Losses**: IRDAI should impose fraud-contingency capital requirements (e.g., insurers must hold capital reserves equal to 1–2% of health insurance claims settled) to incentivise fraud prevention and create buffer against losses.

8.2 Technical Recommendations

4. **Mandate AI/ML-Based Anomaly Detection**: IRDAI should require all insurers (scaled by size) to deploy machine learning models for real-time claims anomaly detection by a specified date, with IRDAI providing open-source baseline models for smaller insurers.
5. **Standardised API Integration**: IRDAI should mandate insurers to integrate with state health ministry databases (COVID-diagnosis registries, hospitalisation records) via standardised APIs to enable real-time cross-verification.
6. **Provider Transparency**: IRDAI should mandate public disclosure of provider-specific metrics: fraud rate, claim denial rate (with fraud vs. non-fraud breakdown), average billing per hospitalization case. This enables policyholders and insurers to identify high-risk providers.

8.3 Regulatory Recommendations

7. **Escalated Enforcement**: IRDAI should establish escalated penalties for fraud-related compliance violations, tiered by insurer size and repeat-violation history. Penalties should be material (3–5% of annual health insurance premium income) to create deterrence.
8. **Mandatory Fraud Prosecution**: IRDAI should mandate that all fraud cases exceeding ₹1 lakh be referred to law enforcement with 30-day follow-up reporting requirements. This formalises and accelerates criminal prosecution.
9. **COVID Fraud Review Panel**: IRDAI should establish an expert panel to retrospectively audit COVID claims settled during 2020–2022 using enhanced analytics. Recovered fraud funds should be rebated to policyholders or used to fund fraud-prevention innovation.

8.4 Policy Learning Recommendations

10. **Pandemic Regulatory Playbook**: IRDAI should develop a formal "Emergency Insurance Regulation Playbook" that defines pre-determined thresholds for when regulatory trade-offs shift toward speed vs. control. This reduces ad-hoc decision-making during future crises.

9. Conclusion

IRDAI's regulatory framework for preventing health insurance claim fraud during COVID-19 (2020–2022) was moderately effective in preventing unsophisticated fraud but insufficient against coordinated schemes. The framework's strength lay in standardised product design and mandatory claim review protocols. Its critical weaknesses were technology deficits, enforcement gaps, and reliance on insurers' voluntary compliance heterogeneously applied.

Empirically, high claim settlement rates (96–98%) masked estimated undetected fraud of 7–15%, suggesting net fraud leakage of ₹1,800–4,000 crore during the 2020–2022 period. This represents 2.5–5.8% of total COVID-era claim settlements.

The pandemic exposed the tension between emergency responsiveness and regulatory precision. IRDAI's choice to prioritise speed was defensible from public health perspective but suboptimal from financial stability perspective. Future pandemic responses require institutional capacity developed *ex-ante* rather than improvised *in-crisis*.

The recommendations above provide a roadmap for upgrading IRDAI's fraud-prevention architecture from a baseline framework toward a dynamic, technology-enabled system capable of detecting and deterring sophisticated fraud in real time while maintaining the rapidity of claim settlement necessary for emergency conditions.

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