

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A COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL AGREEMENTS UNDER THE COMPETITION ACT, 2002

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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Historical Backdrop: From MRTP to Competition Act

The economic history of India can be distinctively categorized into the pre-1991 and post-1991 eras. For several decades following independence, India's economic framework was defined by a "Command and Control" philosophy. The primary piece of legislation governing market conduct was the *Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969* (MRTP Act). The MRTP Act was premised on the socialist ideology that the concentration of economic power in the hands of a few was inherently detrimental to the public interest.
Consequently, the law focused on curbing the size of enterprises rather than their conduct.

However, the economic liberalization of 1991 introduced global competition to Indian shores. It became evident that in a globalized market, Indian companies needed to scale up to compete effectively. The issue was not the size of the company, but whether the company used its size to distort market forces. Recognizing this paradigm shift, the Government of India appointed the High-Level Committee on Competition Policy and Law, popularly known as the **Raghavan Committee**, in 1999.

Based on the Raghavan Committee's recommendations, the MRTP Act was repealed, and the **Competition Act, 2002** (hereinafter "the Act") was enacted. The preamble of the Act explicitly shifts the focus from "curbing monopolies" to "preventing practices having an appreciable adverse effect on competition."

1.2. The Dichotomy of Agreements

At the core of the Act is **Section 3**, which prohibits anti-competitive agreements. However, the legislature displayed economic wisdom by not painting all agreements with the same brush. The Act draws a fundamental distinction between agreements entered into by competitors

(Horizontal Agreements) and agreements entered into by partners in a supply chain (Vertical Agreements). This distinction is not merely structural but forms the basis of the legal standard of proof required to penalize an enterprise.

This paper seeks to provide a comprehensive comparative analysis of these two categories, examining the statutory presumptions, the economic rationale, and the judicial trends established by the Competition Commission of India (CCI).

CHAPTER II: THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Defining "Agreement"

Before analyzing the types of agreements, one must understand the statutory definition of the term itself. **Section 2(b)** of the Act defines an "agreement" in extremely broad terms. It includes any arrangement or understanding or action in concert, whether or not such arrangement is formal or in writing, or whether or not it is intended to be enforceable by legal proceedings.[1] This definition is a departure from the *Indian Contract Act, 1872*. In competition law, a "nod and a wink" is sufficient to constitute an agreement. The CCI has consistently held that since cartels operate in secrecy, demanding direct evidence (like a signed contract) would render the Act toothless. Therefore, the standard of proof is the "preponderance of probabilities" based on circumstantial evidence.

2.2. The Litmus Test: AAEC

The unifying theme between horizontal and vertical agreements is the concept of **Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition (AAEC)**. An agreement is not void merely because it restricts freedom of trade; it is void only if it causes an AAEC within India.
Section 19(3) of the Act lists the factors the CCI must consider when determining AAEC, which include:

- Creation of barriers to new entrants in the market;
- Driving existing competitors out of the market;
- Foreclosure of competition by hindering entry into the market;
- Accrual of benefits to consumers;
- Improvements in production or distribution of goods;
- Promotion of technical, scientific, and economic development.

CHAPTER III: HORIZONTAL AGREEMENTS – THE PRESUMPTION OF GUILT

3.1. Nature and Scope

Horizontal agreements are arrangements between enterprises, groups of enterprises, or persons engaged in identical or similar trade of goods or provision of services. In simpler terms, these are agreements between competitors at the same stage of the production chain. These are governed by **Section 3(3)** of the Act.

The law views these agreements with extreme suspicion. When competitors agree on prices or quantities, they effectively cease to compete, acting instead as a collective monopoly. This results in "Deadweight Loss" to the economy—where prices rise and output falls without any efficiency gain.

3.2. Categories of Prohibited Conduct

Section 3(3) specifically identifies four types of conduct:

1. **Price Fixing:** Agreements to directly or indirectly determine purchase or sale prices.
2. **Limiting Supply:** Agreements to limit or control production, supply, markets, technical development, or investment.
3. **Market Sharing:** Agreements to share the market by geographical area, type of goods, or number of customers.
4. **Bid Rigging:** Agreements that eliminate competition in procurement processes, often leading to the government paying higher prices for public works.

3.3. The Legal Standard: "Shall Presume"

The most critical legal aspect of Section 3(3) is the burden of proof. The text of the Act states that such agreements *"shall be presumed to have an appreciable adverse effect on competition."*

This creates a rebuttable presumption. Once the CCI establishes the existence of a horizontal agreement (e.g., through email evidence or parallel pricing behavior), the burden of proofshifts to the defendants. The defendants must then prove that their agreement creates efficiencies that outweigh the anti-competitive effects. In practice, however, this presumption operates almost like a "Per Se" rule, as it is incredibly difficult to justify a hard-core cartel.

3.4. Judicial Precedent: The Cement Cartel Case

The landmark judgment regarding horizontal agreements is *Builders Association of India v. Cement Manufacturers' Association & Ors.*[2] In this case, the CCI investigated 11 major cement companies. The evidence showed that the companies met regularly under the aegis of the Cement Manufacturers' Association. Following these meetings, the prices of cement would rise simultaneously across different regions, and production dispatches would decrease despite high demand.

The CCI held that while there was no direct written agreement, the economic evidence (price parallelism plus limiting supply) pointed to a "meeting of minds." The Commission levied a massive penalty of over ₹6,000 crores, establishing that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to trigger the presumption of illegality under Section 3(3).

3.5. The Leniency Programme

Recognizing the secrecy of horizontal agreements, the Act includes Section 46, which allows for a "Leniency Programme." If a member of a cartel breaks ranks and provides full disclosure to the CCI, their penalty can be reduced by up to 100%. This game-theory approach is designed to destabilize horizontal conspiracies from within.

CHAPTER IV: VERTICAL AGREEMENTS – THE RULE OF REASON

4.1. Nature and Scope

Vertical agreements are entered into by enterprises at different stages or levels of the production chain in different markets. These are governed by **Section 3(4)** of the Act. Common examples include agreements between Manufacturers and Distributors, or Licensors and Licensees.

Unlike horizontal agreements, vertical restraints are often pro-competitive. For instance, a manufacturer might grant "exclusive territory" to a distributor to encourage them to invest in a showroom and marketing without fear of other distributors "free-riding" on their investment.

4.2. The Legal Standard: Rule of Reason

The Act does *not* presume vertical agreements to be illegal. There is no statutory presumption of AAEC. Instead, the CCI must apply the "Rule of Reason." This means the Commission must

conduct a detailed inquiry into the actual economic impact of the agreement.

The burden of proof lies on the informant or the CCI to demonstrate that the agreement causes significant market distortion. If the pro-competitive justifications (efficiency, quality control) outweigh the anti-competitive effects (foreclosure), the agreement is valid.

4.3. Types of Vertical Restraints

Section 3(4) outlines five major types of vertical restraints:

1. **Tie-in Arrangement:** Conditioning the purchase of one good on the purchase of another.
2. **Exclusive Supply Agreement:** Dealing exclusively with one seller.
3. **Exclusive Distribution Agreement:** Restricting the output or supply to specific areas.
4. **Refusal to Deal:** Restricting the persons to whom goods are sold.
5. **Resale Price Maintenance (RPM):** Dictating the minimum price at which a reseller can sell the product.

4.4. Judicial Precedent: The Hyundai Case

A pivotal case for vertical restraints is *Fx Enterprise Solutions India Pvt. Ltd. v. Hyundai Motor India Ltd.*[3] The CCI found that Hyundai had imposed a "Discount Control Mechanism" on its dealers. Dealers were penalized if they offered discounts beyond a certain limit to customers.

Hyundai argued this was necessary to ensure dealers made enough profit to provide good service. The CCI rejected this, classifying it as Resale Price Maintenance (RPM). The Commission held that by fixing the minimum price, Hyundai was preventing *intra-brand competition* (competition between Hyundai dealers). Since Hyundai had significant market power, this restriction harmed consumers by denying them lower prices.

Conversely, in *Shri Sonam Sharma v. Apple Inc.*[4], regarding the exclusive sale of iPhones through Vodafone, the CCI found no violation. The Commission reasoned that the mobile market is highly competitive with many players (Samsung, Nokia, etc.). Therefore, an exclusive vertical arrangement did not lock out competition or harm the consumer significantly.

CHAPTER V: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

The distinction between horizontal and vertical agreements is the fulcrum upon which the investigative process rests. The differences can be summarized across four key parameters:

5.1. Burden of Proof

- **Horizontal:** The burden is reversed. The accused must prove innocence. The law assumes the act is harmful.
- **Vertical:** The burden is on the accuser. The CCI must affirmatively prove that the agreement harms the market.

5.2. Motivation and Relationship

- **Horizontal:** The parties are substitutes. Their agreement is usually an attempt to extract monopoly rents.
- **Vertical:** The parties are complements. Their agreement is usually an attempt to optimize the supply chain.

5.3. Role of Market Power

- **Horizontal:** Market power is achieved collectively. Even small players can form a cartel and violate the Act.
- **Vertical:** Market power is a prerequisite. A vertical restraint is unlikely to cause AAEC unless the enterprise imposing it possesses significant market power or dominance.

5.4. Efficiency Defenses

- **Horizontal:** Efficiency is rarely accepted as a defense, except in cases of Joint Ventures (Section 3(3) proviso).
- **Vertical:** Efficiency is a central part of the analysis. If a restraint improves distribution or technology, it is likely to be upheld.

CHAPTER VI: EMERGING CHALLENGES

6.1. Hub-and-Spoke Cartels

A modern challenge is the "Hub-and-Spoke" arrangement. This occurs when a central player (Hub) organizes a conspiracy among competitors (Spokes) through vertical agreements. For example, if a supplier tells Retailer A "I will only supply you if Retailer B also raises prices,"

this looks like a vertical agreement but functions as a horizontal cartel.

In *Samir Agrawal v. CCI (Uber Case)*[5], the allegation was that the Uber algorithm acted as a hub to coordinate prices among drivers. While the Court did not find a violation in this specific instance, it highlighted the complexity of classifying such digital arrangements.

6.2. Algorithmic Collusion

With the rise of Artificial Intelligence, competitors may not even need to call each other to fix prices. Their pricing algorithms can learn to monitor and match each other's prices automatically. Current Indian law relies on a "meeting of minds" or human intent. Whether purely algorithmic coordination falls under Section 3(3) remains a gray area that future amendments may need to address.

CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION

The comparative study of horizontal and vertical agreements under the Competition Act, 2002, reveals a sophisticated legal framework that balances economic freedom with market integrity.

The legislature has rightly identified that horizontal agreements are the "supreme evil" of antitrust, warranting a presumption of illegality. They offer no value to the consumer and serve only to transfer wealth from the buyer to the conspirator. Vertical agreements, conversely, are recognized as necessary commercial tools. The "Rule of Reason" approach ensures that the CCI does not over-enforce and chill legitimate business practices.

As the Indian economy matures, the CCI's ability to distinguish between efficient vertical restraints and disguised horizontal cartels will define the efficacy of the Act. The line between the two is becoming increasingly blurred in the digital economy, and the legal frameworks must evolve to ensure that the spirit of competition is preserved.

FOOTNOTES & REFERENCES

[1] The Competition Act, 2002, § 2(b), No. 12, Acts of Parliament, 2003 (India).
[2] *Builders Association of India v. Cement Manufacturers' Association & Ors.*, Case No. 29 of 2010, Competition Commission of India (2012).
[3] *Fx Enterprise Solutions India Pvt. Ltd. v. Hyundai Motor India Ltd.*, Case No. 36 & 82 of

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[5] *Samir Agrawal v. Competition Commission of India*, Civil Appeal No. 3100 of 2020, Supreme Court of India.

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